Amalia Bryant v. MOLLY HILL, Acting Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMALIA BRYANT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
MOLLY HILL, Acting Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 17-56891
D.C. No.
5:15-cv-01217-CAS-JCG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Amalia Bryant appeals from the district court’s
denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging her conviction
for second degree murder. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.
As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 12 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas petition. Rowland v.
Chappell, 876 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2017). Our review is governed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Under AEDPA, when a state court has decided a claim on the merits, we
may grant relief only if the adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is “highly deferential” and “difficult to meet.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 105 (2011) (citation omitted). “Section
2254(d) applies even where,” as here, “there has been a summary denial” by the
state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 187 (2011).
Bryant argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury
instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. However,
in rejecting Bryant’s similar claim on direct appeal that the trial court should have
sua sponte instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter, the California Court of
Appeal determined that an involuntary manslaughter instruction was not
warranted, as a matter of state law, because the evidence reflected that Bryant
committed at least felony assault with a deadly weapon. See People v. Bryant, 129
Cal. Rptr. 3d 808, 819-22 (Ct. App. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 301 P.3d 1136

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(Cal. 2013); see also People v. Bryant, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496, 499 n.4 (Ct. App.
2013). We are bound by this legal interpretation of California law. See Bradshaw
v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam) (“We have repeatedly held that a
state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal
of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”).
Given the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the evidence did
not legally support involuntary manslaughter under any theory, Bryant cannot
show that her trial counsel was deficient or that she was prejudiced by the failure to
request an involuntary manslaughter instruction. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (providing the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “trial
counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection”).
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Bryant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
AFFIRMED.

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