Humberto Cortez Puentes v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HUMBERTO CORTEZ PUENTES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-71102
Agency No. A206-358-704
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 8, 2021
Portland, Oregon
Before: GRABER and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and R. COLLINS,** District
Judge.
Petitioner Humberto Cortez Puentes seeks review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order denying his request for cancellation of
removal on the ground that he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
FILED
NOV 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

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We deny the petition because the BIA properly concluded that Petitioner’s
conviction categorically involved moral turpitude.
“The BIA has defined a crime involving moral turpitude as having two
essential elements: [1] reprehensible conduct and [2] a culpable mental state.”
Ortega-Lopez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 680, 685 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (brackets in original).
1. Petitioner pleaded guilty to attempting to commit a Category D felony of
torturing or unjustifiable maiming, mutilating, or killing an animal kept for
companionship or pleasure. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 193.330(1)(a)(5), 574.100(1)(a),
574.100(6)(a). By doing so, he pleaded guilty to having the specific intent to
commit the relevant class D felony, id. § 193.330(1), which in turn required him to
act “willfully and maliciously,” id. § 574.100(6)(a). Accordingly, the crime of
conviction categorically encompasses a culpable mental state.
2. The BIA permissibly concluded that the crime of conviction categorically
involves reprehensible conduct. We recently held that the infliction of suffering on
animals, without justification, makes animal cruelty a crime involving moral
turpitude. Ortega-Lopez, 978 F.3d at 687. The statute in question does not apply
to acts that interfere with, among other things, Nevada’s fish and game laws, the
right to kill all animals and fowls used for food, or “established methods of animal
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husbandry.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 574.200(1). Thus, an element of the crime of
conviction necessarily negates Petitioner’s contention that his actions were
“justified” as methods of horse training.
PETITION DENIED.
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