In re: LAUREL BELKIN GREENSTEIN v. Wells Fargo Bank, Na;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: LAUREL BELKIN GREENSTEIN,
Debtor,
______________________________
LAUREL BELKIN GREENSTEIN,
Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; et al.,
Appellees.
No. 18-56232
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-08371-ODW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 11, 2019**
Before: WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Laurel Belkin Greenstein appeals pro se from the district court’s order
affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying her motion to set aside foreclosure
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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sale and dismissing related adversary proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We review de novo the district court’s decision on appeal
from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standards of review applied by the
district court. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe
Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court properly concluded that the issuance of the in rem
order did not violate Greenstein’s due process rights. See Raditch v. United States,
929 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (procedural due process requires “notice and an
opportunity to respond in some manner”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) (debtor
in a subsequent case under this title may move for relief from an in rem order
based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown). To the extent
Greenstein contends that the in rem order should be set aside because it was
improperly granted, this constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on a final
order. See In re Alakozai, 499 B.R. 698 (BAP 9th Cir. 2013) (stating that an in
rem order granting relief from stay is a final order and may not be collaterally
attacked).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on reply.
See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as without merit Greenstein’s contentions that the district court

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violated her right to privacy or otherwise acted improperly in responding to her
request for in forma pauperis status on appeal.
Appellee Wells Fargo’s request for summary affirmance, set forth in its
answering brief, is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.

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