United States of America v. Deauntre Montgomery

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DEAUNTRE MONTGOMERY,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-10217
D.C. No.
3:17-cr-00095-WHA-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 22, 2019
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Deauntre Montgomery appeals his conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon and,
specifically, the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress a handgun
discovered during a stop and frisk. We affirm.
FILED
OCT 24 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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We review reasonable suspicion determinations de novo and the findings of
historical facts underlying that determination for clear error. United States v.
Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted). In
doing so, we afford “due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident
judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Defendant concedes that the officers had reasonable suspicion that he had
engaged in criminal activity, justifying his initial detention under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). He challenges only whether the officers established
reasonable suspicion for the subsequent frisk. We assess the reasonableness of a
Terry frisk under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
Here, the district court identified a number of factors supporting the frisk,
the most important of which was the two officers’ testimony that the defendant’s
hand and arm movements led them to independently and simultaneously suspect
that the defendant was concealing contraband or a weapon. The district court
credited their testimony, noting that the differences in their descriptions of the
defendant’s actions did not make their testimony unreliable. Rather, the court
credited the officers’ independent and simultaneous conclusions that the movement
they saw appeared suspicious and indicated concealment of a weapon or
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contraband in the defendant’s waistband. This factor, coupled with the other
factors cited by the district court, justified its conclusion that there was reasonable
suspicion for the frisk under the totality of the circumstances. Given the record
and the deference we owe to the inferences drawn by the district court and the on-
scene officers, see Vales-Vegas, 738 F.3d at 1077, there was no reversible error in
the district court’s decision to deny the suppression motion.
AFFIRMED.
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