Deborah A. Johnson v. General Electric Company; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEBORAH A. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY;
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-35581
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05397-RBL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2019**
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY,***
District Judge.
Deborah A. Johnson challenges the district court’s refusal to order the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 21 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) as the administrator of General
Electric Company’s (“GE”) disability-insurance plan (the “Plan”) to pay her
additional long-term disability benefits. The facts are known to the parties, so we do
not repeat them here.
First, Johnson claims that MetLife miscalculated the benefits owed to her
under the Plan. We disagree. The Plan bases Johnson’s benefits on her “normal-
straight time annual earnings” (“NSTAE”). Under the Plan’s terms, Johnson’s
NSTAE includes the amount she was “earning as salary,” unless GE’s Pension
Board “provide[s]” that it also includes “commissions,” “other variable
compensation,” or “special or supplemental payments.” MetLife calculated
Johnson’s disability benefits based on an annual salary of $219,300, and Johnson’s
payroll records corroborate that her salary was in fact $219,300. Johnson offers no
evidence that the Pension Board determined that her NSTAE should include other
compensation. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that Johnson
failed to prove her claim for benefits.
Second, Johnson argues that the district court erred by admitting extrinsic
evidence—specifically, the declarations of GE and MetLife employees. We
disagree. Such extrinsic evidence was “necessary to conduct an adequate de novo
review of the benefit decision,” Opeta v. Nw. Airlines Pension Plan for Contract
Emps., 484 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis and internal quotation marks

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omitted), because it rebuts Johnson’s claim that her salary was $350,446 per year
instead of $219,300. Without such evidence, the administrative record reflects only
competing assertions from the parties about Johnson’s earnings in the year before
her disability. Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting such evidence.
Finally, Johnson argues that GE and MetLife failed to comply with certain
procedural requirements in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”). 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. We need not reach these arguments, however,
because they cannot affect this case’s outcome. Johnson’s sole cause of action is 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which authorizes her “to recover benefits,” “to enforce [her]
rights,” or “to clarify [her] rights to future benefits” under the Plan’s terms. See also
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 435–38 (2011). Here, the district court
conducted a de novo review of MetLife’s calculations and concluded that Johnson’s
benefits were correctly determined. We agree, and therefore Johnson is not entitled
to any further relief.
AFFIRMED.

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