Dougal Samuels v. PAM AHLIN, Director, Coalinga State Hospital;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUGAL SAMUELS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAM AHLIN, Director, Coalinga State
Hospital; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH;
PETER BRESLER, Doctor; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 19-17419
D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00585-DAD-EPG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 12, 2021**
Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 19-17419
California civil detainee Dougal Samuels appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state
law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse
of discretion the district court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration. Sch.
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir.
1993). We affirm.
The district court did not err by granting reconsideration and dismissing
Samuels’s Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim on the basis of
qualified immunity, because it would not have been clear to every reasonable
official that detaining Samuels in the Central Valley, where Valley Fever was
endemic, was unlawful under the circumstances. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 735 (2011) (explaining two-part test for qualified immunity); Hines v.
Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 2019) (existing Valley Fever cases did
not clearly establish a “right to be free from heightened exposure to Valley Fever
spores”); Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A
district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its
decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” (citation omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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