United States of America v. SEAN HENRY WHITE BREMNER, AKA Sean Bremz

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SEAN HENRY WHITE BREMNER, AKA
Sean Bremz,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-30039
D.C. No.
4:19-cr-00065-BMM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 4, 2021**
Portland, Oregon
Before: BOGGS,*** PAEZ, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
The government appeals the district court’s dismissal of Count II of a five-
count indictment, which charges Sean Bremner with production of child
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 25 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The district court dismissed
Count II because the allegations did not show a sufficient connection to interstate
commerce. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Reviewing de novo, we
reverse. See United States v. Laursen, 847 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2017).
1. Bremner’s alleged conduct may not be connected to interstate commerce,
but such a connection is not required. Congress may regulate “activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
558–59 (1995). “When Congress decides that the total incidence of a practice
poses a threat to a national market,” it considers the practice in the aggregate and
“may regulate the entire class.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We have applied this principle to child pornography cases, including
violations of § 2251(a). See United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir.
2008); United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 2015); Laursen, 847
F.3d at 1035. In United States v. McCalla, we held that “it is eminently rational
that Congress would seek to regulate intrastate production of pornography even
where there is no evidence that it was created for commercial purposes.” 545 F.3d
at 755. The individual circumstances of Bremner’s alleged production of child
pornography do not matter, because “when a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances

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arising under that statute is of no consequence.” Id. at 756. Bremner’s alleged
conduct may have had no connection to the broader market for child pornography,
but McCalla does not require such a connection.
In dismissing Count II, the district court relied on a pre-Raich case, United
States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003), and Bremner argues that Raich did
not fully overrule McCoy. But even assuming that some aspect of McCoy’s
holding survived Raich, that aspect does not apply to this case. McCalla held that
“to the extent the reasoning employed in McCoy relied on the local nature of the
activity, it has been overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Raich.” 545
F.3d at 756. Bremner argues that McCoy also relied on the “non-commercial
nature of the activity,” and that Raich and McCalla did not overrule that aspect of
McCoy’s holding. But McCalla also held that Congress may regulate the
production of child pornography even when the production was not for a
commercial purpose. 545 F.3d at 755.
2. To the extent that Bremner argues that the jurisdictional requirement of §
2251(a) has not been met, the government has alleged sufficient information that,
if proven, can satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. Evidence that a device used to
produce child pornography traveled in interstate commerce—including a phone or
computer—satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of § 2251(a). See United States

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v. Sheldon, 755 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2014).1
REVERSED and REMANDED.
1 Similarly, Bremner’s reliance on United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583 (9th Cir.
2010), to argue that after Raich an individualized connection to interstate
commerce is still jurisdictionally required, is misplaced. Wright concerned
whether the government provided sufficient evidence to meet the jurisdictional
requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), not Congress’s authority to regulate
under the Commerce Clause. See 625 F.3d at 600.

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