Nehemias Arreaga-Diaz v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NEHEMIAS ARREAGA-DIAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-73320
Agency No. A201-290-113
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 15, 2022**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Nehemias Arreaga-Diaz, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 23 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the legal question
of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except to the extent that
deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and
regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We
deny the petition for review.
In his opening brief, Arreaga-Diaz does not challenge the BIA’s conclusion
that he waived any challenge to the IJ’s determination that his asylum application
was time-barred and that he did not establish an exception to the filing deadline,
and he also does not challenge the determination that he did not establish eligibility
for humanitarian asylum. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80
(9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief
are waived). Thus, Arreaga-Diaz’s asylum claim fails.
The BIA did not err in concluding that Arreaga-Diaz failed to establish
membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d
1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular
social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))); Barrios v. Holder,
581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009) (proposed particular social group of “young men

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in Guatemala who resist gang recruitment” lacked particularity). We reject as
unsupported by the record Arreaga-Diaz’s contentions that the agency erred in the
particular social group analysis. Thus, Arreaga-Diaz’s withholding of removal
claim fails.
In his opening brief, Arreaga-Diaz does not raise any challenge to the
agency’s denial of CAT relief. See Lopez-Vasquez, 706 F.3d at 1079-80.
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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