United States of America v. Eghbal Saffarinia

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 11, 2024 Decided May 17, 2024
No. 23-3080
UNITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
EGHBAL S AFFARINIA ,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:19-cr-216)
Jennifer E. Fischell argued the cause for appellant. With
her on the briefs were Eric R. Nitz, Justin V. Shur, and Robert
Y. Chen.
Sonja M. Ralston, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were
Edward Sullivan and John Taddei, Trial Attorneys, Public
Integrity Section Criminal Division.
Before: H ENDERSON and WILKINS , Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
EDWARDS .
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge: For five years, Eghbal
Saffarinia (“Saffarinia” or “Appellant”) was a high-ranking
official within the Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s Office of the Inspector General (“HUD-OIG”).
Federal law mandated that, because of his seniority and level
of responsibility within the federal government, Saffarinia was
required to file annual financial disclosure forms detailing most
of his financial liabilities over $10,000. This form, the Office
of Government Ethics (“OGE”) Form 278, allows federal
government agencies to learn of, investigate, and evaluate
potential conflicts of interest among senior government
officials. The disclosure requirements, in turn, promote the
ideals of ethics and transparency in the administration of the
federal government.
One of Saffarinia’s central responsibilities within HUD-
OIG was the allocation of HUD-OIG’s information technology
(“IT”) contracts. These contracts involve extensive financial
commitments by HUD-OIG that stretch over multiple years
and are worth tens of millions of dollars. Because the contracts
are so lucrative, they are highly attractive to potential
contractors.
In 2014, a contractor who lost out on a HUD-OIG contract
filed a bid protest, resulting in an investigation that uncovered
Saffarinia’s repeated falsifications of his Forms 278 and
failures to disclose financial liabilities over $10,000. The
investigation also revealed that one of the persons from whom
Saffarinia had borrowed money was the owner of an IT
company that had been awarded HUD-OIG IT contracts during

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the time when Saffarinia had near-complete power over the
agency operation.
Following a thorough investigation, the Government
presented criminal charges against Saffarinia to a federal grand
jury. The grand jury indicted Saffarinia on seven counts,
including three counts of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1519. A jury then convicted Saffarinia on all seven counts.
The District Court sentenced Saffarinia to a year and a day in
federal prison, followed by one year of supervised release.
Saffarinia now appeals his conviction. First, he argues that
Section 1519 does not extend to alleged obstruction of an
agency’s review of Forms 278 because review of these forms
is insufficiently formal to fall within Section 1519’s ambit.
Second, he argues that the evidence presented at trial diverged
from the charges contained in the indictment, resulting in either
the constructive amendment of the indictment against him or,
in the alternative, a prejudicial variance. Finally, Saffarinia
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented against
him at trial.
On the record before us, we can find no basis to overturn
Saffarinia’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
I. B ACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Certain high-ranking government officials are required to
report most financial liabilities over $10,000 via OGE Form
278. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.201(a), 2634.202(c), 2634.305. As
noted above, these forms allow an agency to investigate
potential conflicts of interest and ensure the propriety of

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agency officials’ work. The forms that are filed are reviewed
by multiple officials within the agency, including by legal
counsel within HUD-OIG and by an attorney in HUD’s Office
of General Counsel whom OGE has designated as HUD’s
“agency ethics official.”
Between 2012 and 2017, Saffarinia served as HUD-OIG’s
Assistant Inspector General for Information Technology, and
later as the Assistant Inspector General for Management and
Technology. Saffarinia was part of the Senior Executive
Service (“SES”), a class of top-ranking officials and managers
within the federal government’s civil service. Because of his
seniority and rank as an SES official, Saffarinia was required
to file Forms 278 annually.
As part of his duties within HUD-OIG, Saffarinia oversaw
HUD-OIG’s selection of an IT Services contractor. The IT
contract is the largest contract HUD-OIG has, with typical
terms running five to seven years and totaling between 20 to 30
million dollars. Prior to Saffarinia’s arrival at HUD-OIG, STG
Incorporated (“STG”) had provided HUD-OIG with IT
services for about a year under a short-term “bridge” contract,
a form of contract the agency uses to maintain IT support in
between its award of longer-term contracts. STG had also
submitted a bid to serve the agency under a longer-term
contract and, at least inside the agency, STG had been
identified as the likely winner of the long-term contract.
However, when Saffarinia assumed leadership of the operation
in early 2012, he cancelled the pending contract award to STG.
Following the cancellation, a vice president at STG contacted
Saffarinia to discuss how STG could best serve HUD-
OIG’s IT, both in its current bridge contract and moving
forward. In a meeting with STG officers, Saffarinia suggested
that the company consider subcontracting with Orchid
Technologies (“Orchid”), a company owned by

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Saffarinia’s friend, Hadi Rezazad. Saffarinia never explained
why he recommended Orchid, nor did he reveal his personal or
financial relationship with Rezazad. Pursuant to Saffarinia’s
advice, STG arranged for Orchid to become one of its
subcontractors even though STG officers had never previously
heard of the company. STG, partnering with Orchid, then won
the HUD-OIG IT contract.
STG’s contract was cancelled and reopened for bids a little
more than a year later. In this round of solicitations, Orchid
partnered with a different company and won HUD-OIG’s
contract, which was valued at 17 million dollars. STG
subsequently filed a bid protest. Over the next year, STG’s
protest resulted in “multiple corrective actions,” in which
HUD-OIG “acknowledge[d]” problems in the contracting
process and attempted to correct them. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”)
1074. STG ultimately alleged that Saffarinia had steered
contracts to Orchid because of his relationship with Rezazad.
Around the same time, Saffarinia was also accused of
workplace misconduct and favoritism towards certain
employees.
Because of Saffarinia’s high-ranking position within the
agency office normally tasked with investigating allegations of
official misconduct, HUD-OIG could not investigate either the
contract-steering or misconduct accusations against Saffarinia
due to a conflict of interest. HUD-OIG therefore referred both
allegations to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency (“CIGIE”), an entity required by statute to
identify an impartial OIG to investigate allegations of
misconduct against officials in positions such as the one held
by Saffarinia. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 11(d).
Following an initial stage of the investigation led by the
OIG of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the

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contract-steering allegations against Saffarinia were referred to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) for further inquiry.
Through a yearslong inquiry conducted with assistance from
HUD-OIG staff, the FBI learned that Rezazad had loaned
Saffarinia $80,000 in 2013. Saffarinia had also received a
$90,000 loan from a neighbor, Patricia Payne. Saffarinia did
not report the loan from Rezazad on his 2014, 2015, or 2016
Forms 278, nor did he report the loan from Payne on his 2016
Form 278.
B. Procedural History
A federal grand jury indicted Saffarinia on seven charges
on June 25, 2019. Count 1 of the indictment charged Saffarinia
with concealment of a material fact (his relationship with
Rezazad) under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) and (2). Counts 2-4
charged Saffarinia with false statements, specifically his failure
to disclose his loans from Rezazad and Payne, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Counts 5-7 of the indictment charged
Saffarinia with obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1519,
based on the allegation that Saffarinia had “falsely failed to
report certain liabilities owed in the form of promissory notes”
on “forms to be filed with HUD and OGE,” with the intent to
obstruct the “investigation” or “proper administration” of “a
matter within the jurisdiction of a department and agency of the
United States.” J.A. 56.
In July 2019, Saffarinia moved for a bill of particulars,
seeking further clarification of the investigation or matter that
underlay the obstruction-of-justice charge. The Government
opposed the motion and the District Court denied Saffarinia’s
request, finding that the indictment provided Saffarinia with
sufficient notice of the matters and investigations at issue and
explicitly identified the false statements Saffarinia was accused
of making on his Forms 278. The District Court thus held that

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Saffarinia had “sufficient information through discovery” to
mount an adequate defense. United States v. Saffarinia, 422 F.
Supp. 3d 269, 278 (D.D.C. 2019).
Saffarinia also sought to exclude evidence relating to the
misconduct allegations. The District Court granted the motion
in part, based on a concern over “the significant risk of unfair
prejudice that would come from informing the jury that another
entity investigated Mr. Saffarinia, found impropriety, and
removed him from his position.” J.A. 776. The Government
moved to clarify the District Court’s ruling and, in response,
the District Court allowed the Government to explain the
process of and provide evidence regarding the CIGIE/FBI
investigation as evidence regarding the investigation Saffarinia
was alleged to have obstructed.
Following a jury trial, Saffarinia was convicted on all
counts. Saffarinia then sought a judgment of acquittal or a new
trial. The District Court denied Saffarinia’s motion. The
District Court subsequently sentenced Saffarinia to one year
and one day in prison. Saffarinia now appeals his conviction.
C. Statutory Background
Passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section
1519 “instituted new penalties for fraud and obstruction of
justice following ‘a series of celebrated accounting debacles.’”
United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 710 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010)). At the time of its passage,
Congress was especially concerned with the destruction or
coverup of “evidence of financial wrongdoing.” Yates v. United
States, 574 U.S. 528, 536 (2015). The text of the statute
provides:

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Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates,
conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in
any record, document, or tangible object with the intent
to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or
proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1519. In Yates, the Supreme Court clarified the
scope of Section 1519, tying its application to “its financial-
fraud mooring,” Yates, 574 U.S. at 532, and held that
“‘[t]angible object’ in § 1519 . . . cover[s] only objects one can
use to record or preserve information, not all objects in the
physical world,” id. at 536.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review preserved claims of statutory interpretation,
constructive amendment to an indictment, and variance from
an indictment de novo. See United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d
347, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Mize, 814 F.3d 401,
408 (6th Cir. 2016). In considering a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction, we “must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government
and accept the jury’s guilty verdict if we conclude that any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

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Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(quotations omitted).
B. The Scope of Section 1519
At the threshold, Saffarinia argues that his alleged
wrongdoings are not proscribed by Section 1519. He claims:
Section 1519 requires “intent to impede, obstruct,
or influence” one of the following: (1) an existing or
contemplated “investigation” within a federal agency’s
jurisdiction; (2) the “proper administration of [an
existing or contemplated] matter” within a federal
agency’s jurisdiction; or (3) an existing or contemplated
“case filed under title 11 [the Bankruptcy Code].” The
ordinary-course review of Saffarinia’s Forms 278 by
HUD or OGE does not qualify: Neither “investigation”
nor “matter” encompasses routine review of a form.
Brief (“Br.”) for Appellant 46. We disagree.
Section 1519 is capacious, reflecting a deliberate choice
by Congress to capture the sorts of activity with which
Saffarinia was charged. The text of the statute reaches anyone
who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1519. Here, Saffarinia was charged with
lying on his Forms 278 – or, to use Section 1519’s words,
“falsif[ying] . . . document[s]” – which are administered,
reviewed, and subject to further investigation by HUD and
OGE, both a “department or agency of the United States.”
There is little reason for us to linger over this question of

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statutory interpretation: the charges against Saffarinia fit
Section 1519’s bill.
It is undisputed that Section 1519 was passed to close
loopholes in the existing framework of liability for obstruction
of justice. See S. R EP . No. 107-146, at 14 (2002); see also
Yates, 574 U.S. at 536 (“Section 1519 cured . . . conspicuous
omission[s]” in the prior regime.). “[O]bstruction of justice is
a crime that Congress . . . has aggressively sought to deter.”
United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1159 (11th Cir.
2013). In line with this purpose, Congress intentionally wrote
Section 1519 as a “statute of substantial breadth.” Yielding, 657
F.3d at 713. The Senate Report on Section 1519 explains that,
“[w]hen a person destroys evidence with the intent of
obstructing any type of investigation and the matter is within
the jurisdiction of a federal agency, overly technical legal
distinctions should neither hinder nor prevent prosecution and
punishment.” S. R EP . 107-146, at 7. The Senate Report goes on
to make specific note that Section 1519 is “meant to do away
with the distinctions, which some courts have read into
obstruction statutes, between court proceedings, investigations,
regulatory or administrative proceedings (whether formal or
not), and less formal government inquiries, regardless of their
title.” Id. at 15.
Saffarinia argues that Section 1519 applies only to formal,
adversarial, or adjudicative proceedings, not merely “form-
review.” Br. for Appellant 47. There is no such limitation in
Section 1519. “If Congress’s goal were to criminalize a subset
of obstructive behavior, it easily could have used words that
precisely define that subset[.]” United States v. Fischer, 64
F.4th 329, 344 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 144 S. Ct. 537 (2023).
Here, Congress used no words, precise or otherwise, to
reference a requirement of formality. Indeed, the legislative
history shows its purpose was the exact opposite. With the

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enactment of Section 1519, Congress sought “to do away with
the distinctions . . . some courts [had] read into obstruction
statutes” imposing a floor of formality. S. R EP . 107-146, at 15.
Nor does the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “due
administration” in Marinello v. United States, 584 U.S. 1
(2018), control the construction of the distinct phrase “proper
administration” under Section 1519. In Marinello, the Supreme
Court interpreted a clause of the Internal Revenue Code which
made it a felony to “‘corruptly or by force’ to ‘endeavo[r] to
obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of” the Tax Code.
Id. at 4 (alterations in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)).
The Court held that “‘due administration of [the Tax Code]’
does not cover routine administrative procedures that are near-
universally applied to all taxpayers, such as the ordinary
processing of income tax returns.” Id. (alteration in original).
Saffarinia claims that because the Supreme Court found that
certain routine administrative procedures did not fall within
“due administration” of the Tax Code, HUD and OGE’s review
of Forms 278 does not fall within “proper administration”
under Section 1519. We are not persuaded.
Congress passed Section 1519 with text and a purpose quite
distinct from the statute considered in Marinello. See United
States v. Scott, 979 F.3d 986, 992 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting “the
clear differences between the statutory language at issue in
Marinello and that of § 1519”). Key is that Congress wrote
Section 1519 in unmistakably broad terms, whereas such clear
breadth was not present in the statute under consideration in
Marinello. See Marinello, 584 U.S. at 7 (finding that the “literal
language of the statute is neutral” as to its breadth). With no
basis in text or congressional purpose, we cannot adopt

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Marinello’s interpretation of a different phrase in a distinct
context to control the construction of Section 1519.
C. Constructive Amendment and Variance
Contrary to Saffarinia’s claims, we find that the
Government neither constructively amended his indictment nor
prejudicially varied the charges against him. Saffarinia argues
that because the Government presented evidence about the
CIGIE/FBI investigation to the jury, Saffarinia was convicted
for obstruction of this investigation alone, a charge not
contained in the indictment. There is no basis in the record to
support this claim.
“An amendment of the indictment occurs when the
charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or
in effect, by prosecutor or court after the grand jury has last
passed upon them. A variance occurs when the charging terms
of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at
trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the
indictment.” Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnotes omitted). In functional terms, “a
constructive amendment changes the charge, while the
evidence remains the same; a variance changes the evidence,
while the charge remains the same.” United States v. Stuckey,
220 F.3d 976, 981 (8th Cir. 2000).
Though both pertain to departures from an indictment,
constructive amendment and prejudicial variance raise distinct
constitutional concerns. “An amendment is thought to be bad
because it deprives the defendant of his right to be tried upon
the charge in the indictment as found by the grand jury and
hence subjected to its popular scrutiny. A variance is thought
to be bad because it may deprive the defendant of notice of the
details of the charge against him and protection against

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reprosecution.” Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1071-72 (footnote
omitted). Thus, constructive amendment bears on a defendant’s
right under the Fifth Amendment to indictment by a grand jury
and requires no showing of prejudice for reversal whereas a
variance is relevant to a defendant’s right to notice under the
Sixth Amendment and must be prejudicial to warrant reversing
a defendant’s conviction. United States v. Adams, 604 F.3d
596, 599 (8th Cir. 2010).
To demonstrate constructive amendment of an indictment,
“the defendant must show that the evidence presented at trial
and the instructions given to the jury so modif[ied] the
elements of the offense charged that the defendant may have
been convicted on a ground not alleged by the grand jury’s
indictment.” United States v. Lorenzana-Cordon, 949 F.3d 1,
5-6 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
Attention to the fit between the jury instructions and the
indictment is particularly important as “jury instructions
requiring the jury to find the conduct charged in the indictment
before it may convict” provide the court with assurance that
“the jury convicted the defendant based solely on the conduct
actually charged in the indictment.” United States v. Ward, 747
F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Pless,
79 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (no constructive
amendment where jury could logically conclude that defendant
was guilty of crimes charged in indictment pursuant to
instructions given); United States v. Mize, 814 F.3d 401, 410
(6th Cir. 2016) (no constructive amendment where jury
instruction specifically explained that defendants could be
convicted only of the crimes charged in the indictment).
Here, Saffarinia cannot show constructive amendment
because there was no inconsistency between the indictment and
the jury instructions. Quite to the contrary, the jury instructions
closely tracked the language of the indictment. The indictment

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charged Saffarinia with causing falsified forms “to be filed
with HUD and OGE.” The District Court instructed the jury
that to convict Saffarinia under Section 1519, they must find
that he “acted with the intent to impede, obstruct or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter or in
contemplation of or relation to any such matter” and that “the
investigation or proper administration of a matter was within
the jurisdiction of HUD and OGE.” On the third element of the
crime, the District Court specifically instructed that, to convict
Saffarinia, the jury must “agree unanimously that Mr.
Saffarinia acted to impede, obstruct or influence an
investigation or proper administration of a matter by the U.S.
Department for Housing and Urban Development, by the U.S.
Office of Government Ethics or by both.”
The clarity of the jury instructions and their fidelity to the
indictment means that the jury could not have convicted
Saffarinia solely on basis of the evidence presented regarding
the CIGIE/FBI investigation. The jury instructions specified
that the jury could only convict Saffarinia if it found that he
had obstructed HUD or OGE’s investigations – no mention was
made of CIGIE or the FBI in the District Court’s instructions.
Accordingly, Saffarinia’s conviction is predicated either just on
the basis of the evidence of HUD-OGE review or on the basis
of the evidence concerning the CIGIE/FBI investigation
considered jointly with the evidence of HUD-OGE review.
Saffarinia’s contrary arguments are not compelling. In the
cases Saffarinia urges us to follow, the juries did not receive
instructions limiting the grounds upon which they could
convict. See, e.g., United States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290, 294-
95 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370,
380-81 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Adams, 778 F.2d 1117,
1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1985); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S.
212, 214 (1960). Saffarinia counters that, despite specifically

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referencing HUD and OGE, the jury instructions in his
prosecution failed to limit the bases for conviction because the
instructions did not explicitly name review of Forms 278 as the
HUD-OGE investigation Saffarinia obstructed. But this would
have been a step too far. Because HUD referred the
investigation to CIGIE given HUD’s own inability to
investigate in light of Saffarinia’s position, the jury could have
plausibly found that, as a matter of fact, CIGIE and the FBI
were acting as agents of HUD-OGE. The record before us
amply shows that the District Court properly instructed the jury
here.
We also find no merit in Saffarinia’s claim that the
Government varied the charges against him. As noted above, a
variance must be prejudicial in order to require reversal. See
Lorenzana-Cordon, 949 F.3d at 4 (“Variances warrant reversal
only when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” (quotations
omitted)). Saffarinia cannot meet this bar.
First, we are doubtful there was a variance. As noted
above, whether the CIGIE/FBI investigation was within HUD
and OGE’s jurisdiction was a question of fact for the jury to
determine. Thus, the jury could have reasonably based its
conviction on the understanding that CIGIE and the FBI acted
on HUD and OGE’s behalf in pursuing the investigation into
Saffarinia and that, in falsifying his Forms 278, Saffarinia
intended to obstruct the investigation consisting of CIGIE and
the FBI working at the direction of HUD and OGE. As the
Government consistently argued before and during trial, one of
the foreseeable consequences of Saffarinia’s falsification of his
Forms 278 was HUD and OGE’s referral of the conflict-of-

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interest investigation to CIGIE and the FBI. Thus, we see little
light between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial.
Second, even if we accept Saffarinia’s claim of variance,
it was decidedly not prejudicial. Relevantly, “a discrepancy
between the facts alleged in an indictment and the evidence
actually proffered may be cause for a new trial if the divergence
prejudiced the defendant by depriving him of notice of the
details of the charge against him.” United States v. Emor, 573
F.3d 778, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Here,
Saffarinia’s claim of lack of notice hinges on his discovery
strategy: he argues that he would have reviewed the
Government’s production differently and sought additional
discovery had he been on notice of the Government’s intention
to offer evidence of the CIGIE/FBI investigation at trial.
However, as the record shows, the Government produced a
considerable amount of discovery concerning the CIGIE/FBI
investigation. Saffarinia fails to offer any reason to think that
further discovery would have led him to new relevant
information concerning the CIGIE/FBI investigation or that it
would have materially affected his honest-mistake strategy at
trial.
D. Sufficiency of Evidence
Finally, the record before us convincingly shows that the
evidence presented at Saffarinia’s trial was sufficient to support
his conviction. The witness testimony presented by the
Government demonstrated that Saffarinia’s failure to disclose
the loans he received impeded HUD and OGE’s ability to
investigate possible conflicts of interest. As the Government’s
evidence made clear, HUD’s investigations of potential
conflicts of interest depend on accurate information in
employees’ Forms 278. Saffarinia quibbles with the formality
with which the Forms 278 are reviewed. However, as we have

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already noted, his argument misunderstands the proper scope
of the statute, which contains no formality requirement. Free
from this misreading, there is no question that a jury could
reasonably have found Saffarinia intended to obstruct HUD’s
investigation into conflicts of interest or proper administration
of its Forms 278 review based on the evidence presented at
trial.
As to Saffarinia’s other challenges to the jury instructions
and the District Court’s evidentiary rulings, we find no merit in
them. We reject these claims as well.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the District Court’s
judgment.

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