Juan Israel Ponce-Granados v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN ISRAEL PONCE-GRANADOS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-70557
Agency No. A200-822-924
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 10, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,*** Judge.
Juan Israel Ponce Granados petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1),
and we deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of Ponce Granados’s
asylum application as untimely. An asylum application must be filed within one
year of the applicant’s arrival in the United States; otherwise, the applicant must
demonstrate that an exception to the one-year deadline applies. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (D); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(i). Ponce Granados arrived in the
United States on April 15, 2006 but did not file an asylum application until January
3, 2013. He claims that his fear of deportation and lack of knowledge about his
eligibility for asylum constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying the delay.
But neither reason qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance that would excuse the
untimely filing. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) (providing that extraordinary
circumstances may not be “intentionally created by the alien through his or her
own . . . inaction”); Sumolang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1080, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013)
(noting that “ignorance of the one-year filing deadline” did not excuse late filing);
see also Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (“As a
general rule, ignorance of the law is no excuse . . . .”).
2. The Board correctly held that Ponce Granados is ineligible for asylum
and withholding of removal because he failed to demonstrate that his proposed

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particular social groups are cognizable. We review the ultimate question
“[w]hether a group constitutes a ‘particular social group’ . . . de novo,” Barbosa v.
Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2019), and the factual determinations
underlying that conclusion for substantial evidence, Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947
F.3d 1238, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2020).
The group “Salvadoran shopkeepers” or “small shopkeepers” is not
cognizable because its members do not share an immutable characteristic. Being a
shopkeeper is neither fundamental to Ponce Granados’s identity nor a
characteristic that he cannot or should not be required to change. See Macedo
Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[B]eing a wealthy
business owner is not an immutable characteristic because it is not fundamental to
an individual’s identity.”). We reject Ponce Granados’s argument that he need not
demonstrate immutability because owning a business is a “voluntary association
that has become an innate characteristic.” See id. at 881.
The group “Salvadorans targeted by gangs” is impermissibly circular. “[A]
particular social group must exist independently of the harm asserted.” Diaz-
Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2020). While persecution “may be
the catalyst that causes a society to distinguish a group in a meaningful way and
consider it distinct,” id. at 1083 (internal quotation marks omitted), the group
proposed by Ponce Granados has no other defining characteristics. To the extent

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Ponce Granados claims that the group is also defined by his former occupation as a
shopkeeper, that simply restates the first proposed group rejected above and, in any
event, is not the group he presented to the immigration judge.
3. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of relief under the
Convention Against Torture for failure to demonstrate government acquiescence.
Ponce Granados relies on generalized country conditions evidence documenting
violence, unrest, and corruption, and he points to no specific evidence in the record
showing that the Salvadoran government is likely to acquiesce in any future
torture. See Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2021); Garcia-
Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2014).
PETITION DENIED.

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