Anthoney Darnell Lynch v. JOHN OR JANE DOE, Warden, Pleasant Valley State Prison

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONEY DARNELL LYNCH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN OR JANE DOE, Warden, Pleasant
Valley State Prison; JOHN DOE, Assistant
Warden, Pleasant Valley State Prison; JOHN
DOE, State Prison Commissioner;
UNKNOWN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, Constructor Of
Medical/Lockup Facility; UNKNOWN
“MUNICIPALITY”, Authoritarian,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-17068
D.C. No. 1:09-cv-02097-AWI-HBK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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California state prisoner Anthoney Darnell Lynch appeals pro se from the
district court’s post-judgment orders seeking reconsideration, counsel, and relief
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Sch. Dist. No. 1J,
Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We
affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lynch’s motions for
relief from judgment and for reconsideration because Lynch failed to establish any
basis for such relief. See Henson v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 443-44
(9th Cir. 2019) (“A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show
extraordinary circumstances justifying the reopening of a final
judgment.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted)); Sch. Dist.
No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263 (setting forth grounds for reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lynch’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Lynch failed to establish exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement
for appointment of counsel for indigent civil litigants).
We do not consider Lynch’s contentions related to the district court’s
previous orders because Lynch did not timely appeal from those orders. See Fed.

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R. App. P. 4(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of
judgment or the denial of certain post-judgment motions); Tillman v. Ass’n of
Apartment Owners of Ewa Apartments, 234 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The
court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to decide an appeal if the notice of appeal is not
timely filed.”).
We reject as unsupported by the record Lynch’s contention that he was
deprived of due process.
Lynch’s motion for a stay of proceedings (Docket Entry No. 47) is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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