Fernando Guerrero-Guerrero v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FERNANDO GUERRERO-GUERRERO,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-72392
Agency No. A091-641-202
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of an
Immigration Judge
Submitted June 8, 2022**
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: HURWITZ, BRESS, and H. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Fernando Guerrero-Guerrero, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a
decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) affirming an asylum officer’s determination
that Guerrero did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico.
Reviewing for substantial evidence, see Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 811
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 10 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(9th Cir. 2018), we deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Guerrero did not
establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c),
(g) (2011) (amended 2020).
a. A petitioner “may establish a well-founded fear of future persecution in
two ways: by proving past persecution, or by demonstrating that he has a
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.”
Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(cleaned up); see Bartolome, 904 F.3d at 809 n.4. Guerrero never contended that he
was persecuted in the past and he failed to show that anyone in Mexico would want
to harm him in the future.
b. The bulk of Guerrero’s briefing is directed at the IJ’s determination that he
had not shown that he could not reasonably relocate within Mexico. A petitioner
who fails to establish past persecution, or that he faces future persecution by the
government or a government-sponsored actor, has the burden of establishing that it
would be unreasonable for him to relocate. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3)(i) (2000). In
evaluating the reasonableness of relocation, an IJ considers several factors including
“social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial
ties.” Id. § 208.16(b)(3) (2000). Guerrero has failed to establish that the IJ refused
to consider all relevant evidence, including Guerrero’s health, in making his

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determination. See Bartolome, 904 F.3d at 814 (explaining that an IJ is not required
to “address all of the evidence and claims specifically” in reviewing reasonable fear
determinations). The IJ’s statement, “I also wonder if they’re going to be able to
send him back in his medical condition but that’s beside the point,” does not indicate
that he believed Guerrero’s health was irrelevant to the relocation issue. And
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Guerrero failed to establish
that he could not relocate. Guerrero never testified, nor argued, that he could not
reasonably relocate because of his health and when asked whether he could relocate,
he said he did not know.
2. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Guerrero
did not establish a reasonable possibility of torture if returned to Mexico. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.31(c), (g) (2011) (amended 2020). Guerrero did not claim past torture
or establish that anyone would target him if he were removed to Mexico, see Dhital
v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008), and the IJ reasonably found
that relocation was possible, see Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, ---F.4th---, 2022
WL 1196787, at *7 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2022) (explaining that the agency must consider
“the possibility of relocation—without regard for the reasonableness of relocation”
in the Convention Against Torture analysis).
PETITION DENIED.

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