Dimas Rogelio Lopez-Vasquez v. MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIMAS ROGELIO LOPEZ-VASQUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 19-73063
Agency No. A088-734-606
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 15, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Dimas Rogelio Lopez-Vasquez (“Lopez”), a native and citizen of
Guatemala, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision
denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and we deny the petition for review.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
Lopez first moved the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings on the ground
that country conditions in Guatemala had materially changed. Specifically, Lopez
cited evidence that members of indigenous rights groups have recently been
murdered. This evidence alone cannot establish materially changed conditions
because Lopez did not also provide evidence from the time of his original claim to
be used as a comparison. See Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he changed country conditions exception is concerned with two points in
time: the circumstances of the country at the time of the petitioner’s previous
hearing, and those at the time of the motion to reopen.”). Even assuming changed
conditions, Lopez has not shown that this evidence is material to his eligibility for
relief because he does not claim to be a member of any indigenous rights group.
See Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (petitioner must
establish that any new evidence is material and that it establishes prima facie
eligibility for relief).
Lopez also moved the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings to allow him
to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). This motion
was properly denied because Lopez did not provide evidence of prima facie
eligibility for cancellation of removal. Cancellation of removal requires a showing
that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a
qualifying relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Lopez’s motion did not meet this

-- 2 of 3 --

3
standard. He only asserted in a conclusory fashion that his removal would cause
such a hardship, but he did not provide evidence or an explanation of why this is
so. Lopez did provide medical documents for his children, but the documents are
from 2012 and Lopez did not offer evidence showing how his absence would affect
his children’s ability to receive medical care.
For these reasons, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez’s
motion to reopen. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2016).
PETITION DENIED.

-- 3 of 3 --