Xiaoxue Huang v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
XIAOXUE HUANG,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 16-70040
Agency No. A201-192-229
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 15, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: OWENS and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,*** District
Judge.
Xiaoxue Huang, a native and citizen of China, petitions this court for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, United States District Judge for
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 17 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal.
“When the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law rather than
adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to
the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the parties are
familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. Reviewing the BIA’s adverse
credibility determination for “substantial evidence,” Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d
1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016), we deny the petition for review.1
Considering the “totality of the circumstances” and “all relevant factors,”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion
that Huang’s application was not credible. First, as the BIA correctly noted, there
are inconsistencies between Huang’s testimony and supporting documents
regarding whether and when he moved to a new address in China. His asylum
application indicates that he lived at the same address between December 1967,
when he was born, and November 2010, when he traveled to the United States.
Yet, Huang admitted in his brief to the BIA that he changed address in June 2010.
1 Huang does not address the BIA’s conclusion that he waived any challenge to the
IJ’s denial of his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Accordingly, only Huang’s requests for asylum and withholding of removal are at
issue on appeal. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir.
2013) (noting that matters not specifically and distinctly argued in the opening
brief are waived).

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And both stories are inconsistent with his somewhat tentative statement at the
merits hearing that he moved around 2008.
Second, the BIA presented several valid reasons to question the reliability of
Huang’s household registry and his Chinese National ID Card. The household
registry was incomplete, because several lines, including Huang’s religious belief
and his address, were not translated to English. The household registry also listed
Huang’s ethnic group as “Han,” while the ID card listed his ethnic group as
“Korean.” Huang makes no attempt to explain this discrepancy.
Finally, the BIA correctly found that Huang’s testimony was nonresponsive
and inconsistent when confronted with omissions in his supporting medical record
and in his asylum statement. Specifically, Huang had no coherent explanation for
why his hospital certificate failed to specify what treatments he received or why his
asylum statement failed to mention that Bibles were confiscated.
Contrary to Huang’s arguments on appeal, these inconsistencies and
omissions need not go to the heart of Huang’s claim. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d
1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Under the REAL ID Act, even minor inconsistencies
that have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity may constitute the basis for an
adverse credibility determination.”). The cases he cites to the contrary precede
(and are overridden by) the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231
(2005). The sheer amount of unexplained or inadequately explained

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inconsistencies and omissions, together, are substantial evidence that Huang’s
claims are not credible.
These inconsistencies and omissions, in any event, were not minor. Since
the setting of Huang’s church meeting and subsequent arrest was his “old house,”
and he claims to have agreed to host church meetings because this extra home was
available, a consistent account of when and to where he changed his residence was
key to evaluating the veracity of his story. Cf. Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Garland, 11
F.4th 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“We have recognized that an IJ may
rely upon an inconsistency in a ‘crucial date’ concerning ‘the very event upon
which [a petitioner] predicated his claim for asylum.’” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, the medical treatment he received and the mention (or lack
thereof) of confiscated Bibles in his asylum statement were at the center of his
claim of religious persecution. Cf. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1046-47 (“Although
inconsistencies no longer need to go to the heart of the petitioner’s claim, when an
inconsistency is at the heart of the claim it doubtless is of great weight.”). On this
record, it cannot be said that “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to
find Huang’s claims credible. Bhattarai, 835 F.3d at 1042 (citation omitted).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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