Marlene Lori Dickson v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARLENE LORI DICKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-17215
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01024-DJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 1, 2021
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: W. FLETCHER, MILLER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Claimant Marlene Dickson appeals from the district court’s decision affirming
the Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“We review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social security
benefits de novo, and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
FEB 24 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141,
1153–54 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tommasetti v.
Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not err in rejecting the assessments
of Dickson’s treating physicians, Drs. Laura Sherman and Loren Froelich. While a
treating physician’s opinion generally receives “controlling weight,” see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2), “if the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor,
the ALJ may discount the treating physician’s opinion by giving specific and
legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record,” Ford,
950 F.3d at 1154 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ALJ offered
specific and legitimate reasons to reject Dickson’s treating physicians’ opinions.
Namely, the ALJ assigned those physicians’ opinions little weight because they were
inconsistent with the medical evidence and the physicians’ own notes and this
reasoning is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Additionally, the ALJ did not err in assigning greater weight to the non-
treating physicians’ opinions. The ALJ assigned great weight to Dr. Karen
Mansfield-Blair’s opinion because it was consistent with the medical evidence and
Dickson’s daily activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). The ALJ also assigned
partial weight to the opinions of examining physicians Drs. Neil Stafford and An
Nguyen and the non-examining physician Dr. Elliot Salk because their findings of

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mild impairments were consistent with the record. Because these conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err in assessing these medical
opinions.
Finally, the ALJ did not err in discounting Dickson’s symptom testimony. If
a claimant has shown that an impairment “could reasonably be expected to produce
the pain or other symptoms alleged,” the ALJ may reject “testimony about the
severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for
doing so.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted). The ALJ concluded that Dickson’s described daily activities were
inconsistent with her allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. Because a
contradiction between daily activities and alleged limitations is a sufficient basis to
reject Dickson’s testimony, see Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir.
2012), we find no error.
AFFIRMED.

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