United States of America v. Roy Allen Shostak

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROY ALLEN SHOSTAK,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30223
D.C. No. 6:21-cr-00002-BMM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 9, 2022
Portland, Oregon
Before: BUMATAY and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and BAKER,** International
Trade Judge.
Roy Allen Shostak appeals his conviction for possession with intent to dis-
tribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Shostak contends
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
FILED
NOV 23 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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an allegedly invalid search warrant. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
We review the validity of a search warrant de novo. United States v. King,
985 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2021). A search warrant “must be supported by probable
cause—meaning a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place based on the totality of circumstances.” Id. (simplified).
Shostak argues that the search warrant authorizing the search of his vehicle
lacked probable cause because it was based on information provided by a confiden-
tial source with no indication of the informant’s reliability or basis of knowledge.
We analyze an informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge under “the totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis that has traditionally guided probable cause determina-
tions.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983). And probable cause may be
established through a combination of an informant’s tip and “corroboration of details
. . . by independent police work.” Id. at 241.
Viewed as a whole, the affidavit supporting the search warrant provided prob-
able cause to authorize the search of Shostak’s car. First, officers independently
corroborated much of the information given by the informant. The informant told
officers that Shostak was selling drugs, driving a black Jaguar car, and known to
frequent two addresses in Helena, Montana. Officers then established Shostak’s
presence at one of the addresses and linked him with a black Jaguar car found at the

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address. Officers also confirmed with the registered owner of the Jaguar that he had
recently sold the car to Shostak. Second, the information from the informant made
up only a fraction of the details conveyed in the affidavit. The affidavit detailed
Shostak’s criminal history, his associations with known drug users, officers’ obser-
vations of Shostak placing items from a trailer in the Jaguar, and the presence of a
marijuana pipe in plain view on the seat of the car. Under the “totality of circum-
stances,” the affidavit established a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime” would be found in Shostak’s car. King, 985 F.3d at 707.
“Probable cause . . . is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320,
338 (2014). It requires “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (citation omitted). The informant’s in-
formation and the extensive corroborating information cited in the affidavit easily
meet that standard here.
AFFIRMED.

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