FRANCISCO VERA-ALAMILLAS, AKA Francisco Vera Alamillas v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRANCISCO VERA-ALAMILLAS, AKA
Francisco Vera Alamillas,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 16-73665
Agency No. A205-321-847
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 15, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, GOULD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Francisco Vera-Alamillas (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Mexico,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his
appeal of the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for withholding
FILED
MAR 17 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of “withholding of
removal[] and CAT relief for substantial evidence.” Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d
1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). We deny the
petition for review.
Petitioner argues that a remand to the agency is appropriate given our
decision in Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2017). In that case,
we held that an applicant for withholding of removal must show that a statutorily
protected ground is “a reason” for his claimed persecution, rather than the more
stringent standard of “one central reason” applicable to asylum. Id. at 360.
Barajas-Romero thus applies to cases where the agency applied the more stringent
“one central reason” standard to the application for withholding of removal without
indicating in any way whether it would reach the same conclusion under the more
lenient “a reason” standard.
Barajas-Romero is inapposite here. The agency concluded that Petitioner
failed to show any nexus between a statutorily protected ground and the harm that
he suffered. Petitioner testified that he fears returning to Mexico because his
family in the United States needs his financial support, and because of the presence
of crime and drugs in Mexico. The IJ found that there was not “a sufficient nexus
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between any of the[] five protected grounds and the harm [Petitioner] fears in
Mexico.” The BIA noted “the absence of a nexus to a statutorily protected
ground.” Because Petitioner failed to show any nexus between a statutorily
protected ground and his claimed persecution, Barajas-Romero is inapplicable to
him. See Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that no remand
is required, despite asserted Barajas-Romero error, where agency found that there
was “no nexus” at all).
Petitioner makes no argument beyond Barajas-Romero in his opening brief.
His other arguments challenging the denial of withholding and CAT relief are
therefore waived. See Cui v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1332, 1338 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013).
PETITION DENIED.
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