Angela Teresa Velasquez Chinga; Jairo Cruz Velasquez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANGELA TERESA VELASQUEZ
CHINGA; JAIRO CRUZ VELASQUEZ,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-72869
Agency Nos. A205-059-963
A209-866-407
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted January 11, 2022
Pasadena, California
Before: CLIFTON, M. SMITH, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Angela Velasquez Chinga seeks review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order denying her applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner’s
minor son also seeks asylum, and his claim is derivative of Petitioner’s asylum
application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 560–61 (9th
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
JAN 21 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Cir. 2004). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them
here, except as necessary to provide context to our ruling.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “[W]e review both the IJ’s
and the BIA’s decisions” in this case because the BIA cited Matter of Burbano, 20
I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), and “provide[d] its own review of the evidence
and law.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011). We review the
agency’s findings of fact under a substantial evidence standard, Plancarte Sauceda
v. Garland, 2022 WL 144863, at *5 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2022), which means the
findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and withholding
of removal. The IJ and BIA concluded that Petitioner was not persecuted on account
of her membership in any particular social group.1 Petitioner alleged membership
in two particular social groups: (1) the family of her common-law husband, and (2)
Ecuadorian women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships and are
viewed as property. The IJ and BIA assumed these groups were cognizable but
found no nexus between Petitioner’s membership in the groups and her past or feared
future harm. The IJ found that Petitioner’s past harm was “directly related to her not
1 Petitioner waived any argument about fear of harm based on her imputed political
opinion by not presenting it in her opening brief. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94
F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).

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divulging the information that she had discovered.” The IJ also determined that
Petitioner’s fear of persecution was not because of her membership in any particular
social group, but because Petitioner’s common law husband’s family wanted her to
stay quiet about their criminal activity. The BIA agreed, and the record does not
compel an alternate conclusion.
Petitioner also contends that the agency improperly denied her CAT claim
without meaningfully considering CAT relief as separate from her asylum claim.
We disagree. The IJ explicitly noted that he “considered the respondent’s [CAT]
claim . . . wholly separate and apart from her claims for asylum and withholding,”
and provided sufficient analysis to enable our court to review the decision. Although
“a catchall phrase does not suffice” if “there is any indication that the [agency] did
not consider all of the evidence before it,” review of the record does not reveal that
the IJ ignored any “highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence” supporting
Petitioner’s claim. Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2011). The IJ
considered Petitioner’s allegations that the government was involved in her
common-law husband’s drug trade and considered country conditions evidence, but
ultimately concluded that Petitioner could relocate and live safely in Ecuador. The
BIA agreed with the IJ, and substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Plancarte Sauceda, 2022 WL 144863 at *5.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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