United States of America v. Jonathan Joshua Munafo

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued October 8, 2024 Decided December 31, 2024
No. 23-3187
UNITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
J ONATHAN J OSHUA M UNAFO ,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cr-00330-1)
Kevin Lerman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Reuven Dashevsky, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Matthew M.
Graves, U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nicholas P.
Coleman, and Sean P. Murphy, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: P ILLARD , P AN , and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge P ILLARD.

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P ILLARD, Circuit Judge: Jonathan Joshua Munafo
pleaded guilty to two charges related to his role in the January
6, 2021, attack on the United States Capitol. The district court
accepted the plea and entered a judgment of conviction. The
parties agreed that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range for the
offenses at issue was 30-37 months, and the court sentenced
Munafo to 33 months imprisonment.
On appeal, Munafo argues that the government breached
his plea agreement in two ways, and that he is entitled to
resentencing in conformity with the plea agreement as he reads
it. First, he asserts that the agreement required the dismissal of
a pending misdemeanor assault charge in D.C. Superior Court.
Second, he claims that the agreement barred the government
from referring at sentencing to some of Munafo’s past
statements and affiliations. We hold that Munafo has forfeited
the first objection by failing to press it before the district court,
and that in any event both fail on their merits because neither
argument is supported by the text of the plea agreement.
Munafo also asks that his sentence be vacated because—
he claims—it presents the appearance of having been based on
his constitutionally protected political speech and affiliations.
But in the plea agreement Munafo waived the right to appeal
his sentence, and we hold that he has made no colorable claim
of a miscarriage of justice that would support voiding that
waiver. We therefore affirm Munafo’s sentence.
I.
A.
The sentence at issue here stems from Munafo’s
participation in the mob attack on the United States Capitol on
January 6, 2021, waged to prevent Congress from certifying
President Biden as the winner of the 2020 Presidential Election.

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Unless otherwise specified, in describing the relevant facts we
rely on the Statement of Offense that Munafo confirmed was
“true and accurate” as part of his plea agreement. Statement of
Offense 6 (Appellant’s Appendix (App.) 57).
Munafo traveled to Washington, D.C., on January 6 to
support President Trump. On the afternoon of January 6,
Munafo joined a violent mob that breached the police line
surrounding the Capitol and overran the West Plaza. Capitol
Police then endeavored to block the rioters from forcing their
way into the Capitol Building through the Inauguration Tunnel.
Munafo was among the rioters who physically attacked law
enforcement officers in an effort to force their way through the
Inauguration Tunnel. During the fighting, rioters succeeded in
pulling Capitol Police Officer Michael Fanone out of the police
line. When Metropolitan Police Department Officer Neil
McAllister attempted to protect Fanone, Munafo punched
Officer McAllister twice and pulled McAllister’s riot shield out
of his grasp. Statement of Offense ¶ 10 (App. 55). Munafo
also used a flagpole to repeatedly strike a window of the
Capitol Building.
B.
The government charged Munafo with ten offenses.
Munafo agreed to plead guilty to Counts One and Two:
obstructing, impeding, and interfering with law enforcement
during a civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3)
(Count One) and assaulting, resisting, or impeding a federal
officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (Count Two).
Munafo also agreed that the aforementioned Statement of
Offense accurately described his conduct on January 6. In view
of the government’s agreement to support a three-level
reduction of Munafo’s offense level in return for his timely
acceptance of responsibility, Munafo’s estimated Sentencing

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Guidelines range was 30-37 months imprisonment. The parties
agreed that a sentence within that range would be “reasonable”
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even as they reserved the right to
seek a variance and request a sentence outside of that range.
Moreover, the Reservation of Allocution clause of the plea
agreement reserved to both parties “the right to describe
fully . . . to the sentencing judge[] the nature and seriousness of
[Munafo’s] misconduct, including any misconduct not
described in the charges to which [Munafo] is pleading guilty”
and to “inform the presentence report writer and the Court of
any relevant facts.” Plea Letter 5 (App. 44).
In return for Munafo’s guilty plea, the government
promised to “request that the Court dismiss the remaining
counts of the Indictment.” Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). The
agreement also guaranteed that Munafo “will not be further
prosecuted criminally . . . for the conduct set forth in the
attached Statement of Offense.” Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). And
the government pledged that Munafo “will not be charged with
any non-violent criminal offense in violation of Federal or
District of Columbia law which was committed within the
District of Columbia by [Munafo] prior to the execution of this
Agreement and about which [the government] was made aware
by [Munafo] prior to the execution of this Agreement.” Plea
Letter 2 (App. 41).
Finally, Munafo agreed to waive his right to appeal his
sentence unless it exceeded the statutory maximum or
Guidelines range for his offenses of conviction.
C.
Both parties submitted memoranda in advance of
Munafo’s sentencing. Munafo sought to portray his conduct as
an aberrant departure from his peaceful political activity as a
“Front Row Joe”—a moniker for certain dedicated supporters

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of President Trump who queued for front row seats at campaign
rallies. The government emphasized Munafo’s history of
violent conduct, as well as allegations that Munafo recently
joined with inmates in the D.C. Jail to assault other inmates.
At Munafo’s sentencing hearing, the government
presented further information as showing Munafo’s lack of
respect for the law. First, the government quoted a statement
by Saundra Kiczenski, a fellow “Front Row Joe” who appears
next to Munafo in a picture included in Munafo’s own
sentencing memorandum, that the January 6 rioters “were just
there to overthrow the government.” Sentencing Tr. 7:16-17
(App. 128). Second, the government recounted that, on a
phone call to participants in a prayer vigil for January 6
prisoners, Munafo said that his case was before Judge Boasberg
and so he hoped to receive the “Boasberg discount” of a
sentence half as long as what the government recommended.
Sentencing Tr. 8:14-21 (App. 129). The government also noted
that Munafo praised the book Becoming a Barbarian, which—
as the government described it—urges readers to “choose your
values” and “go all in and devote [your] lives to one group of
people above all others.” Sentencing Tr. 8:22-9:12 (App. 129-
30). The government requested a sentence of 37 months.
For his part, Munafo denied that he had assaulted anyone
in jail as the government asserted. And, while he conceded that
the government’s sentencing recommendation was in line with
the plea agreement, Munafo objected that the government’s
sentencing presentation breached the agreement because it
covered topics beyond the agreed-upon Statement of Offense,
exceeded the limitations of the plea agreement’s Reservation
of Allocution clause, was based on unvetted and unreliable
statements, and sought to “impute the actions of others” to
Munafo. Sentencing Tr. 30:20-37:18 (App. 151-58).

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Munafo did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, but
instead requested “specific performance,” meaning a
resentencing at which the government would be prevented
from engaging in “allocution and advocacy that’s outside of the
agreed-upon framework by the parties.” Sentencing Tr. 35:13-
36:23, 37:17-18 (App. 156-58).
The district court ruled that the government had not
breached the agreement and emphasized that it based Munafo’s
sentence solely on his admitted conduct. The district court
sentenced Munafo to 33 months imprisonment, 36 months
supervised release, and a special assessment of $200. Munafo
reiterated his objection to the court “taking into account factors
that it wasn’t supposed to” in deciding his sentence.
Sentencing Tr. 45:15-20 (App. 166).
With the sentence determined and the proceeding drawn to
a close, Munafo’s counsel brought “one additional matter” to
the district court’s attention. Sentencing Tr. 46:5-13 (App.
167). Counsel stated his understanding that the government
also “agree[d] to dismiss and not charge Mr. Munafo in the
superior court for additional crimes that occurred prior to the
execution of the [plea] agreement,” including a pending D.C.
Superior Court misdemeanor charge unrelated to Munafo’s
conduct on January 6. Sentencing Tr. 46:5-13 (App. 167).
After a brief discussion of whether the plea agreement required
dismissing that charge, the district court said “[l]et me just look
at the agreement” and then announced it was “not going to say
anything about that” and suggested Munafo’s counsel speak to
the Superior Court division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
Sentencing Tr. 46:25, 47:3-7 (App. 167-68). Munafo’s counsel
acknowledged the court’s statement without objection.
Munafo timely appealed his sentence. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

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II.
We first address Munafo’s two claims of breach of the plea
agreement. To preserve a claim of error, a party must inform
the court “of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the
party’s objection to the court’s action and the grounds for that
objection.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b); see United States v. Mack,
841 F.3d 514, 525-26 (D.C. Cir. 2016). As to claims that
Munafo preserved, we “interpret the terms of the plea
agreement de novo” and, “[c]onsistent with constitutional
principles and the settled rule that contracts are construed
against their drafters, we construe any ambiguities . . . against
the government.” United States v. Moreno-Membache, 995
F.3d 249, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2021). “[T]he law demands clarity
when constitutional rights are waived.” Id. at 251. An
unpreserved claim of breach of a plea agreement, by contrast,
is reviewed only for plain error. Puckett v. United States, 556
U.S. 129, 143 (2009). Such a claim merits reversal only if the
breach was “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable
dispute,” the breach resulted in prejudice, and the breach
resulted in a “miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Thomas,
999 F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S.
at 135); see Fed R. Crim. P. 52(b).
Munafo asserts both that the plea agreement required the
dismissal of his D.C. Superior Court misdemeanor charge and
that it forbade some of the government’s factual assertions at
sentencing. We review the former claim for plain error,
because Munafo failed to obtain a ruling from the district court
on whether the plea agreement required that charge’s dismissal,
and review the latter argument de novo. Because each
challenge rests on an erroneous interpretation of the plea
agreement, we reject both arguments.

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A.
Munafo first argues that the plea agreement’s promise that
he “will not be charged with any non-violent criminal
offense . . . committed within the District of Columbia by [the
defendant] prior to the execution of this Agreement” required
that the government dismiss a 2020 misdemeanor assault
charge that, at the time of sentencing in this case, was pending
in D.C. Superior Court. Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). We hold that
the relevant provision of the plea agreement applies only to
hypothetical future charges based on Munafo’s pre-plea
conduct, and not to the already-pending 2020 assault charge.
We first determine whether Munafo preserved this issue
for appellate review. After the district court imposed the
sentence and, per the plea agreement, dismissed the remaining
counts of the indictment, Munafo’s counsel told the court that
he believed the plea agreement required the government also to
dismiss the 2020 assault charge. Sentencing Tr. 46:5-13 (App.
167). The government responded that “this wasn’t part of
something that they have requested of me beforehand,” and that
the Superior Court action “is not related to January 6. It’s a
separate incident that happened during a previous visit to
Washington, D.C.” Sentencing Tr. 46:18-22 (App. 167).
Without expressly ruling on whether Munafo’s interpretation
of the plea agreement was correct, the district court declared “I
am not going to say anything about that” issue and suggested
that Munafo’s counsel discuss it with the U.S. Attorney’s
Office. Sentencing Tr. 47:3-7 (App. 168). Rather than object
or demand that the district court rule on the question, Munafo’s
counsel merely responded “Okay.” Sentencing Tr. 47:8 (App.
168). That did not suffice to preserve the claim. And, after the
U.S. Attorney’s Office refused Munafo’s request to dismiss the
D.C. Superior Court charge, counsel did not return to ask the
district court to enforce his reading of the plea agreement as

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requiring that the 2020 assault charge be dropped. We review
Munafo’s unpreserved objection for plain error.
Accordingly, to prevail here Munafo must show (1) a clear
breach of the plea agreement (2) that caused him prejudice, and
(3) that the breach resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The
second and third factors are easily met here. A governmental
refusal to fulfill a binding agreement to dismiss a criminal
charge would cause obvious prejudice to the defendant. And
allowing the government to secure a guilty plea in return for its
promise to drop a charge that the government then refuses to
dismiss would “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)
(formatting altered)). As to the first factor, if a plea agreement
required dismissal of a charge, the government’s unexplained
failure to fulfill that requirement would almost certainly satisfy
the plain error standard.
But Munafo’s claim fails at the first step: There was no
breach of the plea agreement, let alone one that was “clear or
obvious.” Thomas, 999 F.3d at 728. The wording of the
disputed clause does not require dismissal of the unrelated
assault charge that was pending against Munafo when he
entered the plea agreement in this case. Reading the clause in
context with other terms of the agreement further confirms that
it applies only to yet-to-be-filed charges.
The disputed clause promises that Munafo “will not be
charged with any non-violent criminal offense in violation of
Federal or District of Columbia law which was committed
within the District of Columbia . . . prior to the execution of
this Agreement.” Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). By agreeing that the
defendant, upon pleading guilty, “will not be charged” with
additional offenses, the government made a promise about its

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own future charging behavior: It pledged not to initiate any
new prosecution relating to Munafo’s past, non-violent
conduct in the District of Columbia.
Munafo argues that the phrase “will not be charged” refers
to an ongoing status of continuing to “be charged” with an
offense, which persists until the charge is dropped or otherwise
resolved. Munafo Reply Br. 15. His reading is unsupported.
To “charge” someone means “[t]o accuse (a person) of an
offense.” Charge, B LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(def. 1). The plea agreement’s use of the future tense “will not
be charged” refers to conduct that has yet to occur—
specifically, the act of charging Munafo with other applicable
crimes. It is not naturally read to undo or reverse the
government’s past charging decisions. Nor does the
agreement’s use of the future passive “will not be charged”
phrasing, rather than the equivalent “will not charge Munafo”
with a non-violent criminal offense, support Munafo’s
interpretation.
The language of the relevant phrase of the plea agreement
is thus sufficient to resolve this challenge. But if additional
evidence were needed, the plea agreement notably uses
different, clearly distinct language when referring to the
disposition of charges that (like those in the 2020 assault case)
had already been filed at the time of the agreement. First, the
agreement promises that Munafo “will not be further
prosecuted criminally” for the conduct described in the
Statement of Offense. Plea Letter 2 (App. 41). Second, the
government pledges to “request that the Court dismiss the
remaining counts of the Indictment in this case.” Plea Letter 2
(App. 41). Both of those phrases—“further prosecute” and
“dismiss”—unambiguously cover offenses with which Munafo
had already been charged, and for which his prosecution had
already begun. But neither of those provisions covers the 2020

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misdemeanor assault charge, which did not involve conduct
described in the Statement of Offense and was not contained in
the federal indictment. The plea agreement’s use of “will not
be charged” to describe offenses beyond those in the Statement
of Offense and the indictment, rather than promising that the
government would “dismiss” or not “further prosecute” such
offenses, confirms that the former provision applies only to
potential future charges resulting from Munafo’s conduct.
B.
Munafo also claims that the government’s sentencing
allocution violated the terms of the plea agreement. There is
no dispute that Munafo preserved this argument. We conclude
on de novo review that Munafo has failed to demonstrate that
the government’s allocution breached the plea agreement.
Munafo primarily objects to the government’s references
to the statement of his fellow “Front Row Joe” Saundra
Kiczenski and to Munafo’s comments on the phone call with
people holding a prayer vigil for the January 6 prisoners.
Nothing in the plea agreement forbade the government from
referencing that information at sentencing. The agreement
expressly reserved—to both parties—the right to “describe
fully . . . any misconduct not described in the charges to which
[Munafo] is pleading guilty” and to “inform . . . the Court of
any relevant facts” at sentencing. Plea Letter 5-6 (App. 44-45)
(emphasis added). Information that the government believed
shed light on Munafo’s respect for the law, a relevant
consideration at sentencing per 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), was
within the permissible scope of the sentencing allocution under
the plea agreement. The same is true of the allegation that
Munafo engaged in violence while in custody in the D.C. Jail.
Munafo seeks to draw support from United States v.
Mojica-Ramos, 103 F.4th 844 (1st Cir. 2024), in which the

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imposition of an upward-variant sentence following the
prosecutor’s suggestions that the defendant likely committed
other crimes and was “exceptional[ly]” dangerous implicitly
breached the government’s commitment in the plea agreement
to advocate for a sentence within the Guidelines range. Id. at
850-51. As an initial matter, even if we agreed with Munafo
that the government was subtly urging the district court in his
case to vary upward from the Guidelines range—which we do
not—that would not have breached his plea agreement, which
(unlike Mojica-Ramos) expressly permitted either party to
request a variance. Plea Letter 5 (App. 44).
In any event, Munafo identifies nothing like a suggestion
that Munafo was exceptionally dangerous or otherwise
deserving of an atypically harsh sentence. At sentencing, the
government recommended a 37-month sentence of
imprisonment even as it noted that it would not “quibble” with
the judge “over [the] one month” it sought beyond the
probation office’s recommendation of 36 months. Sentencing
Tr. 13:8-21 (App. 134). And, unlike the sentence on appeal in
Mojica-Ramos, the 33-month sentence the court imposed on
Munafo was within the agreed-upon Guidelines range and
below the government’s recommendation. Sentencing Tr.
43:21-24 (App. 164); see Mojica-Ramos, 103 F.4th at 848-49.
III.
Lastly, we address Munafo’s claim that, even if the
government did not breach the plea agreement, his sentence
must be reversed on the ground that it appears to have been
based on Munafo’s constitutionally protected political speech
and associations. We see no basis in the record that would
cause any fair observer to suspect that the district court
impermissibly disfavored Munafo because of his political
beliefs or associations. And this claim stumbles at the gate

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because Munafo expressly waived his right to appeal his
sentence outside of circumstances not implicated in this case—
namely, a sentence “above the statutory maximum or
guidelines range.” Plea Letter 8 (App. 47).
A criminal defendant “may waive his right to appeal his
sentence as long as his decision is knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.” United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C.
Cir. 2009). But because such a defendant does not “agree to
accept any defect or error that may be thrust upon him by . . . an
errant sentencing court,” we will not enforce a waiver of the
right to appeal “if the sentencing court’s failure in some
material way to follow a prescribed sentencing procedure
results in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 530-31. For example,
we will not enforce a waiver if a sentence “is ‘colorably alleged
to rest upon a constitutionally impermissible factor, such as the
defendant’s race or religion.’” United States v. Adams, 780
F.3d 1182, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Guillen, 561 F.3d at
531). And, while “the Constitution does not erect a per se
barrier” to the admission of First Amendment-protected beliefs
and associations at sentencing, the First Amendment does
prohibit consideration “of a defendant’s abstract beliefs at a
sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the
issue being tried.” Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165,
168 (1992).
Munafo does not dispute that his appeal waiver was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Instead, he contends that
his sentence falls into the “miscarriage of justice exception” to
enforceability, Adams, 780 F.3d at 1184 (formatting altered),
because it appears to rest on Munafo’s First Amendment-
protected activities.
Munafo’s argument immediately runs into difficulty
because he alleges only that his sentence “has the appearance”

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of resting on his constitutionally protected expression. Munafo
Br. 35. But our circuit’s miscarriage of justice exception
applies when a sentence is “colorably alleged to rest upon a
constitutionally impermissible factor,” Guillen, 561 F.3d at
531 (emphasis added), not necessarily when a sentence is only
alleged to appear to rest upon such a factor. The government
argues that the distinction supports affirmance here. Munafo
responds that even the appearance of reliance on an
impermissible factor can invalidate a sentence. For that variant
of taint, Munafo relies principally on the Second Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir.
2007), which vacated and remanded a sentence that the district
court had justified in part as a crime deterrent directed at people
of the defendant’s national origin. But Kaba—unlike
Munafo—had not waived her right to challenge her sentence
on appeal, id., and the Second Circuit accordingly did not
address whether proof that the circumstances of sentencing
gave rise to an appearance that the sentence was influenced by
an impermissible factor would suffice to void a knowing and
voluntary waiver.
For the purpose of this appeal, we nonetheless assume
without deciding that we may decline to enforce an appeal
waiver when the defendant colorably alleges that his sentence
appears to rest on constitutionally impermissible factors.
Munafo argues that courts should “take great care to avoid”
imposing a sentence that “leaves the appearance of being based
on beliefs and associations protected by the First Amendment.”
Munafo Reply Br. 21. There are compelling arguments in
favor of such a standard. Requiring a colorable allegation that
a challenged sentence in fact rested on impermissible factors
might place defendants—and courts on review—in the
uncomfortable position of choosing between abandoning a
claim and accusing a sentencing judge of bigotry. In Kaba, for
example, the district court announced from the bench that it

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hoped that the harsh sentence it imposed on Kaba would send
a message to other “people from the Guinea community” in
New York. 480 F.3d at 155-56, 158-59. In vacating that
sentence, the Second Circuit asserted that it had “no doubt that
the district court ‘harbored no bias’ toward Kaba because of her
national origin,” and identified the problem as only “the
appearance of unfairness.” Id. at 158. Vigilance against
unconstitutional factors affecting judicial decision making is
also manifest in the due process standard for claims of judicial
bias, which “may sometimes demand recusal even when a
judge ‘ha[s] no actual bias’” if, “objectively speaking, ‘the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” See
Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 287 (2017) (per curiam) (first
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825
(1986), then quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47
(1975)). On the other hand, we have noted that the reliable
enforceability of appeal waivers is part of what makes them
valuable to defendants as “an additional bargaining chip” to use
in plea negotiations. Adams, 780 F.3d at 1184 (quoting
Guillen, 561 F.3d at 530). In defending the narrowness of the
“miscarriage of justice” exception to such waivers, we stressed
that a waiver may “lose its value” as negotiating leverage “[i]f
the Government cannot count upon the waiver being enforced.”
Id.
The precise rule is ultimately immaterial here because
even under Munafo’s preferred standard his appeal waiver
must be enforced. There is no indication whatsoever that the
district court’s sentence presents the appearance of relying on
any constitutionally impermissible factor, such as Munafo’s
political beliefs. To the contrary, the district court repeatedly
declared that Munafo’s sentence was based only on Munafo’s
own conduct and background, and that the court was not
assuming that Munafo had “adopted any statement” of others

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or “attributing others’ behavior” to Munafo. Sentencing Tr.
17:11-17, 43:3-5 (App. 138, 164). Munafo’s reliance on Kaba
is therefore misplaced. In holding that Kaba’s harsh sentence
raised the appearance of unconstitutional reliance on her
national origin, the Second Circuit primarily relied on the
district court’s own explanation. The district court highlighted
deterrence, expressing hope that, in sentencing a person of
Guinean origin, its message would reach other people from
Guinea who might be involved in the heroin trade and would
“deter other people from that background” from committing
similar offenses. Kaba, 480 F.3d at 155-56.
In sharp contrast to the Kaba court, the district court here
gave unambiguous assurance that it was “merely considering
[Munafo’s] conduct” rather than any impermissible factor.
Sentencing Tr. 17:17 (App. 138). Munafo contends that the
district court’s statement that there had been “plenty of
violence in [Munafo’s] past,” Sentencing Tr. 43:6-13 (App.
164), demonstrates that the court was persuaded by the
government’s suggestions that Munafo was politically
affiliated with other violent January 6 defendants and violent
D.C. Jail inmates. But the court made that observation based
on the record before it and in the context of expressing hope
that, with mental health treatment, Munafo could avoid a
recurrence of “the kinds of things that’s happened over the last
20 years.” Sentencing Tr. 43:8-13 (App. 164). Rather than
imputing the violence of his putative political associates to
Munafo, the district court referenced the many prior incidents
of Munafo’s own violent conduct spanning decades, as
recounted in the presentence report. No reasonable observer
could view Munafo’s sentence as potentially resting on any
“constitutionally impermissible factor.”

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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence the
district court imposed.
So ordered.

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