SALVADOR ERNESTO MONTEJO, AKA Salvador Ernesto Montejo Morales v. ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SALVADOR ERNESTO MONTEJO, AKA
Salvador Ernesto Montejo Morales,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
Nos. 16-72380
19-71895
Agency No. A074-824-326
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 20, 2021**
Before: McKEOWN, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
In this consolidated case, Salvador Ernesto Montejo, a native and citizen of
El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying
his application for cancellation of removal (petition No. 16-72380) and the BIA’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 25 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 16-72380 & 19-71895
order denying his motion to reopen and terminate proceedings (petition No. 19-
71895). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of
discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen, Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d
983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010), and the denial of a motion to terminate, Dominguez v.
Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny in part and dismiss in part
petition No. 16-72380, and deny petition No. 19-71895.
As to petition No. 16-72380, Montejo does not challenge the agency’s
determination that his conviction for a crime of domestic violence renders him
ineligible for cancellation of removal. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d
1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a
party’s opening brief are waived). We lack jurisdiction to consider Montejo’s
unexhausted contentions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and voluntary
departure. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court
lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).
As to petition No. 19-71895, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying
Montejo’s motion to reopen to apply for new relief, where he had the opportunity
to apply during his proceedings before the IJ, see 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(1), and he has
failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19
I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), to support his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[b]efore

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3 16-72380 & 19-71895
making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an alien generally must comply
with procedural requirements [of] Matter of Lozada”).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Montejo’s motion to
terminate, because Montejo’s contentions that the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his
proceedings are foreclosed by Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160-62 (9th
Cir. 2019) and Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 889, 895 n.4 (9th
Cir. 2020) (notice to appear “need not contain time, date, and place information to
vest an immigration court with jurisdiction if such information is provided before
the hearing”).
As stated in the court’s October 5, 2016 and September 6, 2019 orders, the
temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION NO. 16-72380 DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
PETITION NO. 19-71895 DENIED.

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