WAYNE HAGENDORF, Attorney, as special administrator of the estate of Deborah Carroll v. Ladah Law Firm Pllc; Ramzy P. Ladah

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WAYNE HAGENDORF, Attorney, as
special administrator of the estate of Deborah
Carroll,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LADAH LAW FIRM PLLC; RAMZY P.
LADAH,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-16127
D.C. No.
2:18-cv-00960-JCM-BNW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2022 **
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 1 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2
Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne Hagendorf, on behalf of his deceased spouse
Deborah Carroll (“Carroll”), appeals from the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Ladah Law Firm PLLC and Ramzy P.
Ladah (collectively, “Ladah”) on Carroll’s claims for unpaid overtime wages and
final paycheck penalties under Nevada and federal law. We review de novo the
district court’s grant of summary judgment. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 769
(9th Cir. 2008). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
1. The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the entirety of
Carroll’s overtime claim. Ladah’s records show that Carroll was logged into the
company’s Effortless Office (“EO”) system for more than 40 hours during 13 of
the 42 weeks of her employment with Ladah.1 Viewed in the light most favorable
to Carroll, the EO records, Carroll’s declaration, and the undisputed fact that EO
automatically logs users out after a period of inactivity together create a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether Carroll worked overtime hours for these
1 EO records show Carroll was logged in for more than 40 hours during the
weeks beginning May 22, 2017, June 9, 2017, August 14, 2017, September 11,
2017, September 18, 2017, October 2, 2017, October 16, 2017, November 13,
2017, November 27, 2017, December 4, 2017, December 11, 2017, January 29,
2018, and February 5, 2018.

-- 2 of 4 --

3
13 weeks.2 See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.
2004). We vacate and remand to the district court for reconsideration of Carroll’s
overtime claims for these 13 weeks.
Ladah argues that summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate because
neither Appellee had actual or constructive knowledge of Carroll’s hours worked.
See Campbell v. Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2018). The district
court did not reach this issue and should address it on remand.
3. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the remaining
29 weeks of Carroll’s employment. Carroll’s general statement that she performed
additional work tasks while logged out of the EO system and her self-generated
spreadsheet citing isolated texts and emails as evidence of multiple hours worked
are too conclusory to survive summary judgment.3 See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
2 Ladah’s contention that Carroll may have logged into EO and left to
complete personal tasks at most creates a factual dispute about whether Carroll’s
EO hours constitute compensable worktime.
3 In his reply brief, Appellant raises for the first time the argument that the
continuous workday doctrine creates the inference that Carroll worked more than
forty hours during many additional weeks. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals
Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 941 (9th Cir. 2019). By not raising this argument
before the district court or in his opening brief, Appellant has waived it. See United
States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005). Even if the argument were
not waived, there is not enough information in the record for this court to conclude
that Carroll’s first EO system log-in and last EO system log-off of each day
constitute her first and final principal activities, respectively. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a).

-- 3 of 4 --

4
1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm the district court with respect to the
remaining 29 weeks.
4. Ladah made Carroll’s last paycheck available to her within the time
required by Nevada law. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 608.040(1)(a). The district court
correctly held that Carroll is not entitled to penalties for late payment of her final
regular wages because she declined to pick up her check. § 608.040(2).
However, Carroll’s final paycheck may not have included all wages due at
the time of her termination. See Neville v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 406 P.3d 499, 501,
504 (Nev. 2017). We vacate the district court’s summary judgment order on
Carroll’s final paycheck claim and remand for reconsideration in light of Carroll’s
unpaid overtime claims for the 13 weeks identified above.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

-- 4 of 4 --