United States of America v. MARCOS DELAROSA RAMIREZ, AKA Joker

23-50009Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit18.10.2023

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARCOS DELAROSA RAMIREZ, AKA
Joker,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 23-50009
D.C. No. 3:05-cr-00199-BEN-5
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 10, 2023 **
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Marcos Delarosa Ramirez appeals from the district court’s judgment
revoking supervised release and challenges the three-year term of supervision
imposed to follow his 60-day term of imprisonment. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 18 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Ramirez first contends that his supervised release term should be stricken
because the district court failed to orally impose it. See United States v. Munoz-
Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The only sentence that is legally
cognizable is the actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.”).
The record belies this claim. After hearing the parties’ sentencing arguments and
Ramirez’s allocution, the court determined that it would impose a sentence of 60
days, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Though it did not repeat
the term of supervised release when it referred again to the imprisonment term later
in the sentencing hearing, it discussed at length Ramirez’s obligations for his new
supervised release term. On this record, we find no ambiguity in the oral
pronouncement of sentence.
Ramirez next contends that the district court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) factors or offer an adequate explanation for the supervised release term.
We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103,
1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude there is none. The record demonstrates that the
court heard and considered Ramirez’s arguments. Moreover, its explanation for
the sentence reflects its consideration of the relevant § 3583(e) factors and permits
meaningful appellate review. See United States v. Perez-Perez, 512 F.3d 514, 516-
17 (9th Cir. 2008).
Finally, Ramirez argues that the three-year term of supervision is

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substantively unreasonable in light of his lengthy period of compliance prior to the
instant revocation and his mitigating circumstances. The district court did not
abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Given
Ramirez’s criminal history and more recent violation conduct, the three-year term
of supervised release is substantively reasonable. See United States v. Hurt, 345
F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003).
AFFIRMED.

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