Matthew C. Oskowis, individually and on behalf of E.O. v. Sedona Oak-Creek Unified School District, 9

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW C. OSKOWIS, individually
and on behalf of E.O.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SEDONA OAK-CREEK UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT, # 9,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-17265
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-08070-DWL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 4, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Matthew C. Oskowis appeals pro se the district court’s order awarding
attorneys’ fees to the Sedona Oak-Creek Unified School District, # 9 (the “School
FILED
AUG 6 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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District”), under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). We review a district court’s decision to award attorneys’
fees under IDEA for abuse of discretion, determining first whether the district
court identified the correct legal rule and second whether the court’s application of
this legal rule to the facts was illogical, implausible, or without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. C.W. v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 784 F.3d 1237, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2015). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees to
the School District. The district court identified and applied the correct law, which
permits the court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing educational
agency against a parent whose “complaint or subsequent cause of action was
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay,
or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III);
see also R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th
Cir. 2011) (requiring “a showing of both frivolousness and an improper purpose”
for a school district to recover attorneys’ fees from a parent). The district court’s
findings that the School District was the prevailing party, Oskowis’s causes of
action were frivolous, and Oskowis’s action was brought for the improper purposes
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of harassing the School District and driving up litigation costs were amply
supported by the record. The district court properly considered and rejected
Oskowis’s arguments that his claims were not frivolous or presented for an
improper purpose.
Oskowis waived his argument that an ALJ may not dismiss a due process
complaint for failure to state a claim without holding a hearing because he
conceded before the district court that such dismissal is proper. We do not
consider his arguments that are made for the first time on appeal. Padgett v.
Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
The joint motion to clarify the scope of the supplemental excerpts of record,
Dkt. No. 31, is DENIED.
AFFIRMED.
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