Maria Guadalupe Rosales Martinez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA GUADALUPE ROSALES
MARTINEZ; GUADALUPE VICTORIA
SALAZAR ROSALES; MANUEL
ALEJANDRO SALAZAR ROSALES,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1980
Agency Nos.
A202-177-973
A202-177-974
A202-177-975
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 6, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 8 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-1980
Petitioners Maria Guadalupe Rosales Martinez (Rosales) and her minor
children, natives of Mexico, seek review of the decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ)
denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de
novo and the agency’s factual findings, including credibility determinations, for
substantial evidence. Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 651–52 (9th Cir. 2022). “To
prevail under the substantial evidence standard, the petitioner must show that the
evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion that these findings and
decisions are erroneous.” Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th
Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here, the BIA adopts
an IJ’s findings as its own and “expresses no disagreement with the IJ’s decision,
we review the IJ’s order as if it were the BIA’s.” See Chuen Piu Kwong v. Holder,
671 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2011).
1 Rosales’s minor children were listed as derivatives on her application pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). The children also filed separate, independent
applications. However, their applications were based on the same facts and
experiences set forth in Rosales’s petition. Because Rosales’s minor children rely
on the same evidence for their applications, our analysis is the same for all
Petitioners.

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3 22-1980
We deny the petition as to Rosales’s asylum and withholding-of-removal
claims, because substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.
See Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2016). The IJ
reasonably concluded that there were material inconsistencies between Rosales’s
written declaration and her testimony regarding (1) the sources and forms of
threatening communications Rosales received; (2) why competing cartels allegedly
made the same threats from the same phone number; (3) whether Rosales reported
the threats to the police; and (4) the circumstances of her reunification with the
father of her children in a small Washington state town. Rosales was evasive or
unresponsive when confronted about these inconsistencies. This record does not
“compel” a conclusion that Rosales was credible. See Silva-Pereira, 827 F.3d at
1185–86 (emphasis added); see also Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th
Cir. 2011).
Rosales’s argument that the IJ improperly failed to explain its reasoning in
denying the withholding-of-removal claim is unpersuasive, because the IJ stated on
the record that his adverse credibility finding was the basis for his decision. See
Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the agency
because “the IJ established a legitimate, articulable basis to question Farah’s
credibility and offered specific, cogent reasons for disbelief as required under our
law”). Accordingly, we also affirm the BIA’s determination on Rosales’s

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4 22-1980
withholding of removal claim. See id. (“Because we affirm the BIA’s
determination that Farah failed to establish eligibility for asylum, we also affirm
the denial of Farah’s application for withholding of removal.”).
Though the adverse credibility determination did not “necessarily defeat
[her] CAT claim,” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014), Rosales
does not identify independent record evidence that “meet[s] the high threshold of
establishing that it is more likely than not that [she] will be tortured by or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official,” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924,
927 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 361 (9th
Cir. 2017). She therefore has not “establish[ed] entitlement to protection under
CAT.” Plancarte Sauceda, 23 F.4th at 834.
PETITION DENIED.

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