Malkeet Singh Sanhotra v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MALKEET SINGH SANHOTRA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-73018
Agency No. A205-169-773
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 17, 2022**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Malkeet Singh Sanhotra, a native and citizen of India, petitions pro se for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence
the agency’s factual findings. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th
Cir. 2020). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the harm
Sanhotra experienced in India, even considered cumulatively, did not rise to the
level of persecution. See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Persecution . . . is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of
treatment our society regards as offensive.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). We reject as unsupported by the record Sanhotra’s contentions that the
agency failed to adequately explain its reasoning or otherwise erred in its analysis.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Sanhotra
failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution in India. See
id. at 1018 (possibility of future persecution “too speculative”).
Thus, Sanhotra’s asylum claim fails. Because Sanhotra failed to establish
eligibility for asylum, in this case, he did not establish eligibility for withholding of
removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Sanhotra failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the
consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to India. See Aden v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).

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We do not address Sanhotra’s remaining contentions because the BIA did
not reach these issues in denying relief, see Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657
F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider
only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)), and Sanhotra does not argue that the BIA erred by deciding his
case without reaching those issues, see Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256,
1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s
opening brief are waived). To the extent Sanhotra now contends changed country
conditions make him eligible for asylum-related relief, he may raise this claim in a
motion to reopen filed with the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Sanhotra’s motion to supplement the record on appeal (Docket Entry No. 9)
is denied. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (the
court’s review is limited to the administrative record).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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