Aldo Donai Mejia Romero v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALDO DONAI MEJIA ROMERO,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1247
Agency No.
A088-809-507
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Aldo Donai Mejia Romero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro
se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947
F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Mejia Romero
failed to establish he was or would be persecuted on account of a political opinion
or other protected ground. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992)
(an applicant “must provide some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial”);
Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (to establish a nexus to
political opinion, petitioner must show “(1) that [he] had either an affirmative or
imputed political opinion, and (2) that [he was] targeted on account of that
opinion.”).
Because Mejia Romero does not challenge the agency’s determination that
the recruitment-based particular social group is not cognizable, we do not address
it. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).
Thus, Mejia Romero’s asylum claim fails. Because Mejia Romero failed to
establish any nexus at all, he also failed to satisfy the standard for withholding of
removal. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017).
Mejia Romero’s contentions regarding newly-raised particular social groups
are not properly before the court because he failed to raise them before the BIA.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (exhaustion of administrative remedies required); see

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also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19 (2023) (section 1252(d)(1)
is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule).
We do not address Mejia Romero’s contentions as to whether the Salvadoran
government is unable or unwilling to protect him, internal relocation, and
discretion because the BIA did not deny relief on these grounds. See Santiago-
Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision
of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because Mejia Romero does not contest the BIA’s determination that he
waived challenge to the IJ’s denial of CAT protection, we do not address it. See
Lopez-Vasquez, 706 F.3d at 1079-80.
We do not consider the materials Mejia Romero references in his opening
brief that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955,
963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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