SOCORRO ALONSO HERMOSILLO, AKA Socorro Hermosillo-Adame v. ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SOCORRO ALONSO HERMOSILLO,
AKA Socorro Hermosillo-Adame,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 19-70599
Agency No. A087-183-625
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 1, 2021**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: W. FLETCHER, MILLER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Socorro Alonso Hermosillo is a citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent
resident of the United States. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
charged Hermosillo as removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) in
FILED
FEB 4 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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connection with his misdemeanor domestic violence conviction. He appeals from
a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision discretionarily denying his
application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). We “lack[]
jurisdiction to review the merits of a discretionary decision to deny cancellation of
removal,” Szonyi v. Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 896 (9th Cir. 2019), but may consider
constitutional questions and questions of law raised in connection with petitions for
review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D).
Hermosillo first argues that his due process rights were violated because in
argument before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) the DHS attorney quoted what
appeared to be scripture to suggest that Hermosillo’s religion condoned violence.1
See Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 2010). Although use of the
quotation was inappropriate, we conclude there was no prejudice because nothing
in the record indicates that the IJ relied on the quotation in rendering his decision.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (demonstrating prejudice requires showing
“that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged
violation”). Hermosillo’s alternative argument—that under Sanchez v. Sessions,
904 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2018), he need not demonstrate prejudice—was not raised
1We note that the quote is actually from PULP FICTION (Miramax 1994), and
not the Bible.
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in his opening brief and was therefore waived. Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152,
1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in an appellant’s opening brief are
typically deemed waived.”).
Second, Hermosillo argues that the IJ erroneously applied the more stringent
standard for cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents under 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), instead of the standard for lawful permanent residents set
out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). He also alleges that the BIA failed to address this
claim on appeal. Neither argument has merit. A review of the proceedings and the
IJ’s opinion demonstrates that the IJ explicitly applied the correct standard under 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and merely attached to Hermosillo’s file a form addendum
stating the incorrect standard. The BIA expressly addressed this claim on appeal
and concluded there was no error.
Third, Hermosillo argues that the BIA erred by assigning his appeal to a
single-member rather than a three-member panel. The BIA appropriately assigned
the appeal to a single-member panel. The relevant regulation permits, but does not
require, review by a three-member panel when certain factors are present. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6) (emphasis added) (“[c]ases may only be assigned for review
by a three-member panel if the case presents one of these circumstances. . .”).
Finally, Hermosillo argues that the IJ failed to consider or weigh
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appropriately a number of factors relevant to cancellation of removal. But the
agency considered the relevant factors, including the hardship to Hermosillo and
his family, and we otherwise lack jurisdiction to review its discretionary decision
to deny cancellation of removal. Szonyi, 942 F.3d at 896–97. Accordingly, we
dismiss this part of Hermosillo’s petition for review.
The petition is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.
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