Vladimir Gagic v. COUNTY OF MARICOPA; JOY RICH, Maricopa County Manager, in her official capacity

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VLADIMIR GAGIC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF MARICOPA; JOY RICH,
Maricopa County Manager, in her official
capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-15857
D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00037-MTL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 7, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and
BENCIVENGO,*** District Judge.
Vladimir Gagic appeals from an order of the district court dismissing his
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo, United States District Judge
for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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complaint without leave to amend. Gagic brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the County of Maricopa (the “County”) and Joy Rich, Maricopa County
Manager, in her official capacity, alleging two claims based on violations of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Gagic argues that the district court did not read his complaint or his response
to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, as evidenced by the district court mistakenly
referring to Gagic as a County employee and to his complaint with the County’s
Human Resources (“HR”) Director as an “internal complaint.” While the district
court did suggest that Gagic was a County employee, that conclusion has no
bearing on the sufficiency of Gagic’s claims. Gagic fails to establish that the
County’s outside counsel’s request (the “Request”) that Gagic direct all further
communications relating to his legal claims and allegations to her, rather than to
County employees, violated his rights under the First or Fourteenth Amendments.
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits state and local governments from “abridging the freedom of
speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment means that “a government,
including a municipal government vested with state authority, has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (internal quotation

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marks and citations omitted). Gagic fails to establish that the Request constitutes a
restriction on his freedom of speech, as it did not prohibit him from
communicating with County employees or penalize him for doing so. Even if the
Request were construed as a restriction on Gagic’s freedom of speech, it would be
permissible as a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restriction in a limited public
forum (the County’s HR complaint filing system). See Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). Therefore, Gagic does not plausibly allege
that his First Amendment rights were violated by the Request.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that no state
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”
which is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To
state an equal protection claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendants “acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based
upon membership in a protected class.” Sampson v. County of Los Angeles, 974
F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). Alternatively, a
plaintiff may state an equal protection claim in some circumstances by alleging
that he “has been irrationally singled out as a so-called ‘class of one.’” Engquist v.
Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Gagic
does not allege that the Request discriminated against him based on his

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membership in a protected class, nor does he allege that Defendants intentionally
treated him differently than others similarly situated by making the Request. See
id. Therefore, Gagic does not state a plausible claim under either theory of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gagic fails to establish that the Request violated his rights under the First or
Fourteenth Amendments, and thus has not alleged that he “suffered the deprivation
of a federally protected right” as required to state a § 1983 claim. Hyun Ju Park v.
City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the
district court did not err in dismissing Gagic’s § 1983 claims premised on alleged
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
AFFIRMED.

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