John Lucas v. Donny Youngblood;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN LUCAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DONNY YOUNGBLOOD; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-17420
D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00654-DAD-JLT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2019**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
John Lucas appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 26 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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The district court properly dismissed Lucas’s action because Lucas failed to
allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino,
464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (18 U.S.C. § 242 is a “criminal statute[] that
do[es] not give rise to civil liability”); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646,
653 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Neither a municipality nor a supervisor . . . can be held liable
under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation has occurred.”); Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (elements of an
equal protection “class of one” claim); Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183,
1189 (9th Cir. 1999) (the California Penal Code “sections do not create enforceable
individual rights”); see also Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings
are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Lucas’s first
amended complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been
futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court may
dismiss without leave to amend when amendment would be futile).
Contrary to Lucas’s contention, the district court did not grant defendants’
motion for a protective order.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See
United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not
presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
AFFIRMED.

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