George A. Saba; Nabeel Slaieh v. Mark D. Houle, individually and as U.S. Bankruptcy Judge;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE A. SABA; NABEEL SLAIEH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MARK D. HOULE, individually and as U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-56827
D.C. No.
5:17-cv-01389-JVS-SP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2019**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
George A. Saba and Nabeel Slaieh, proceeding pro se, appeal the district
court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, and 1985 and state law. These claims stem from Slaieh’s Chapter 7
bankruptcy case, where Saba was Slaieh’s counsel. We have jurisdiction under 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 20 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s dismissal de novo. Leeson v.
Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2012) (lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916,
922 (9th Cir. 2004) (absolute immunity). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the claims against Judge Houle as
barred by absolute immunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (barring injunctive relief
against judicial officers for their judicial conduct “unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9,
11-12 (1991) (per curiam) (judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages
based on their judicial conduct except when performing nonjudicial functions or
acting in the complete absence of jurisdiction).
The district court properly dismissed the claims against Chapter 7 Trustee
Simons and Simons’s counsel and real estate broker as barred by the Barton
doctrine. See Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 129 (1991); Beck v. Fort James
Corp. (In re Crown Vantage, Inc.), 421 F.3d 963, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2005) (the
Barton doctrine requires “that a party must first obtain leave of the bankruptcy
court before it initiates an action in another forum against a bankruptcy trustee or
other officer appointed by the bankruptcy court for acts done in the officer’s
official capacity;” without such leave, “the other forum lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit”). Moreover, because Saba has not alleged that these

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defendants caused him injury, he lacks standing to bring any claims against them.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (explaining the
constitutional requirements of standing).
AFFIRMED.

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