Alberto Pineda Melgar v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALBERTO PINEDA MELGAR,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 18-72653
Agency No. A200-116-746
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an
Order of the Immigration Judge
Submitted September 18, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Alberto Pineda Melgar, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for
review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a)
that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Honduras, and is
thus not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. We have jurisdiction
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 25 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the IJ’s factual
findings, Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016), and we
deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Pineda Melgar
failed to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution in Honduras on account
of a protected ground. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011)
(even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must
still show that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such
group” (emphasis in original)); Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2001) (harm based on personal retribution is not persecution on account of a
protected ground).
Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Pineda Melgar
failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or
acquiescence of the government if returned to Honduras. See Andrade-Garcia,
828 F.3d at 836 (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to
investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.”).
Finally, we do not consider the materials referenced in Pineda Melgar’s
opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79

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F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (court’s review is limited to the
administrative record).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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