Jose Manuel Flores-Giron v. Merrick Garland

20-71209Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit08.12.2022

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE MANUEL FLORES-GIRON,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK GARLAND,
Respondent.
No. 20-71209
Board of Immigration Appeals No.
A089-100-377
San Francisco, California
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 6, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: BRESS, LUCERO,*** and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Juan Manuel Giron-Flores, a citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, adopting the Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, United States Senior Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 8 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He contends he was subject to past
persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution because of his
political opinion (“opposition to gang violence”) and membership in a particular
social group (“individuals who have taken active steps to oppose gangs”).
Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the petition.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding of
removal. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a
likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). An asylum seeker alleging past persecution must
demonstrate that (1) his treatment rises to the level of persecution; (2) his treatment
was based on one or more protected grounds; and (3) the government committed or
acquiesced in the persecution. Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000).
The agency’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to show past persecution is
supported by substantial evidence. The IJ found that Giron-Flores did not proffer
evidence that any threats he faced were severe or specific enough to constitute past
persecution. Giron-Flores also failed to establish that he held the political opinion
he proposed. The IJ appropriately declined to make a ruling on the legal
sufficiency of his proposed political opinion when it found he never expressed this

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opinion, nor did anyone impute one to him. Similarly, the IJ declined to make a
ruling on the legal sufficiency of his proposed social group. Substantial evidence
supports the finding that Giron-Flores failed to take active steps to oppose gangs.
Substantial evidence also supports the finding that Petitioner failed to show a
fear of future persecution. To demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution, an applicant must show that their fear is “both subjectively genuine
and objectively reasonable,” Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir.
2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted), “by credible, direct, and specific
evidence in the record,” Agbuya v. INS, 241 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
finding that Giron-Flores failed to demonstrate that his fear, while subjectively
valid, was objectively reasonable. Giron-Flores’s assertions were too generalized
and too remote.
Because substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum, Giron-Flores
necessarily failed to meet the higher standard for withholding of removal. See
Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066.
To qualify for CAT protection, an applicant must prove there is more than a
fifty percent chance they would be tortured upon removal. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2). Amongst other requirements, an applicant’s asserted torture must
be particularized. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2022).

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Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision to deny CAT protection because
Petitioner failed to show a particularized risk of torture.
Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.

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