Emmanuel Lars Brew v. DANIEL FEHDERAU, Deputy District Attorney Santa Clara County;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EMMANUEL LARS BREW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DANIEL FEHDERAU, Deputy District
Attorney Santa Clara County; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-15752
D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00681-LJO-EPG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 22, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Emmanuel Lars Brew appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(9th Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson
v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Brew’s DNA evidence claim as barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Brew’s claim amounts to a forbidden “de
facto” appeal of prior state court orders or is “inextricably intertwined” with those
orders. Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-79, 781-83 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-
Feldman doctrine deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear direct and
“de facto” appeals from state courts, as well as claims that are “inextricably
intertwined” with state court orders challenged in de facto appeals).
Dismissal of Brew’s claim challenging the denial of good-time credits was
proper because Brew failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings
are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient
to state a plausible claim for relief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brew leave to file a
second amended complaint because further amendment would be futile. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to
amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
We reject as without merit Brew’s contention that the magistrate judge

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lacked authority to issue findings and recommendations to dismiss the first
amended complaint for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) &
(C).
We do not consider matters not distinctly raised and argued in the opening
brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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