JUAN FRANCISCO DEPAZ CASTRO, AKA Juan De Paz, AKA Juan Depaz v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN FRANCISCO DEPAZ CASTRO,
AKA Juan De Paz, AKA Juan Depaz,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 18-73501
Agency No. A094-195-977
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 10, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: HURWITZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN,*** District
Judge.
Juan De Paz Castro petitions for review of a decision of the Board of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal from the order of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for withholding of removal and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition.
1. De Paz claims that he would be persecuted in El Salvador because of his
membership in a proposed social group of “returning El Salvadorian citizens who
will be persecuted by gang members because of their tattoos.” The IJ concluded,
however, that this group was not cognizable because, among other reasons, De Paz
had not met his burden to establish that the group has “particularity” and is “socially
distinct within El Salvadorian society.” See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
227, 237 (BIA 2014). The BIA did not err in finding the IJ’s findings supported by
the record. See Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. Substantial evidence also supported the IJ’s conclusion, which was adopted
by the BIA, that De Paz did not establish it is more likely than not that he will be
tortured if returned to El Salvador. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Although De Paz
speculated that gangs would torture him with the acquiescence of the Salvadoran
police, neither his testimony nor the country conditions report compel that
conclusion. See Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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