Norman Douglas Diamond v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DOES, Unknown Employees of the United States

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NORMAN DOUGLAS DIAMOND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DOES,
Unknown Employees of the United States,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-55376
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-06327-ODW-
PJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2019**
Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Norman Douglas Diamond, a resident of Japan, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his action seeking tax refunds and damages
arising from various interactions with defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of res judicata.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Diamond’s claims for unauthorized
disclosure as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Diamond litigated these
claims in a prior action that resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Tahoe–
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077
(9th Cir. 2003) (requirements for res judicata).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Diamond’s motion
to transfer venue as to nonresident Diamond’s internal revenue tax claims because
venue was not proper in any district court. See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc.,
211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) (standard of review); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1402(a)(1) (providing that any action filed in district court against the United
States “may be prosecuted only . . . in the judicial district where the plaintiff
resides”). To the extent that Diamond alleged damages claims arising from
defendants’ acts or omissions in the District of Columbia, denial of Diamond’s
request to transfer venue was not an abuse of discretion because Diamond failed to
show why it was in the interest of justice to transfer rather than dismiss without
prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is
filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in

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the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could
have been brought.”).
AFFIRMED.

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