Carmen Antonio Gomez- Hernandez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

21-347Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit30.05.2023

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARMEN ANTONIO GOMEZ-
HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-347
Agency No.
A094-795-150
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Immigration Judge
Submitted May 16, 2023**
Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Carmen Antonio Gomez-Hernandez, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions pro se for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under
8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or
torture in El Salvador and is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal
order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 30 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except to the
extent that deference is owed to the Board of Immigration Appeals’
interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo v.
Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings. Id. at 1241. We deny the petition for
review.
The IJ did not err in concluding that Gomez-Hernandez did not establish
membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842
F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (to demonstrate membership in a particular
social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’”
(quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014)); see also
Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2008) (proposed
group of “young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence” lacked
particularity), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707
F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). In light of this disposition, we need not
reach Gomez-Hernandez’s remaining contentions regarding the IJ’s failure to
address social distinction and immutability. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues
unnecessary to the results they reach).

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As to protection under the Convention Against Torture, substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Gomez-Hernandez failed to show
a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of the
government if returned to El Salvador. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d
829, 836-37 (9th Cir. 2016) (petitioner failed to demonstrate government
acquiescence sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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