Larry Elliott Klayman v. Julia Porter

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued October 16, 2023 Decided June 11, 2024
No. 22-7123
LARRY ELLIOTT KLAYMAN,
APPELLANT
v.
JULIA PORTER, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Consolidated with 23-7120
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 20-cv-3109)
Larry E. Klayman, pro se, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for appellant.
Lide E. Paterno argued the cause for appellees. With him
on the brief were Preston Burton, Jackson Hagen, Mark J.
MacDougall, and Caroline L. Wolverton.

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Before: MILLETT and RAO, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge RAO.
MILLETT, Circuit Judge: In recent years, the District of
Columbia Bar’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel has initiated
multiple disciplinary investigations and proceedings against
attorney Larry Klayman. In response, Klayman has brought a
series of lawsuits against the District of Columbia Bar, the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and individual D.C. Bar
officials, alleging a variety of torts and constitutional claims.
We have previously affirmed dismissal of several of those
lawsuits.
In June 2020, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
ordered a ninety-day suspension of Klayman’s license to
practice law in the District of Columbia. Employees of the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel mailed notice of that
suspension to other jurisdictions to which Klayman is admitted
to practice law. Two of those jurisdictions then initiated
reciprocal disciplinary actions or investigations against him.
Klayman brought three lawsuits against the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel employees and the Chair of the D.C.
Board on Professional Responsibility, alleging that the
notification letters amounted to tortious interference and abuse
of process. The district court dismissed Klayman’s suits in full
and entered a pre-filing injunction restricting Klayman’s
ability to file any related actions or claims for relief in any
forum, state or federal.

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Klayman challenges both the pre-filing injunction and the
dismissal of his claims. We vacate the pre-filing injunction.
We affirm on immunity grounds the district court’s dismissal
of Klayman’s claims for damages, but we affirm in part and
reverse in part the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s
claims for injunctive relief.
I
A
All members of the District of Columbia Bar are subject
to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the D.C. Court of Appeals and
its Board on Professional Responsibility. D.C. Bar Rule XI,
§ 1(a); D.C. CODE § 11–2502.1 Accordingly, the Board has the
power to “consider and investigate any alleged ground for
discipline or alleged incapacity of any attorney * * * and to
take such action with respect thereto as shall be appropriate[.]”
D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 4(e)(1).
Members of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”)
prosecute attorney-discipline matters before the Board. See
D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 6(a)(4). In that role, Disciplinary Counsel
are empowered to investigate, prosecute, and dispose of all
matters involving alleged attorney misconduct, see id.
§ 6(a)(2)–(4), and to “maintain permanent records of all
matters processed and the disposition thereof,” id. § 6(a)(6).
D.C. Bar Rule XI provides that members of the Board and the
ODC “shall be immune from * * * civil suit for any conduct in
the course of their official duties.” Id. § 19(a).
1 All citations to D.C. Bar Rules refer to the Rules Governing the
District of Columbia Bar in place during the time period relevant to
this case.

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Over the past several years, the ODC has investigated and
sought discipline against Klayman multiple times. See, e.g., In
re Klayman, 282 A.3d 584, 587–590, 598 (D.C. 2022); In re
Klayman, 228 A.3d 713, 715–717, 719–720 (D.C. 2020);
Report and Recommendation of Hearing Committee Number
Nine at 1–2, In re Larry Klayman, No. 18-BD-070 (D.C. Bd.
Prof. Resp. Sept. 20, 2023).
Klayman, for his part, has repeatedly sued the District of
Columbia Bar, the ODC, and individual D.C. Bar officials,
alleging tortious conduct and constitutional harms arising from
their proceedings against him. See generally Klayman v. Fox,
No. 18-cv-1579, 2019 WL 2396538 (D.D.C. June 5, 2019);
Klayman v. Lim, No. 18-cv-2209, 2019 WL 2396539 (D.D.C.
June 5, 2019); Order, Klayman v. Porter, No. 2020-CA-
000756-B (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2020); Klayman v. Porter,
No. 22-cv-80642, 2022 WL 4229383 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2022);
Klayman v. Kaiser, No. 21-cv-727, 2023 WL 8941317 (D.D.C.
Jan. 23, 2023); Klayman v. Porter, No. 22-cv-953, 2023 WL
2496738 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2023).
We have previously affirmed dismissals of several of these
suits. See Klayman v. Kaiser, No. 23-7020, 2023 WL 8890505,
at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 26, 2023); Klayman v. Lim, 830 F. App’x
660, 661 (D.C Cir. 2020); see also Klayman v. Porter, No. 23-
7034, 2024 WL 137330, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 2024).
As relevant here, in June 2020, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals accepted the Board’s recommendation that
the court suspend Klayman for ninety days for violating a
conflict-of-interest provision in the District of Columbia Rules
of Professional Conduct. See In re Klayman, 228 A.3d at 715;
see also D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 (Conflict of
Interest: Former Client). Klayman challenged the order by

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petitioning for rehearing and rehearing en banc. Both motions
were denied.
While Klayman’s rehearing petitions were pending before
the D.C. Court of Appeals, ODC employees sent ex parte
letters to courts to which Klayman is admitted that notified
them of the suspension order. The employees did not copy
Klayman on those communications.
Klayman alleges that, after receiving notice of the
suspension, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas opened a reciprocal disciplinary case against him,
directed the clerk to remove Klayman’s electronic filing
privileges, and ordered Klayman not to file any more cases in
that court. Klayman further alleges that the Ninth Circuit
issued an order to show cause as to why it should not issue
reciprocal discipline.
B
Klayman filed three separate lawsuits against the ODC
employees and Matthew Kaiser, the Chair of the Board,
(collectively, “ODC Employees”) in federal district courts in
Texas and California. See Complaint, Klayman v. Porter, 20-
cv-2526 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2020); Complaint, Klayman v.
Porter, 20-cv-1014 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2020); Complaint,
Klayman v. Kaiser, 20-cv-9490 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2020). In
each suit, Klayman alleged that the ODC Employees were
engaged in a politically motivated agenda aimed at removing
him from the practice of law, see App. 3, 103, 207, and asserted
that the ex parte letters tortiously interfered with his business
relationships with his clients and constituted an unethical abuse
of the attorney-discipline process, see App. 9–11, 109–111,
218–220. Klayman sought damages and, in one suit, an

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injunction ordering the ODC Employees to provide him with
copies of the ex parte letters. See App. 11–12, 111, 221.
The cases were transferred to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia and consolidated. The ODC
Employees subsequently filed two motions relevant to this
appeal. First, they moved for a permanent injunction that
would, among other things, prevent Klayman from “filing any
new action, complaint, or claim for relief against” the ODC
Employees, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, current and
former employees of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and
the Board of Professional Responsibility, or any D.C. Bar
officials “in any federal court, state court, or any other forum
* * * without first making application to and receiving the
consent of [the district court] and any other court where the
litigation is proposed to be filed.” App. 440. The ODC
Employees argued that such an injunction was necessary
because Klayman’s “vexatious” and “meritless” motions and
lawsuits imposed unjustified burdens on the parties and the
court, and had “extract[ed] a substantial personal toll on the
[ODC Employees] and their families[.]” App. 440 (quotation
marks omitted).
The ODC Employees also moved to dismiss Klayman’s
consolidated lawsuits in full, asserting that the D.C. Bar Rules
confer absolute immunity on ODC employees for their official
actions. The ODC Employees further argued that the court
should dismiss Klayman’s request for injunctive relief based
on Younger abstention, which generally obligates federal
courts to abstain from enjoining ongoing state proceedings.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971); see also

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Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,
457 U.S. 423, 431–435 (1982).2
The district court granted both motions in a single order.
To start, the district court entered a pre-filing injunction
against Klayman. The court’s order provided that:
[W]ithout first making application to and receiving
the consent of this Court or any other court where
additional litigation is proposed to be pursued,
[Klayman wa]s ENJOINED from:
(1) filing, in any federal court, any new action,
complaint, or claim for relief concerning any matter
derived from [Klayman’s] disciplinary proceedings
which are the subject of this case as well as Klayman
v. Fox, Civil Action No. 18-cv-1579; Klayman v. Lim,
Civil Action No. 18-cv-2209; and Klayman v. Porter,
No. 2020 CA 000756 B, and against the [ODC
Employees]; their employer, the Office of the
Disciplinary Counsel; current and former employees
2 The ODC Employees also filed a motion for a preliminary pre-
filing injunction in January 2022. See Defs.’ Mot. for Interim Relief,
Klayman v. Porter, No. 20-cv-3109 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2022), ECF No.
64. In June 2022, the district court entered an order enjoining
Klayman from “filing any additional lawsuits based upon the
previous and pending D.C. Bar proceedings against him” pending a
final ruling by the district court on the then-pending motions in the
case. Order, Klayman v. Porter, No. 20-cv-3109 (D.D.C. June 29,
2022), ECF No. 81. Klayman appealed, and we dismissed that
interlocutory appeal as moot after the district court issued the
permanent pre-filing injunction that is the subject of this appeal. See
Order, Klayman v. Porter, No. 22-7094 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 2, 2022).

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of the office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Board of
Professional Responsibility; or any D.C. Bar officials;
or
(2) serving or causing to be served any of the [ODC
Employees] with a subpoena or any other
instrumentality of civil discovery in any other legal
proceeding concerning any matter derived from
[Klayman’s] disciplinary proceedings which are the
subject of this case as well as Klayman v. Fox, Civil
Action No. 18-cv-1579; Klayman v. Lim, Civil Action
No. 18-cv-2209; and Klayman v. Porter, No. 2020 CA
000756 B.
App. 424 (formatting modified).
In imposing the pre-filing injunction, the court pointed to
six of Klayman’s complaints—including the three before it—
that it characterized as raising “essentially identical claims of
abuse of process regarding the [ODC Employees’] conduct in
relation to [Klayman’s] disciplinary proceedings[.]” App. 443.
The court labeled those suits “frivolous[,]” “harassing[,]” and
“well within the range that other members of th[e] court ha[d]
deemed sufficiently numerous and repetitive to warrant a pre-
filing injunction.” App. 444 (quotation marks omitted). The
court added that Klayman’s “serial lawsuits [had] extract[ed] a
substantial personal toll on the [ODC Employees] and their
families[.]” App. 445–446 (quotation marks omitted). Finally,
the district court found that Klayman “ha[d] a demonstrated
record of filing baseless motions accusing judges * * * of bias
and prejudice when they do not order the relief he seeks[,]” and
had previously “engaged in abusive language” and
“demonstrated disrespect and contempt” for the court. App.
446 (quotation marks omitted).

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In addition to issuing the pre-filing injunction, the district
court granted the ODC Employees’ motion to dismiss
Klayman’s consolidated actions in full.
The district court held that the ODC Employees were
entitled to absolute immunity from Klayman’s damages
claims. The court explained that the ODC Employees
“perform quasi-judicial functions” and that “D.C. Bar Rule XI
and D.C. Circuit precedent confer absolute immunity on the
defendants as officials who act in a quasi-judicial capacity[.]”
App. 450 (formatting modified).
The district court rejected Klayman’s argument that the
ODC Employees’ actions in sending the ex parte letters fell
outside of the scope of their duties. The court noted that D.C.
Bar Rule XI permits ODC disciplinary counsel to “disclose
information pertaining to proceedings resulting in informal
admonitions to any court, [or] to any other judicial tribunal or
disciplinary agency[.]” App. 452 (first alteration in original;
quoting D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 17(c)). The district court reasoned
that, “if the D.C. Bar Rules explicitly permit the disclosure of
informal admonitions, then it stands to reason that the ODC
would be permitted to disclose the fact of [Klayman’s]
suspension—a more serious sanction[.]” App. 452 (formatting
modified). The court added that the ex parte letters accorded
with the notice provisions of the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, and that
“providing notice to other jurisdictions regarding relevant
disciplinary action is the type of activity that is plainly within
the general matters committed to the [ODC Employees’]
discretion[.]” App. 453 (formatting modified); see App. 452–
453.
The district court further ruled that Klayman’s claims for
injunctive relief were barred by Younger abstention. The

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district court explained that Younger abstention generally
obligates federal courts to abstain from deciding claims
involving pending state-bar disciplinary proceedings “so long
as there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other
extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention
inappropriate[.]” App. 454 (quotation marks omitted); see
App. 453–454. The district court noted that there were at least
four disciplinary proceedings pending against Klayman in the
District of Columbia, and that Klayman’s claims of tortious
interference and abuse of process in the consolidated cases
before it “stem[med]” from what Klayman alleged was the
ODC Employees’ “political persecution of him in both the
closed and pending disciplinary actions.” App. 454. The
district court also found that Klayman’s assertions regarding
the ODC Employees’ “purported political motivations” fell
short of “a sufficient showing of bad faith, harassment, or some
other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention
inappropriate.” App. 455–456 (formatting modified).
C
Two months after the district court entered the pre-filing
injunction, Klayman filed a new suit against the ODC
Employees, this time in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. See Complaint, Klayman v. Sataki, 2022-CAB-
5235 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2022). In response, the ODC
Employees moved the district court to clarify that the pre-filing
injunction encompassed Klayman’s recently filed action and to
order Klayman to dismiss the claims in that suit. See Defs.’
Mot. for Clarification and Enforcement of Order Granting
Defs.’ Mot. for an Inj. Against Vexatious Litigation by Pl.,
Klayman v. Porter, 20-cv-3109 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2022), ECF
No. 101.

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In August 2023, the district court expanded its pre-filing
injunction to prohibit Klayman from “filing, in any federal
court, state court, or any other forum, any new action,
complaint, or claim for relief concerning any matter derived
from the plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings” without the
advance approval of the district court or the “court where
additional litigation is proposed to be pursued[.]” Order at 8,
Klayman v. Porter, 20-cv-3109 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2023), ECF
No. 111. The district court acknowledged that its prior
injunction had “expressly limit[ed]” the pre-filing injunction to
filings in federal court, id. at 3, but noted that the language in
the accompanying memorandum opinion was not similarly
circumscribed, see id. at 4. Because of that “ambiguity” in the
order’s scope, the court declined to enjoin Klayman’s Superior
Court action and limited the expanded injunction to future
filings. Id. at 7; see id. at 6–7.
II
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
We have jurisdiction to review the order granting the motion
to dismiss and granting the injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We have jurisdiction to review the August 2023 modification
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of
Klayman’s claims. See Statewide Bonding, Inc. v. Department
of Homeland Sec., 980 F.3d 109, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2020). We
review the district court’s decision to issue or modify an
injunction for abuse of discretion. See Cobell v. Kempthorne,
455 F.3d 301, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Bear Ranch, L.L.C. v.
Heartbrand Beef, Inc., 885 F.3d 794, 803 (5th Cir. 2018); cf.
United States v. All Assets Held at Credit Suisse (Guernsey)
Ltd., 45 F.4th 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[W]e review a

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district court’s refusal to modify an injunction for abuse of
discretion.”).
III
Klayman challenges both the pre-filing injunction and the
dismissal of his complaints. We vacate the pre-filing
injunction because Klayman’s litigation does not meet the very
high threshold for a nationwide restriction on a litigant’s
constitutional right of access to the courts. We affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for damages on
immunity grounds, but we reverse in part the district court’s
dismissal of his claims for injunctive relief because there was
no relevant pending state proceeding to support Younger
abstention at the time of the dismissal. We affirm on mootness
grounds the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for
injunctive relief against the now-former Board Chair Matthew
Kaiser.
A
Klayman first challenges the district court’s decision to
enter a pre-filing injunction. He raises both procedural and
substantive challenges, arguing that (1) the district court erred
by not conducting a full evidentiary hearing and by failing to
articulate sufficient reasoning for the injunction; and (2) the
ODC Employees did not meet the necessary standard for a pre-
filing injunction.
We need not reach Klayman’s procedural arguments
because we agree that a pre-filing injunction was not warranted
on this record. The handful of lawsuits on which the district
court based its pre-filing injunction were not sufficiently
prolific, frivolous, or harassing to warrant broadly restricting

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Klayman’s constitutional right of access to all courts and
forums, state and federal.
1
It is “well settled that a court may employ injunctive
remedies to protect the integrity of the courts and the orderly
and expeditious administration of justice.” Urban v. United
Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
Those remedies can include, in appropriate cases, pre-filing
injunctions that restrict a litigant’s ability to file certain actions
without prior leave of the court.
Pre-filing injunctions, though, must be a tool of last resort
and reserved for those rare and egregious cases in which the
“frivolous or harassing nature” of a litigant’s actions threatens
the “administration of justice” or the “integrity of the courts[.]”
In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 430–431 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (quotation marks omitted); see In re Martin-Trigona,
737 F.2d 1254, 1261–1262 (2d Cir. 1984) (pre-filing injunction
issued to protect party’s ability to participate fully in the
litigation). Courts impose that high threshold because such
injunctions can “unduly impair a litigant’s constitutional right
of access to the courts.” In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 430; see id.
at 431 (“[Pre-filing] injunctions should remain very much the
exception to the general rule of free access to the courts[.]”)
(quotation marks omitted).
For that reason, we have upheld the “extreme remedy” of
a pre-filing injunction only in “exigent circumstances.” In re
Powell, 851 F.2d at 431 (quotation marks omitted). For
example, in In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per
curiam), a pro se litigant had “deliberately flooded” state and
federal courts with 600 to 700 lawsuits over the course of a
decade. Id. at 782; see id. at 781. As a result, we directed the

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district court to enter a pre-filing injunction constraining the
litigant from filing “any civil action without leave of court.”
Id. at 787. Similarly, in Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d
1497 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam), we entered a pre-filing
injunction against a pro se litigant who had “flood[ed] the court
with meritless, fanciful claims” against “a variety of real and
imaginary government defendants[.]” Id. at 1498–1499. In
entering the injunction, we determined that the litigant was on
pace to file more than 100 appeals in this court in the coming
year. Id. at 1499. Underscoring the court’s “obligation to
protect and preserve the sound and orderly administration of
justice” from the institutional burden of a litigant with a
“fanatical desire to flood the courts[,]” we enjoined the litigant
from filing any civil action in a federal court of the United
States without first obtaining leave of that court. Id. at 1500
(quotation marks omitted).
2
Klayman’s six lawsuits are neither so prolific nor so
frivolous or harassing in their content that they threaten the
order or integrity of the courts’ operations. Nor did the district
court find that less draconian sanctions were unavailable or
would not work. In addition, the district court did not find, and
the record does not reflect, the type of egregious abuse of the
judicial process that would be necessary to support enjoining
litigation in all other courts and forums, state and federal.
First, the filing of six lawsuits across several jurisdictions
does not, without more, provide a sufficient predicate for the
extraordinary relief of a pre-filing injunction barring litigation
in the courts within the D.C. Circuit. See In re Powell, 851
F.2d at 431 (“Overall, the district court should look to both the
number and content of the filings as indicia of frivolousness
and harassment.”). Six lawsuits will rarely, if ever, threaten the

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courts’ ability to manage their dockets or disproportionately
burden the courts’ ability to operate efficiently and fairly. See
id. at 432 (finding that litigant’s thirteen filings did not pose a
sufficient threat to the orderly administration of justice to
warrant a pre-filing injunction). Contrast United States ex rel.
Yelverton v. Federal Ins. Co., 831 F.3d 585, 586–587 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (pre-filing injunction appropriate where, “[o]ver the
course of the bankruptcy proceedings, [litigant] filed over 40
lawsuits, adversary bankruptcy proceedings, or appeals of the
bankruptcy court’s rulings, and within those lawsuits over 150
motions”) (quotation marks omitted). Tellingly, the district
court here made no findings that Klayman’s six lawsuits
confounded its docket management or otherwise obstructed the
administration of justice.
Nor does the record support such a finding. Klayman’s
filings “fall far short of the level of the Green filings—over 600
in federal and state courts, of which thirty-eight were in our
district court alone[.]” In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 432. And they
are far more manageable than the filings in Urban, which
included “sixteen separate district court cases comprising one
consolidated appeal, twenty-eight separate appeals, and fifty
motions in the appellate court alone.” Id. Klayman’s six suits
in two years perhaps constitute an abnormally heavy flow of
litigation, but they do not amount to an intractable flood.
Contrast Urban, 768 F.2d at 1498–1499; In re Green, 669 F.2d
at 781–783.
Second, the district court did not support its
characterization of Klayman’s suits as frivolous with
“substantive findings[.]” In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 431.
Klayman’s lawsuits stop short of the pervasively frivolous and
facially insubstantial character that has supported pre-filing
injunctions in prior cases. Contrast Urban, 768 F.2d at 1499
(“[I]n his first visit to this court, Mr. Urban sought an

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emergency stay of the second inauguration of President
Reagan. Revealing himself at that time to be a self-proclaimed
presidential candidate, Mr. Urban cited his residency in the
Milkyway Galaxy as a jurisdictional basis for that action.”).
Instead, the district court equated the repetitive nature of
Klayman’s filings with frivolity, pointing out that the six
complaints contained “essentially identical claims[.]” App.
443. But the three consolidated cases that are the subject of
this appeal do not simply replicate already-rejected claims.3
Contrast In re Green, 669 F.2d at 782. As the district court
acknowledged, the “consolidated cases include additional
factual allegations concerning the [ODC Employees’] mailing
of ex parte letters to notify other jurisdictions of [Klayman’s]
disciplinary actions,” App. 444 (formatting modified), and
involve legal claims about those notices that have not before
been adjudicated. In other words, this case does not involve
the type of voluminously “duplicative” lawsuits that we found
warranted a pre-filing injunction in Green. 669 F.2d at 782.
Notably absent in the district court’s frivolity analysis was
a finding that Klayman’s claims were, as a matter of law,
“irrational” or “incoherent,” or that they “evidence[d] a
‘complete lack of any substantive allegations[.]’” In re Powell,
3 We have previously explained that, “[w]hile it may be appropriate
to review a pending action for the limited purpose of determining
whether the litigant has filed similar claims or for analyzing the
prospective effect of the claims,” courts should not “characterize
pending claims as frivolous except to the extent that they are similar
to ones already so characterized.” In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 431.
Because the district court considered the three consolidated cases
before it only for these limited purposes, see App. 443–446, we need
not decide whether those cases—which the district court dismissed
after analyzing whether a pre-filing injunction was appropriate—
were “pending” at the time of the court’s analysis.

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851 F.2d at 432 (formatting modified) (quoting Urban, 768
F.2d at 1499). The district court did not, in other words, find
they involved the “obvious lack of merit” that has supported
pre-filing injunctions in the past. Id. This absence is
particularly glaring since only one of Klayman’s previously
dismissed suits was arguably treated as frivolous by the
dismissing court. Compare Klayman v. Fox, No. 18-cv-1579,
2019 WL 2396538, at *1 (D.D.C. June 5, 2019) (dismissing
claims on Younger and immunity grounds and based on the non
sui juris status of the ODC), and Klayman v. Lim, No. 18-cv-
2209, 2019 WL 2396539, at *1 (D.D.C. June 5, 2019)
(dismissing claims on Younger and immunity grounds, based
on the non sui juris status of the ODC, and for failure to state a
claim), with Klayman v. Porter, No. 2020-CA-000756-B, slip
op. at 12–14 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2020) (sanctioning
Klayman for filing claims similar to those the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia had twice dismissed).
Third, the district court did not find, and the record in these
consolidated cases does not reflect, an “intent to harass” the
ODC Employees or the courts. In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 431.
Certainly nothing on the face of Klayman’s complaints is, by
its very nature, “oppressive and burdensome to the * * * point
of harassment[.]” Id. at 433. Nor does the content of
Klayman’s filings show that Klayman’s litigation goal is to
burden the ODC Employees and the courts, rather than to seek
redress of alleged legal grievances. Contrast In re Green, 669
F.2d at 782 n.8 (“The major goal of [Green’s group] is to flood
the courts with prisoner civil rights complaints. At some point,
Green believes, the courts will ‘cry uncle’ and the prisoners
(read: Green) will obtain early release in return for a promise
to put away pen and paper.”) (citation omitted); In re Martin-
Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1261 (finding that litigant “used legal
processes solely to harass parties to federal litigation, their
counsel, judicial personnel and their families”).

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18
To be sure, the district court referenced what it considered
to be harassing litigation that Klayman had aimed at the court
system at other times. See App. 446 (commenting that
Klayman “has a demonstrated record of filing baseless motions
accusing judges * * * of bias and prejudice when they do not
order the relief he seeks[,]” has engaged in “abusive language,”
and has “demonstrated disrespect and contempt for th[e
courts]”) (formatting modified). But the court did not elaborate
on that point, and there is no indication that the six cases on
which the district court grounded its pre-filing injunction were
themselves purposely wielded as tools of harassment. See
App. 442–447.
In short, although litigiousness need not rise to the level of
abuse of process manifested in Urban and Green before a pre-
filing injunction may issue, the record here does not show how
the integrity of the court or the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice “has been so impeded as to require
such an extreme sanction.” In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 434; see
id. at 433–434.
Fourth, we recognize that repetitious lawsuits can take
time and resources from those sued and the courts that
adjudicate them. But those concerns must be balanced against
the Constitution’s protections of due process and access to the
courts. See U.S. CONST. Amends. I, V; Bill Johnson’s
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (“[T]he
right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment
right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”).
And while pre-filing injunctions are the last tool in a
court’s tool chest, district courts have other tools available to
them to address repetitive and unduly burdensome litigation.
For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

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19
precedent allow the imposition of targeted sanctions or awards
of attorney’s fees to deter litigation abuses. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(c); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 53–54 (1991)
(“The award of attorney’s fees for bad faith * * * vindicates the
District Court’s authority over a recalcitrant litigant” and
“compensates a private party for the consequences of a
contemnor’s disobedience.”) (formatting modified); National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639, 643 (1976) (explaining that sanctions “penalize those
whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction” and
“deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the
absence of such a deterrent”). Those commonly employed and
effective tools can deter misconduct while compensating other
parties for unwarranted litigation burdens.
Imposing lesser sanctions before resorting to a pre-filing
injunction protects against undue incursions onto a litigant’s
constitutional right of access to the courts “while preserving
the court’s ability to deter and punish abuses of the judicial
process.” Shepherd v. ABC, 62 F.3d 1469, 1479 (D.C. Cir.
1995); see Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. America, Inc., 390 F.3d
812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004) (Courts must consider “the adequacy
of alternative sanctions” before entering a pre-filing
injunction.); Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24
(2d Cir. 1986) (similar); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (“A
sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated.”).
Yet, in this case, the district court neither tried alternative
means of addressing any perceived improper litigation tactics
nor explained why nothing else would work. There is no need
to haul out a sledgehammer if a tack hammer will suffice.

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20
Finally, in extending the pre-filing injunction to cover
filings in all courts, state and federal, as well as “any other
forum,” the district court went too far. Order at 8, Klayman v.
Porter, 20-cv-3109 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2023), ECF No. 111.
Courts must ensure that the breadth of any pre-filing
injunction is commensurate with and necessitated by the extent
of misconduct, harassment, or abuse. And courts should tread
especially carefully when purporting to regulate access to other
federal trial or appeals courts outside their circuit. Absent an
exceptionally egregious abuse of the judicial process, courts
should leave it to other jurisdictions to decide for themselves
how best to address improper litigation before them. See
Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“It is not reasonable for a court in this Circuit to
speak on behalf of courts in other circuits in the country; those
courts are capable of taking appropriate action on their own.”).
Federal courts should exercise even more caution when
enjoining access to state courts. Whatever the scope of federal
courts’ ability to address frivolous and harassing litigation that
burdens their effective functioning, federalism principles
“militate[] against extension of the terms of [such]
injunction[s] to state courts.” In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d
at 1263. After all, “[a]buse of state judicial processes is not per
se a threat to the jurisdiction of Article III courts and does not
per se implicate other federal interests.” Id. Furthermore, the
imposition of a pre-filing injunction can create work for and
impose burdens on personnel in those state courts. Here, for
example, the district court’s order obligated judges on the other
courts to expend time and resources prescreening filings and
attempting to determine, at the very threshold of a case, their
relationship to unfamiliar litigation that occurred in a distant
forum. See Order at 8, Klayman v. Porter, 20-cv-3109 (D.D.C.
Aug. 30, 2023), ECF No. 111 (enjoining Klayman from filing

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21
“any new action, complaint, or claim for relief concerning any
matter derived from [Klayman’s] disciplinary proceedings
which are the subject of this case as well as [three other cases]”
without the consent of the relevant court). Federal courts
should be loath to restrict access to state courts or to
unilaterally impose extra administrative burdens on state-court
personnel. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935
(1997) (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States’ officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program.”).
In addition, courts generally lack the authority to restrict
access to the courts that sit in review of their decisions. This
court would have no power to enter an injunction that purports
to restrain access to the Supreme Court. Nor should district
courts include appellate courts within their pre-filing
injunctions absent the most compelling necessity.
In this case, the record does not support the exceptional
remedy of a pre-filing injunction even within the courts of the
D.C. Circuit, and so it necessarily falls far short of warranting
the nationwide pre-filing injunction the district court entered.4
Courts, no doubt, have the power to prevent the
harassment of litigants, and they should analyze the harassing
nature of a litigant’s filings by considering the effect of those
filings on both the parties and the courts. See FED. R. CIV. P.
4 It is unclear what the district court’s restriction on filings in “any
other forum” meant to include. To the extent the district court
purported to constrain proceedings in the executive or legislative
branches of government, that restriction would only compound the
pre-filing injunction’s constitutional tenuity.

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22
11(c); In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 431; In re Martin-Trigona, 737
F.2d at 1262 (“[T]he United States Courts are not powerless to
protect the public, including litigants[,] from the depredations
of those who abuse the process of the Courts to harass and
annoy others with meritless, frivolous, vexatious or repetitive
proceedings.”) (formatting modified). The problem in this case
is that the district court neither tried less drastic remedies first
nor stayed within appropriate bounds when it entered a pre-
filing injunction of such sweeping breadth. For those reasons,
the pre-filing injunction is vacated.
B
Klayman separately challenges the district court’s
dismissal of his damages claims, arguing that the ODC
Employees are not absolutely immune from a suit for damages
arising from their sending of ex parte letters to the bars in other
jurisdictions.
Klayman is wrong. As he has been told before, absolute
immunity shields the ODC Employees from his damages
claims. Klayman, 830 F. App’x at 662; see Simons v.
Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 777–785 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re
Banks, 805 A.2d 990, 1001 (D.C. 2002) (applying Simons to
claims arising under D.C. law); D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 19(a).5
5 Klayman asserts that Texas substantive law governs the actions he
filed in the U.S. District Courts for the Western and Northern
Districts of Texas, while California substantive law governs the
action he filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California. See Klayman Br. 32–36. He does not identify, however,
any relevant differences between the substantive law of those
jurisdictions and the common-law sources of immunity and District
of Columbia Bar rule on which our prior cases rested. See Klayman,
830 F. App’x at 662; Simons, 643 F.2d at 777–785. Nor do there

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23
“D.C. officials charged with disciplining individuals engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law are ‘entitled to the
protection of absolute immunity.’” Klayman, 830 F. App’x at
662 (quoting Simons, 643 F.2d at 782); see Simons, 643 F.2d
at 777–785; In re Banks, 805 A.2d at 1001; D.C. Bar Rule XI,
§ 19(a). This immunity extends to any activities that are “not
manifestly beyond [the officials’] authority.” Simons, 643 F.2d
at 786.
Here, the ODC Employees’ decision to send ex parte
letters was not manifestly beyond their discretion in carrying
out their official duties. The D.C. Bar Rules generally allow
them to communicate with other jurisdictions about informal
disciplinary matters. See D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 17(c)
(“Disciplinary Counsel may disclose information pertaining to
proceedings resulting in informal admonitions to any
court[.]”). The ODC Employees’ judgment that they equally
have the authority to inform other jurisdictions about formal
appear to be any relevant differences in the provision of absolute
immunity. Compare D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 19(a) (“Members of the
Board, its employees, members of Hearing Committees, Disciplinary
Counsel, and all assistants and employees of Disciplinary Counsel,
all persons engaged in counseling, evaluating or monitoring other
attorneys pursuant to a Board or Court order or a diversion
agreement, and all assistants or employees of persons engaged in
such counseling, evaluating or monitoring shall be immune from
* * * civil suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties.”),
and Simons, 643 F.2d at 777–785 (applying common-law immunity
doctrines), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6079.1(g) (“[A]ny
employee of the State Bar assigned to the State Bar Court shall have
the same immunity that attaches to judges in judicial proceedings in
this state.”), and TEX. R. DISC. PROC. 17.09 (“[A]ll officers and
Directors of the State Bar, and the staff members of the
aforementioned entities are immune from suit for any conduct in the
course of their official duties.”). Klayman thus has not shown that
the choice-of-law question has any effect on the outcome of this case.

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24
charges was the type of decision that is not manifestly beyond
their discretion. Indeed, the American Bar Association Model
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contemplate that
disciplinary proceedings will result in notice letters like those
the ODC Employees sent. See MODEL RULES FOR LAW.
DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 22 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (“If a
lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also
admitted in another jurisdiction[,] * * * [d]isciplinary counsel
in the forum jurisdiction should be notified by disciplinary
counsel of the jurisdiction where the original discipline or
disability inactive status was imposed.”); cf. D.C. Bar Rule XI,
§ 11(b) (“It shall be the duty of Disciplinary Counsel to obtain
copies of all orders of discipline from other disciplining
courts.”).
Because the ODC Employees are absolutely immune from
Klayman’s damages claims, the district court properly
dismissed them.
C
Finally, Klayman argues that the district court erred by
dismissing his claims for injunctive relief under the Younger
abstention doctrine. See Klayman Br. 44–46. “Federal-court
abstention from interference with pending state proceedings
(including D.C. proceedings) is appropriate” if “‘there is no
showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary
circumstance’ on the part of the state ‘that would make
abstention inappropriate.’” Klayman, 830 F. App’x at 662
(quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 435).
Klayman argues that abstention was not appropriate because
the disciplinary proceedings at issue and related ex parte letters
were retaliatory and in bad faith. See Klayman Br. 44–46.

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25
Klayman points to no factual support in the record for his
assertions of bad faith or retaliation. Nonetheless, Younger
abstention was not warranted in this case for the
straightforward reason that there was no relevant pending state
proceeding at the time of the district court’s decision. The
disciplinary proceeding resulting in the ninety-day suspension
order concluded on June 11, 2020. See In re Klayman, 228
A.3d at 713. And Klayman did not bring his lawsuits until after
the ODC Employees began sending notification letters
regarding that suspension to other jurisdictions. By that time,
all D.C. court proceedings and actions relevant to the
consolidated cases before the district court had concluded.
Accordingly, there was no relevant “ongoing” state proceeding
that could provide a predicate for Younger abstention at the
time the district court ruled. Middlesex County Ethics Comm.,
457 U.S. at 437.6
For that reason, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief as to all of the ODC
Employees other than Kaiser. We affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief against
Kaiser on mootness grounds because Kaiser no longer serves
on the Board. See ODC Employees Br. 5 n.1; Meza v. Renaud,
6 The ODC Employees state that they have now provided Klayman
with copies of the letters, a point Klayman appears to dispute.
Compare ODC Employees’ Letter Pursuant to FRAP 28j Advising
of Additional Authorities (Dec. 4, 2023), with Klayman Response to
ODC Employees’ Letter Pursuant to FRAP 28j Advising of
Additional Authorities (Dec. 4, 2023). On remand, the district court
will have to determine whether any of Klayman’s requests for
injunctive relief remain live. Cf. Drake v. Federal Aviation Admin.,
291 F.3d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding FOIA litigant’s requests
for information moot “because he ha[d] received all the documents
to which he [wa]s entitled”).

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26
9 F.4th 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“On de novo review, we
generally may affirm on any ground supported by the record.”).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s
pre-filing injunction, affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Klayman’s damages claims, and reverse the district court’s
dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief as to all of
the ODC Employees except Kaiser. We remand to the district
court for further proceedings on those injunctive-relief claims.
So ordered.

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RAO, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the court’s opinion
in full but write separately to highlight an open question about
the choice of law governing the D.C. Bar officials’ immunity
from these tortious interference and abuse of process claims.
While courts have held these officials are immune from
District law tort claims, they have not explained the applicable
law. 1 See In re Banks, 805 A.2d 990, 1001 (D.C. 2002);
Klayman v. Lim, 830 F. App’x 660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2020). In
previous cases, as in this one, the officials would be immune
under either federal or District law, making it unnecessary to
decide which law applies. See Op. 22 n.5. But in a future case,
in which the choice of law matters, the court would need to
decide. The choice of law question turns on the extent of
federal control over the D.C. Bar officials.
If the D.C. Bar officials are federal officials, their
immunity from District law claims would be governed by
federal law. See Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 244–45,
252–53 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593,
597 (1959). When determining whether officials serving in the
District of Columbia are federal or District officials for other
purposes, we consider who establishes the offices and controls
the officials: the federal government through Congress and the
President, or the local D.C. government through the D.C.
Council and Mayor. See, e.g., Close v. United States, 397 F.2d
686, 687 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (discussing
“federal control” when applying the Federal Tort Claims Act’s
definition of “Federal Agency”); Cannon v. United States, 645
F.2d 1128, 1140–42 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (narrowing Close but
1 Simons v. Bellinger, our leading case on D.C. Bar officials’
immunity, involved only federal law claims, immunity from which
is governed by federal law. 643 F.2d 774, 776–85 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(relying on federal law immunity precedents without expressly
stating the choice of law).

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2
continuing to focus on whether the federal government has
“physical control”). For instance, in Johnson v. District of
Columbia, we concluded that the Superior Court Marshal was
a federal official because Congress created his office, the
President appointed him with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and federal officials supervised his work. 734 F.3d
1194, 1199–1200 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Because of the federal government’s extensive control
over the D.C. courts, which in turn control the D.C. Bar, the
D.C. Bar officials may be federal officials. Congress created
the D.C. Court of Appeals, an Article I court, and instructed it
to oversee D.C. Bar membership and discipline.2 Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973); District of Columbia
Court Reorganization Act of 1970 (“1970 Act”), Pub. L. No.
91-358, § 111, 84 Stat. 473, 475, 521 (codified at D.C. CODE
§§ 11-101(2), -2501 to -2503). Congress prohibits the D.C.
Council from modifying these provisions or any other part of
Title 11 of the D.C. Code, which governs the D.C. courts. See
District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 602(a)(4), 87 Stat.
774, 813 (1973) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 1-
206.02(a)(4)).
The Article I judges serving on the D.C. Court of Appeals
are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
1970 Act, 84 Stat. at 491. The D.C. Bar officials serve in offices
created by an Article I court, are supervised by that court, and
2 The district court and D.C. Bar officials erroneously attributed a
key statutory provision, D.C. Code § 11-2501(a), to the D.C. Council
when it was, in fact, enacted by Congress. Compare District of
Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358,
§ 111, 84 Stat. 473, 521, with Klayman v. Porter, 2022 WL 3715775,
at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), and D.C. Bar Officials Br. 40–41.

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3
carry out responsibilities established by federal law. See D.C.
Bar Rule XI. By contrast, the D.C. Council and Mayor have a
negligible role, if any, in the activities of D.C. Bar officials.
In a case in which the scope of immunity varies between
federal and District law, the court should decide whether the
D.C. Bar officials are federal officials whose immunity is
governed by federal law.

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