QUEST INTERNATIONAL MONITOR SERVICE, INC., a California corporation v. ROCKWELL COLLINS, INC., a Delaware corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
QUEST INTERNATIONAL MONITOR
SERVICE, INC., a California corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROCKWELL COLLINS, INC., a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-55364
D.C. No.
8:19-cv-02471-JLS-KES
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 12, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL,** District Judge.
Quest International Monitor Service, Inc., appeals from the district court’s
grant of Rockwell Collins, Inc.’s motion to confirm arbitration awards and denial
FILED
APR 20 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for the
District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

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of Quest’s petition to vacate the arbitration award. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16, and we affirm.
The district court did not err in holding that Quest’s petition to vacate the
arbitration award was time-barred under 9 U.S.C. § 12. The Enterprise
Commercial Product Support Agreement is a contract “evidencing a transaction
involving commerce” for purposes of 9 U.S.C. § 2, and therefore “there is a strong
default presumption that the FAA, not state law, supplies the rules for arbitration.”
Johnson v. Gruma Corp., 614 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Quest
did not overcome this presumption because the contract does not “evidence a clear
intent to incorporate state law rules for arbitration.” Id. (cleaned up). Therefore,
the California arbitration rules, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1280–1294.4, are not
applicable here. “[W]here the FAA’s rules control arbitration proceedings, a
reviewing court must also apply the FAA standard for vacatur,” Johnson, 614 F.3d
at 1067, including the three-month limitation period for filing a petition for
vacatur.
Quest’s reliance on the rule that federal courts apply state substantive law to
state law claims in diversity cases, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), is inapposite. Quest’s petition for vacatur of an arbitration award under the
FAA does not concern any “rights and obligations . . . created by one of the
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States.” Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). Therefore, neither
Erie nor California’s statute of limitations for vacating arbitration awards, see Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 1288, applies here. The FAA’s limitation period for petitioning
for vacatur controls. See Johnson, 614 F.3d at 1067.
Quest’s request for declaratory relief, if successful, would have the same
effect as a petition to vacate the award of the arbitration tribunal. Accordingly, the
limitations period applicable to the petition to vacate the arbitration award also
applies to bar Quest’s request for declaratory relief. See United Parcel Serv., Inc.
v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 61–62 (1981). Because the statute of limitations provides
sufficient grounds to affirm, we do not address Quest’s other challenges to the
district court’s alternative holdings. See Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi
Bishop Tr., 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The reviewing court may affirm
the dismissal upon any basis fairly supported by the record.”).
AFFIRMED.
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