Lourdes Toman, an individual; ANTONIO PAREDES, an individual; ALAN CASTRO, an individual v. DAVIS CRABTREE, Fullerton Police Officer

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LOURDES TOMAN, an individual;
ANTONIO PAREDES, an individual;
ALAN CASTRO, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
DAVIS CRABTREE, Fullerton Police
Officer; MICHAEL MCCASKILL,
Fullerton Police Officer; DAVID
MACSHANE, Fullerton Police Officer,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
PEDROZA, Fullerton Police Officer;
PEREZ, Fullerton Police Officer;
HERRERA, Fullerton Police Officer;
FULLERTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
No. 22-55082
D.C. No.
8:20-cv-00046-JWH-KES
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding
FILED
JAN 4 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Argued and Submitted December 7, 2022
Pasadena, California
Before: BEA, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Officers Davis Crabtree, Michael McCaskill, and David Macshane (the
officers) appeal the district court’s order denying them summary judgment in a
civil rights action alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officers
for plaintiffs’ claims of unlawful entry into and search of their residence because
whether the officers’ search fell within the emergency aid exception to the warrant
requirement was not beyond debate. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152
(2018). The district court held that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable
basis for concluding that there was an emergency. We agree. As the officers
conceded at oral argument, absent an emergency, community caretaking does not
justify the warrantless entry into a home. However, under the facts of this case, the
officers could have erroneously but not unreasonably concluded that an emergency
existed that would have permitted their warrantless entry. See Martin v. City of
Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2004).
2

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We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for the claim of
unreasonable seizure based on the officers’ arrest of plaintiffs. The officers’
argument that the arrests were lawful under section 148 of the California Penal
Code because plaintiffs had actively delayed and obstructed officers is contradicted
by body camera footage that demonstrates that none of the plaintiffs took any
action to obstruct officers other than passively demanding a warrant prior to
allowing entry into their home. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007).
Because citizens have a constitutional right to withhold consent to a warrantless
entry, see United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir. 1978), it is
clearly established that such conduct cannot form the basis of a crime.
We also affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for the claim
that the officers used excessive force when arresting Lourdes Toman. It is obvious
that the officers used excessive force because body camera footage shows Lourdes
Toman presented no threat to the officers and was seized and handcuffed in a way
that caused extensive injuries, including a broken elbow, without being given an
opportunity to comply with the officers’ commands. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 199 (2004). Therefore, it is beyond debate that Lourdes Toman’s Fourth
Amendment right was violated. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152.
3

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AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.1
1 Each party will bear its own costs on appeal.
4

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