Sean Jeffery Richson-Bey v. CELIA BELL, Chief Executive/Medical Officer of CCHCS at CSP Corcoran

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SEAN JEFFERY RICHSON-BEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CELIA BELL, Chief Executive/Medical
Officer of CCHCS at CSP Corcoran,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-16219
D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00447-JLT-BAM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Sean Jeffery Richson-Bey appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations
related to COVID-19 testing policies that arose while he was a California state
prisoner. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Richson-Bey’s individual capacity
claims because Richson-Bey failed to allege facts sufficient to show that placing
him in quarantine or testing him for COVID-19 violated any of his constitutional
rights. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (explaining that a prisoner
has no protected liberty interest when the sanction does not impose an “atypical
and significant hardship”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (setting
forth the requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation); Cruzan by Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (stating that a violation of an
individual’s right to refuse medical treatment “must be determined by balancing
his liberty interests against the relevant state interests”); Jones v. Williams, 791
F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating standard for a free exercise claim);
Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing factors for
assessing whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
Dismissal of Richson-Bey’s official capacity claims was proper because
Richson-Bey failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered a
constitutional violation as the result of an official policy or custom. See Castro v.
County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)

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(discussing requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d
712, 714 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient to
establish custom.”).
Richson-Bey’s assertion that he should have been allowed to identify any
unknown defendants through discovery is unavailing where his complaint failed to
state a claim for relief. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)
(“[T]he plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the
unknown defendants . . . unless . . . the complaint would be dismissed on other
grounds.”).
We reject as meritless Richson-Bey’s contentions related to the United
States-Morrocco Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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