DIEGO ARMANDO FRANCISCO PABLO, AKA Jose Alvarado Vasquez, AKA Jose Velasquez Alvarado; v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIEGO ARMANDO FRANCISCO
PABLO, AKA Jose Alvarado Vasquez,
AKA Jose Velasquez Alvarado; et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-70016
Agency Nos. A088-355-319
A208-605-359
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 14, 2021**
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Diego Armando Francisco Pablo and his child, natives and citizens of
Guatemala, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying their
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
review factual findings for substantial evidence. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d
1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We review de novo questions of law. Bhattarai v.
Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the determination that petitioners failed to
establish that the harm they experienced from members of the Civil Society rose to
the level of persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028-29
(9th Cir. 2019) (record did not compel the conclusion that threats rose to the level
of persecution). Substantial evidence also supports the determination that
petitioners failed to establish that the harm they experienced or fear from the Civil
Society was or would be on account of an actual or imputed political opinion. See
Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To establish a nexus
to the political opinion ground, the [petitioners] must show (1) that [they] had
either an affirmative or imputed political opinion, and (2) that they were targeted
on account of that opinion.”); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals
motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a
protected ground”).

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Substantial evidence further supports the determination that, even under a
disfavored group analysis, petitioners failed to demonstrate sufficient
individualized risk of harm to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of their indigenous ethnicity. See Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056,
1062 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “a petitioner’s membership in a disfavored
group is not sufficient by itself to meet [the petitioner’s] ultimate burden of proof;
some evidence of individualized risk is necessary for the petitioner to succeed”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, petitioners’ asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
The BIA did not err in its determination that Francisco Pablo waived any
challenge to the IJ’s denial of CAT relief. See Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061,
1068-69 (9th Cir. 2019) (no error in BIA’s waiver determination).
We reject as unsupported by the record petitioners’ contentions that the IJ or
BIA ignored evidence, applied an incorrect standard, failed to address arguments,
or otherwise erred in the analysis of their claims.
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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