United States of America v. Desmond Quinntrail Hayes

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DESMOND QUINNTRAIL HAYES,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-10266
D.C. Nos.
3:13-cr-00007-RCJ-WGC-1
3:13-cr-00007-RCJ-WGC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 15, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, GOULD, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Desmond Quinntrail Hayes (“Hayes”) appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release due to “extraordinary and compelling reasons” pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we
do not review them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
JUN 30 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We review a motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1) for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (per
curiam). “A district court abuses its discretion if it fails to apply the correct legal
standard or if its application of the correct standard is ‘illogical, implausible, or
without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.’” United
States v. Estrada, 904 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v.
Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). A district court’s
construction of a statute is reviewed de novo. Aruda, 993 F.3d at 799.
1. The district court stated the wrong legal standard when it asserted that a
defendant seeking compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) must show that he “‘is not a not a danger to the
safety of any other person or the community, as provided under [18 U.S.C. §]
3142(g).’ § 3582(c)(1)(A).” A finding of non-dangerousness is not required under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Aruda, 993 F.3d at 799 (“This dangerousness finding is not
statutorily required under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)”). The district court’s
supplemental order did not cure this error.
2. For Hayes to succeed on his motion for compassionate release pursuant
to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the district court must determine that both (a) “extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and (b) a reduction is consistent
with the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See § 3582(c)(1)(A); United

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States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that the “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” analysis and the 3553(a) factors analysis are a “sequential
inquiry”). Here, the district court found, independent of its incorrect recitation of
the legal standard, that Hayes’s circumstances were not so “extraordinary and
compelling” as to warrant compassionate release. Although the district court
explained its finding poorly, a district court has wide latitude to determine whether
a defendant has demonstrated “extraordinary and compelling reasons” sufficient to
justify compassionate release. See § 3582(c)(1)(A); Keller, 2 F.4th at 1281. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Hayes has not
demonstrated “extraordinary and compelling reasons” sufficient to justify
compassionate release.1
AFFIRMED.
1 Because we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that Hayes had not demonstrated “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” we need
not determine whether the district court’s cursory analysis of the § 3553(a) factors
was legally sufficient.

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