United States of America v. Darryl Burton

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DARRYL BURTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-10143
D.C. No. 1:85-cr-00205-LJO-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2019**
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Darryl Burton appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
motions challenging his 25-year term of special parole. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Burton first contends that he is entitled to relief under Federal Rule of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 13 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Criminal Procedure 35(a) (1984) because his special parole term is illegal. We
disagree. The term does not exceed the penalty authorized by the applicable
statute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1984) (establishing a minimum term of
special parole, but no maximum term), and is not otherwise illegal on its face, see
United States v. Montalvo, 581 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009) (illegality
warranting relief under Rule 35(a) “must be apparent in the terms of the sentence
itself” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To the extent Burton’s Rule 35 motion
“challenge[s] the process by which the sentence was imposed, not the terms of the
sentence,” Montalvo, 581 F.3d at 1153, it is time-barred because Burton did not
bring the challenge within 120 days of his judgment of conviction becoming final.
See id.
Burton also contends that the district court should have exercised its
discretion to reduce his 25-year special parole term under a doctrine deriving from
United States v. Holloway, 68 F. Supp. 3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). However, as the
district court noted, the Holloway doctrine has not been adopted in this Circuit.
Moreover, we agree with the district court that the instant case is factually
distinguishable from Holloway.
In light of this disposition, we do not reach the parties’ remaining
arguments. The government’s motion to take judicial notice is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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