Dinora Yanira Rivas De Perez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DINORA YANIRA RIVAS DE PEREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-71128
Agency No. A209-417-374
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 5, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: WATFORD and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ,*** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 7 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Dinora Yanira Rivas de Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the
decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying her motion for a continuance and
her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition.
1. A continuance may be granted for “good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.29. We review an IJ’s decision to grant or deny a continuance for abuse of
discretion. Garcia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2015). Rivas de Perez
requested a continuance because the Attorney General decided Matter of A-B-, 27
I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), approximately ten days before her statement of
particular social group was due. The IJ did not abuse his discretion in finding that
Matter of A-B- was not relevant to Rivas de Perez. The decision addresses whether
victims of domestic abuse constitute a particular social group, Matter of A-B-, 27 I.
& N. Dec. at 319, while Rivas de Perez’s application was based on an attack and
threats by people with whom Rivas de Perez had no direct relationship. Rivas de
Perez’s counsel also argued that Matter of A-B- heightened the burden in asylum
claims based on harm perpetrated by private actors. But she did not articulate how
additional time would aid her in responding to that change. The IJ properly noted
that Rivas de Perez’s counsel had ample time to explore all possible bases for relief
before Matter of A-B- was decided. Thus, the IJ did not abuse his discretion by

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denying the motion for a continuance.
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and
withholding of removal. Rivas de Perez was attacked by Griselda, the ex-
girlfriend of Rivas de Perez’s boyfriend. The IJ’s conclusion that this attack bore
no nexus to a particular social group is supported by substantial evidence. Rivas
de Perez testified that Griselda attacked her because she didn’t “want [the
boyfriend] to start a new life with someone else.” Thus, as the IJ found, the attack
was not a form of persecution, but a “personal dispute.”
Any other harm Rivas de Perez endured was not severe enough to rise to the
level of persecution. After Rivas de Perez reported the attack and testified in
Griselda’s prosecution, Griselda’s gang-affiliated brothers threatened Rivas de
Perez with death. Rivas de Perez claims she was persecuted on account of her
status as a witness. But even assuming that Rivas de Perez has articulated a
cognizable particular social group that was properly exhausted below, the threats in
question did not amount to persecution. “Unfulfilled threats are very rarely
sufficient to rise to the level of persecution.” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647
(9th Cir. 2021). That is particularly true when no additional mistreatment
accompanies the threats. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.
2019). For the same reason, Rivas de Perez’s fear of future persecution is too
speculative to support relief. See Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th

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Cir. 2005).
3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection.
To establish eligibility for CAT relief, Rivas de Perez must demonstrate that she is
more likely than not to suffer torture at the hands of public officials or with the
acquiescence of public officials if returned to El Salvador. Andrade-Garcia v.
Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016). Law enforcement responded to Rivas de
Perez’s report of violence and prosecuted her attacker. She never informed any
public official that she sought reconciliation of the charges against her attacker in
response to threats on her life. As such, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
finding of no acquiescence.1 Although Rivas de Perez offers evidence of
generalized corruption in El Salvador, that evidence does not compel the
conclusion that she would face a particularized probability of future torture if
removed to El Salvador. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
1 The evidence does not compel us to conclude that the El Salvadoran court’s
decision to downgrade the classification of Griselda’s crime amounted to
acquiescence to torture. To the contrary, the court relied on expert testimony that
Rivas de Perez’s injuries were not life-threatening in adjusting the charges, and
Rivas de Perez provides no evidence that the attack endangered her life or that the
court applied the wrong standard under El Salvadoran law.

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