Jane Doe, by v. District of Columbia

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued December 18, 2024 Decided August 19, 2025
No. 23-7135
J ANE DOE, BY AND THROUGH HER NEXT FRIEND , J ULIE DOE
AND J ULIE DOE, MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND OF J ANE DOE,
APPELLANTS
v.
DISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA AND AQUEELHA J AMES ,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN AGENT OF D ISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:18-cv-02181)
Kasey K. Murray argued the cause and filed the brief for
appellants. David M. Schloss entered an appearance.
Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of
the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the
cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Brian L.
Schwalb, Attorney General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor
General, and Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor
General.

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Before: M ILLETT, KATSAS , and P AN , Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge P AN .
P AN , Circuit Judge: When appellant Jane Doe was a
freshman at a public high school in the District of Columbia,
she was sexually assaulted by a classmate in a school
bathroom. Jane’s mother, Julie Doe, reported the assault to
District officials, and the District investigated. The District
concluded that Jane had likely been assaulted and took
remedial measures to assist Jane and to protect her from further
harassment. Jane never encountered her assailant again.
Although the District as a whole worked to respond
appropriately to the assault on Jane, evidence suggests that one
administrator — Principal Aqueelha James — did not. Shortly
after the Does reported the assault to school administrators and
before any investigation had taken place, Principal James told
other administrators that she was sick of the Does, that Jane’s
claim was “bullshit,” and that James would take steps to
“embarrass [Jane’s] ass.” Even after Principal James watched
video footage unmistakably corroborating Jane’s claim, James
lied to her superintendent about what the footage showed. On
other occasions, she downplayed what had happened to Jane
and declined to share information that supported Jane’s
account.
Jane sued the District and Principal James. She alleged
that the District responded to the assault with deliberate
indifference and that District officials, including Principal
James, retaliated against her, all in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688.
Jane also brought claims under D.C. tort law, alleging negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

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The district court dismissed the NIED claim for failure to
state a claim and, after discovery, granted summary judgment
to defendants on the IIED and Title IX claims. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm the district court as to the NIED
claim and the Title IX claims. But because a reasonable jury
could conclude that Principal James intentionally inflicted
severe emotional distress on Jane, we reverse the grant of
summary judgment as to the IIED claim and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
A.
June 13, 2017, was Jane Doe’s penultimate day as a
freshman at Roosevelt High School, a public school in the
District of Columbia.1 Her classmate, M.P., chose that day to
sexually assault her in a Roosevelt High bathroom. When M.P.
refused to return a charger that Jane had lent him, Jane followed
him out of a classroom and down a hallway. Hallway security
footage shows that as Jane and M.P. neared a bathroom, M.P.
grabbed Jane and forcibly dragged her into the bathroom. M.P.
then forced Jane into a stall, where he molested and kissed her
for several minutes, leaving a mark on her neck. Security
footage shows Jane leaving the bathroom visibly distressed.
Jane immediately called her mother, Julie Doe, who gave Jane
permission to go home. Julie then reported the assault to
Superintendent David Pinder, the District of Columbia Public
Schools (DCPS) official who oversees Roosevelt High.
1 We draw these facts from the parties’ summary-judgment
papers and present the evidence in the light most favorable to Jane,
the nonmoving party. See Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).

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The next day, Julie Doe emailed Superintendent Pinder
and Aqueelha James, the Principal of Roosevelt High,
requesting “assistance” in response to the assault. App. 642.
That evening, after the last day of classes had ended, Julie and
Jane Doe met Principal James, Assistant Principal Michael
Moss, and Intervention Coach Maurice Butler in a conference
room at Roosevelt High. Reginald Stevens, the Dean of
Students, participated by phone. Unbeknownst to the
Roosevelt High administrators, Julie Doe was recording the
meeting on her cellphone.
Principal James began by asking Jane about the assault.
After a few minutes of brusque questioning, Julie Doe
informed Principal James that Jane did not feel comfortable
due to James’s demeanor and tone, which Julie described as
uncaring. Audio Recording 4:48 to 4:53, 5:08 to 5:10, 5:28 to
5:30, 5:58 to 6:26. James told the Does that she took Jane’s
claim seriously and that she would contact the police to
investigate it. Nevertheless, Jane was upset by what she
perceived to be James’s insensitivity and left the room. Julie
Doe quickly followed her daughter but left her phone, still
recording, on the conference table.
Immediately after the Does exited the conference room,
Julie’s phone recorded Principal James telling the other
administrators the following:
This whole thing is going to blow up in [Jane’s]
face, that is why I am going to go the extra mile
and call [the police,] . . . because I am sick of
her, sick and tired of her and her mom. So I am
going to call [the police] and have a long and
drawn out email just so that I can embarrass her
ass . . . . You should see the dress she’s got

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on. . . . Since I walked into this building, I
immediately responded to what I knew was
bullshit.
Audio Recording 9:34 to 11:10.
Several minutes later, Jane returned to the conference
room, where she was interviewed by Intervention Coach
Butler. Police officers then arrived and arranged to interview
Jane at her home. While officers talked to Jane, Julie Doe
spoke with Principal James at Roosevelt High. James
mentioned that Superintendent Pinder was willing to grant Jane
a transfer to Cardozo High School, a school that Julie dismissed
as “gang-infested.” Audio Recording at 53:30 to 54:10. Later
that evening, James emailed Julie that her staff would “review
the cameras” and provide Jane with counseling options, and
that James would “follow-up with Dr. Pinder” regarding a
transfer. App. 55–56. But James telephoned Pinder and told
him she did not believe that Jane was assaulted.
On or around June 14, Principal James directed Dean
Stevens to retrieve the hallway security footage and conduct an
investigation. By June 16, DCPS personnel had secured the
footage and sent a copy to the police. Then, around June 22,
Principal James watched the video. Although that video
unmistakably corroborated Jane’s account — by showing M.P.
dragging Jane into the bathroom against her will — Principal
James continued to dispute Jane’s claim. According to
Superintendent Pinder, James told him that the footage did not
support Jane’s claim and that instead, “it appeared that the
young man and Jane were hand-in-hand and entered the
bathroom mutually.” App. 639.
On June 26, James appeared to underplay the incident in
an email to Jane Spence, a senior DCPS official. James told

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Spence only that Intervention Coach Butler “informed me that
[Jane Doe] (rising 10th grader), told him that the boy kept
trying to hold her down and kiss her.” App. 703. Although
James simultaneously forwarded to Spence an email from Julie
Doe describing how M.P. had pulled Jane Doe into the
bathroom, see App. 55–56, James did not mention to Spence
the security footage that showed M.P. forcibly dragging Jane
into the bathroom.
Similarly, on July 17, when asked by another DCPS
official, Milo Howard, to provide an update regarding “the
outcome of the [police] investigation,” App. 687, James
directed a subordinate to reply on her behalf; when her
subordinate merely informed Howard that prosecutors had
declined to bring a case against M.P., James did not mention
the existence of security footage that corroborated Jane’s claim
of assault.
Nevertheless, independent of Principal James’s actions,
the District conducted a Title IX investigation, which
ultimately confirmed Jane’s claim that she had been sexually
assaulted. At the outset of that investigation on June 27, Lynice
Hannah, DCPS’s manager of civil rights compliance, emailed
Julie Doe that the District took Jane’s claim “very seriously!”
App. 1031–32. Hannah proactively communicated with the
Does throughout the investigation. And in a letter to the Does
dated July 17, the District concluded that it was “more likely
than not” that Jane had been sexually harassed by M.P. App.
341.
The letter noted several “corrective actions” that the
District had already implemented: Among other things, the
District had provided Jane counseling services and had given
her the opportunity to participate in a paid community-service
program over the summer. App. 341. The letter also noted that

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Superintendent Pinder had offered Jane two more school-
transfer options, in addition to Cardozo, though none of the
options were to Julie Doe’s satisfaction — she wanted Jane to
transfer to Woodrow Wilson High School or School Without
Walls. And the letter recommended further counseling for
Jane, discipline against M.P., and the creation of a “safety plan”
that would ensure “full separation” between Jane and M.P. if
Jane chose not to transfer schools. App. 342. The parties
dispute whether the Does received a copy of the letter.
Jane and Julie Doe eventually listened to the recording of
Principal James telling other administrators that she would “go
the extra mile” and “embarrass [Jane’s] ass.” Both Jane and
Julie were distressed by Principal James’s remarks, and Julie
sent Superintendent Pinder a copy of the audio recording.
In mid-August, Pinder listened to the recording and
watched the security footage. Concerned by what he had seen
and heard, Pinder filed a disciplinary report against James and
requested an investigation into her conduct. Pinder wrote that
James’s “clear distrust of [Jane] . . . clouded her judgment and
endangered student safety.” App. 639. Pinder also noted that
“James was not transparent with me about the nature” of the
assault on Jane. App. 640. Although James “indicated . . . that
there was no evidence on the video of an assault,” the video
“[c]learly” shows that M.P. “pulled Jane in the bathroom
against her will.” App. 639. The District investigated James,
“substantiated” Pinder’s report, and issued a formal reprimand
against James. App. 644.
After viewing the security footage, Superintendent Pinder
also granted the Does’ request to transfer Jane to Wilson High.
Jane’s transfer was finalized the week before the start of the
new school year.

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Ultimately, the District never disciplined M.P. for
assaulting Jane. By the start of the new school year, M.P. had
transferred from Roosevelt High to a different public school in
the District. Although Pinder notified officials at M.P.’s new
school of his misconduct the prior academic year, the District
concedes that M.P.’s new school failed to take disciplinary
action. Jane, however, never encountered M.P. again.
B.
After her transfer, Jane struggled at Wilson High. As a
result of the assault and Principal James’s response, Jane “had
a hard time focusing on schoolwork because [she] felt sad and
depressed a lot of the time,” and she no longer trusted teachers
and administrators. App. 665.
Jane was frequently absent from school. During her
sophomore year, Wilson High marked Jane absent 74 times,
with 48 of those absences marked as unexcused. Jane disputes
41 of those 48 unexcused absences, and argues that many were
for therapy appointments and therefore should have been
marked as excused. Jane also complains that administrators at
Wilson High were not informed by District officials that Jane
had suffered a sexual assault at Roosevelt High.
In September 2018, shortly after Jane’s junior year began,
the Does filed this lawsuit against the District and Principal
James. A week later, The Washington Post reported on the
lawsuit. After the article was published in the Post, Wilson
High administrators gleaned that Jane was the sexual-assault
victim from Roosevelt High who had sued the District.
At some point in September 2018, Jane was removed from
the cheerleading team because of too many unexcused
absences from cheerleading practice. The next month, Julie

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Doe filed a grievance with DCPS, alleging that Jane was
wrongly kicked off the team, incorrectly marked for unexcused
absences, and given an unreasonable three days to complete
fifty make-up assignments.
After an investigation, the grievance office found that
Jane’s “attendance has been documented accurately” and that
her removal from the cheerleading team was proper due to her
many unexcused absences. App. 795. The grievance office
provided Jane with extra time for her make-up assignments and
twenty-five hours of additional tutoring. The grievance office
further stated that it would set up a meeting with Wilson High
administrators to help Jane obtain mental-health
accommodations. Julie Doe appealed the grievance office’s
determination and, after “further investigation,” App. 799, a
senior administrator denied Julie’s appeal. The administrator
noted that Wilson High officials had met with the Does to
develop accommodations for Jane and that Jane’s
accommodations plan was “currently active.” App. 799–800.
By the end of Jane’s junior year, the District had marked
Jane for 106 total absences, 56 of which were marked as
unexcused. Julie Doe filed a second grievance that summer.
In September 2019, the grievance office determined that 10 of
those 56 unexcused absences should have been marked as
excused. As a result, the District amended Jane’s U.S. history
grade from an F (due to unexcused absences) to a C-.
Over Jane’s junior and senior years at Wilson High, after
The Washington Post reported on Jane’s lawsuit, three Wilson
High staff members separately made inappropriate comments
to Jane. Early in Jane’s junior year, a security guard remarked
to Jane, “[O]h, you’re the girl from Roosevelt that was sexually
assaulted.” App. 952. Julie Doe reported this remark to the
DCPS grievance office, and the District replaced the security

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guard. Later in her junior year, a teacher told Jane to stop using
the assault as an “excuse.” App. 1070. And finally, during
Jane’s senior year, a different teacher similarly accused Jane of
using the assault as an excuse to skip class. Jane has not offered
evidence that she brought those latter two comments to the
attention of District administrators.
C.
After Jane sued the District and Principal James, the
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court
declined to dismiss the IIED and Title IX claims. The district
court did, however, dismiss the NIED claim for failure to state
a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court
explained that Jane brought her NIED claim under a “special
relationship theory,” and under such a theory, Jane needed to
allege “that the defendant has a relationship with the plaintiff
or has undertaken an obligation to the plaintiff of a nature that
necessarily implicates the plaintiff’s emotional well-being.”
App. 901 (citing Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d
789 (D.C. 2011) (en banc)). The court concluded that Jane’s
complaint failed to allege either. Under D.C. law, “the
relationship between a student and her school is not enough,
without more, to impose the predicate duty of care” for an
NIED claim. App. 902 (citing Sibley v. St. Albans Sch., 134
A.3d 789 (D.C. 2016)). And Jane’s complaint had not alleged
any representations by the District to the Does “that
investigation would be conducted or that any remedies would
be taken.” App. 903.
Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary
judgment on the three remaining claims: deliberate
indifference, retaliation, and IIED. The district court granted
summary judgment to defendants on all three claims. Doe v.
District of Columbia, 694 F. Supp. 3d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2023).

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First, the district court held that no reasonable jury could
find that the District responded to the assault with deliberate
indifference in violation of Title IX. Doe, 694 F. Supp. 3d at
34. The District promptly investigated Jane’s claim of assault,
confirmed that Jane had likely been assaulted, provided her
with counseling services, and granted her request to transfer to
Wilson High. Id. at 34–36. “To the extent” Jane’s deliberate-
indifference claim “extend[ed] to school officials at Wilson
High,” the district court held that Jane “similarly failed” to
raise a jury issue. Id. at 37. Although Jane alleged that Wilson
High officials mismarked some of her absences as unexcused,
the District “looked into the matter again and again . . . , and
while it found that the bulk of the absences had been
documented accurately, it also made changes based on its
review.” Id.
Next, the district court held that Jane’s Title IX retaliation
claim likewise failed as a matter of law. The district court
reasoned that Principal James’s recorded comments did not rise
to the level of a materially adverse action. Doe, 694 F. Supp.
3d at 40. The district court rejected as unsupported Jane’s
theory that Principal James interfered with the police
investigation of the assault (a theory that Jane does not raise on
appeal). Id. at 41–44. And the court concluded that Jane failed
to raise a jury issue as to whether Wilson High officials
retaliated against her. Id. at 45–46.
Finally, with respect to the IIED claim, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of both the District and
Principal James. The analysis focused “on defendant James’s
conduct only.” Doe, 694 F. Supp. 3d at 47. The district court
concluded that James’s recorded comments could not form the
basis of an IIED claim because no reasonable jury could
conclude that James either intended those comments to inflict

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severe emotional distress on Jane or acted in “deliberate
disregard” of a high degree of probability that her comments
would cause such distress. Id. at 47–48. That is because the
Does had “left the room” and “there was no way for James to
have known that [Jane] would hear the recorded remarks at any
point.” Id. at 47. The district court did not reach the issue of
whether the District would be liable for James’s conduct under
a theory of respondeat superior.
Jane timely appealed. The district court had federal-
question jurisdiction over the Title IX claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the NIED and IIED
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
“We review de novo both the dismissal for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the
grant of summary judgement.” Coleman v. Duke, 867 F.3d
204, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). In reviewing a dismissal for
failure to state a claim, we “accept all the well-pleaded factual
allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Hurd v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (cleaned up).
Summary judgment is appropriate “only if ‘there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Johnson v. Perez,

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823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a)). “A dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party’” on the factual issue in dispute. Id.
(cleaned up) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party . . . and draw[] all reasonable inferences
in [her] favor.” Id.
III.
On appeal, Jane Doe presses two claims under Title IX for
deliberate indifference and retaliation, and two claims under
D.C. tort law for NIED and IIED. For the reasons below, we
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Jane’s NIED claim and
its grant of summary judgment to the District on the Title IX
claims. But because a reasonable jury could find for Jane on
her IIED claim against James, we reverse the grant of summary
judgment with respect to that claim.
A. Deliberate Indifference
Title IX seeks to eliminate sex-based discrimination in
education programs that receive federal funds. See Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998).
Subject to exceptions not relevant here, it provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]

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20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Private parties may enforce this provision
against federal-funding recipients through an implied cause of
action for damages. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 281. “Title IX
does not provide for individual liability; only a recipient of
federal funds may be liable in damages under Title IX.” Bose
v. Bea, 947 F.3d 983, 988 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up); see also
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 641 (1999) (“The Government’s enforcement power
[under Title IX] may only be exercised against the funding
recipient . . . , and we have not extended damages liability
under Title IX to parties outside the scope of this power.”).
Accordingly, Jane’s Title IX claims are against the District
only; she has no Title IX claim against Principal James.
Critically, a funding recipient may be held liable “only for
its own misconduct.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added).
Thus, a recipient school district is not liable for harassment that
a teacher commits against a student, or that one student carries
out against another. It may, however, be liable, “in certain
limited circumstances,” for its own deliberate indifference to
known acts of sexual harassment committed by a teacher
against a student or by one student against another. Id. at 643;
see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167,
182 (2005) (“[A] recipient’s deliberate indifference to one
student’s sexual harassment of another . . . constitute[s]
intentional discrimination on the basis of sex” as prohibited by
Title IX.).
That is the claim that Jane brings here: She contends that
the District responded to the sexual assault she suffered with
deliberate indifference. To prevail on a claim of deliberate
indifference to sexual harassment, a plaintiff must satisfy five
elements. First, the sexual harassment complained of must be
“so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive . . . that the
victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an

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institution’s resources and opportunities.” Davis, 526 U.S. at
651. Second, an official with authority to address the
harassment must have “actual knowledge” of that harassment.
Id. at 650; see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. Third, the
recipient must have “substantial control over both the harasser
and the context in which the known harassment occurs.”
Davis, 526 U.S. at 645. Fourth, the recipient’s response or
failure to respond must amount to “deliberate indifference to
known acts of harassment.” Id. at 643. Fifth, that “deliberate
indifference” must “‘subject[]’ its students to harassment.” Id.
at 644. “That is, the deliberate indifference must, at a
minimum, cause students to undergo harassment or make them
liable or vulnerable to it.” Id. at 645 (cleaned up).
The district court held that the District’s response to the
assault did not amount to deliberate indifference as a matter of
law. We agree.
Deliberate indifference is a “high standard” that requires
more than a showing of mere negligence. Davis, 526 U.S. at
642–43. A recipient is “deliberately indifferent to . . . student-
on-student harassment only where the recipient’s response to
the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light
of the known circumstances.” Id. at 648 (cleaned up). This
standard is meant to provide administrators with “flexibility”
and “to account both for the level of disciplinary authority
available to the school and for the potential liability arising
from certain forms of disciplinary action.” Id. at 648–49.
Thus, recipients need not “purg[e] their schools of actionable
peer harassment” nor “engage in particular disciplinary
action.” Id. at 648. Victims, moreover, have no “Title IX right
to make particular remedial demands.” Id. In order to avoid
liability, the “recipient must merely respond to known peer
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.” Id.
at 649.

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Here, the District’s response was not clearly unreasonable,
and no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. The
undisputed evidence shows that District officials took prompt
action that was reasonably calculated to prevent further
harassment. See Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d
674, 689 (4th Cir. 2018) (a recipient’s response may amount to
deliberate indifference when the recipient, although “not
entirely unresponsive,” failed to “engage in efforts that were
‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment’” (cleaned up)
(quoting Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655,
669 (2d Cir. 2012))). District officials met with the Does
within a day of the assault, reported the assault to the police,
secured the video footage that corroborated Jane’s claim, and
began their own Title IX investigation. Within five weeks, the
District’s Title IX official concluded that Jane had likely been
assaulted. The District, moreover, took several remedial
actions in response to the assault. It immediately provided Jane
with counseling services, offered her several transfer options,
and subsequently granted her preferred transfer to Wilson
High. Jane never encountered her assailant again nor suffered
any further sexual harassment.
Jane complains that it took the District over two months to
approve her preferred transfer to Wilson High. In certain
circumstances, a delayed response may amount to deliberate
indifference. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys.
of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2007); Zeno, 702
F.3d at 669–70. But that is far from the case here.
First, context matters. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. The
delay that Jane complains of occurred over the summer, when
school was in recess. See McAvoy v. Dickinson Coll., 115 F.4th
220, 229 (3d Cir. 2024) (the fact that a delay was due in part to
a college’s winter recess mitigated against a finding of

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deliberate indifference). The District granted Jane’s preferred
transfer before the new school year began and thus before Jane
might have reencountered her assailant. Accordingly, any
delay in granting the transfer to Wilson High did not render the
District’s response “clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added).
In any event, a victim is not entitled to receive a particular
remedy, Davis, 526 U.S. at 648, and the District quickly
offered Jane several remedial options before eventually
granting her preferred remedy. In particular, Superintendent
Pinder promptly offered Jane a transfer option within a day of
the assault, and two additional transfer options within a month.
District officials also promised to set up a safety plan for Jane
in the event that Jane chose to return to Roosevelt High.
Although the Does were not satisfied with those remedial
options, Jane has made no showing that they were clearly
unreasonable. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504
F.3d 165, 175 (1st Cir. 2007) (The deliberate-indifference
standard “does not require an educational institution either to
assuage a victim’s parents or to acquiesce in their demands.”).
Jane’s other arguments fare no better. First, Jane focuses
on Principal James’s misconduct and argues that a plaintiff can
“establish school district liability by showing that a single
school administrator . . . responded to harassment with
deliberate indifference.” Opening Br. 30. That may be so in
some cases, but Jane has not shown that Principal James’s
misconduct amounted to misconduct by the District because
the District’s response as a whole was attentive and
appropriate, not indifferent. The Supreme Court has explained
that liability arises from “an official decision by the recipient
not to remedy” the harassment. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290
(emphasis added). Thus, we must examine the recipient’s
response as a whole, not the conduct of individual

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administrators in isolation. To be sure, the conduct of an
individual administrator is relevant to evaluating the recipient’s
response in its totality, and could perhaps demonstrate
deliberate indifference if the individual administrator’s
conduct materially defined the funding recipient’s response.
But here, despite Principal James’s misconduct, the District as
a whole responded in a manner that was not clearly
unreasonable. The District, moreover, investigated and
formally reprimanded Principal James for her misconduct,
which further demonstrates that the District was not
deliberately indifferent in its overall response to the assault.
Next, Jane argues that the District’s failure to discipline
M.P. renders the District’s response clearly unreasonable. We
again disagree. Title IX does not require a recipient to
undertake particular action in response to student-on-student
harassment. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Although the District
failed to discipline M.P., it took other actions reasonably
calculated to address the harassment Jane suffered. See Hurley,
911 F.3d at 689. In particular, the District investigated and
confirmed Jane’s claim of assault, and ultimately granted Jane
her preferred transfer to a school where she never encountered
her assailant again.
Finally, Jane alleges that after the assault, Wilson High
officials mischaracterized her absences as unexcused when
those absences should have been marked as excused. But those
alleged errors — which were committed by officials at a
different school months and years after the assault occurred —
are not sufficiently related to the District’s duty to address the
assault and to take steps to protect Jane from further
harassment. They thus are not evidence of deliberate
indifference to the assault.

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B. Retaliation
Next, Jane claims that District officials retaliated against
her for reporting the assault and initiating this suit. In Jackson
v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Supreme Court
recognized that Title IX’s implied cause of action encompasses
retaliation claims against funding recipients. 544 U.S. at 173.
The Court explained that when a funding recipient retaliates
“against a person because he complains of sex discrimination,”
that retaliation “constitutes intentional discrimination on the
basis of sex in violation of Title IX.” Id. at 174 (cleaned up)
(emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court, however, has never clarified the
elements of a Title IX retaliation claim. “Other circuits
approach” such claims by “relying on Title VII jurisprudence.”
Du Bois v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 987 F.3d 1199,
1203 (8th Cir. 2021); see also Hurley, 911 F.3d at 694. Both
the district court and the parties did so here, and we accordingly
assume without deciding that the Title VII framework for
retaliation applies. Under that familiar framework, a plaintiff
must show that she engaged in protected activity, that she
suffered a materially adverse action, and that there is a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action. See Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Moreover, because a funding recipient may only be held liable
for its own misconduct, see Davis, 526 U.S. at 640, the adverse
action must be “attributable to the defendant educational
institution,” Hurley, 911 F.3d at 694.
Here, Jane alleges two categories of retaliatory conduct:
retaliation by Principal James, and retaliation by Wilson High
staff. We consider each in turn and conclude that neither
presents a jury issue.

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1. Principal James
First, Jane claims that Principal James retaliated against
her by repeatedly attempting to sabotage the District’s response
to her claim of assault. But Jane cannot hold the District liable
for Principal James’s alleged retaliatory conduct because no
reasonable jury could attribute that conduct to the District.
Indeed, Jane’s theory is that Principal James misled her fellow
administrators about the assault, which shows that James was
not acting on the District’s behalf. Cf. Bose, 947 F.3d at 989–
91, 994 (university could not be held liable under Title IX
where a professor with a retaliatory motive duped unwitting
administrators into carrying out an adverse action).
Under Title IX, only funding recipients may be held liable
in damages and “only for [their] own misconduct.” Davis, 526
U.S. at 640–41; see also Bose, 947 F.3d at 988. Thus, Jane
cannot seek damages against James for retaliation, nor may she
seek damages against the District for James’s “independent
actions.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. Instead, Jane must show
that James’s alleged retaliatory conduct is attributable to the
District, see Hurley, 911 F.3d at 694, and is not the independent
conduct of a “rogue” employee, Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 111 F.4th
705, 721 (6th Cir. 2024).
Here, there is no evidence that Principal James was acting
on behalf of the District when she allegedly attempted to
undermine its investigation and response. See Univ. of Ky., 111
F.4th at 721 (requiring “evidence that [school officials’
retaliatory] actions were taken at the behest of the institution”
in order to impute that misconduct to the funding recipient). To
the contrary, it is clear that James was acting as a rogue
employee. As detailed above, the District as a whole took
Jane’s claim of sexual assault seriously. Indeed, Jane alleges
that James was not acting at the District’s behest but rather was

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actively working to undermine the District’s efforts to address
Jane’s claim of sexual assault. Moreover, once James’s
misconduct came to Superintendent Pinder’s attention, the
District investigated and reprimanded James, further
demonstrating that James’s misconduct cannot be attributed to
the District.2
2. Wilson High
Second, Jane claims that Wilson High officials retaliated
against her by marking certain absences as unexcused when
they should have been marked as excused.3 But no reasonable
jury could find for Jane on this claim because she cannot
demonstrate a causal connection between her protected activity
and the alleged adverse action. To demonstrate a causal
connection, a plaintiff must show that “the desire to retaliate
was the but-for cause of the . . . action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013). But as Jane herself
alleges, the mischaracterization of absences began before
Wilson High officials became aware of the report of the assault
2 Other circuits have held that a recipient can be liable for the
independent retaliatory conduct of employees or others when the
recipient knows of the retaliation and responds with deliberate
indifference. See, e.g., Univ. of Ky., 111 F.4th at 721–22; Hurley,
911 F.3d at 695. But we need not reach that issue because Jane did
not raise a deliberate-indifference-to-retaliation theory here.
3 Jane also contends that Wilson High officials retaliated against
her by “fail[ing] to . . . correct [her] academic record once [they]
became aware that [she] was a sexual assault victim” and by making
inappropriate comments regarding the assault in her presence.
Opening Br. 39. But Jane forfeited those arguments by failing to
raise them in the district court. See Apprio, Inc. v. Zaccari, 104 F.4th
897, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a
party forfeits an argument by failing to press it in district court.”
(cleaned up)).

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and before she initiated this suit. Accordingly, no reasonable
jury could conclude that the mischaracterization was motivated
by a desire to retaliate against Jane for her protected activity.
We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the District on Jane’s Title IX retaliation claim.
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
We also agree with the district court that Jane’s complaint
failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress under D.C. law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Historically, under D.C. law, NIED claims were limited to
cases where the defendant put the plaintiff in a “zone of
physical danger,” i.e., where “the defendant’s actions caused
the plaintiff to be ‘in danger of physical injury’” and “as a
result, the plaintiff ‘feared for [her] own safety.’” Hedgepeth
v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 796 (D.C. 2011) (en
banc) (quoting Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C.
1990) (en banc)). In Hedgepeth, the D.C. Court of Appeals
expanded the NIED cause of action to permit recovery in cases
involving a special relationship or undertaking between the
plaintiff and the defendant. Id. at 810. To prevail in such a
case, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant has a relationship with the
plaintiff, or has undertaken an obligation to the
plaintiff, of a nature that necessarily implicates
the plaintiff’s emotional well-being, (2) there is
an especially likely risk that the defendant’s
negligence would cause serious emotional
distress to the plaintiff, and (3) negligent actions
or omissions of the defendant in breach of that
obligation have, in fact, caused serious
emotional distress to the plaintiff.

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Id. at 810–11.
Jane relied on a special-relationship theory of liability. To
survive a motion to dismiss under that theory, Jane was
required to allege that the defendants had a special relationship
with her or had undertaken an obligation to her that necessarily
implicated her emotional well-being. Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d at
815. Although Jane primarily based her NIED claim on the
school-student relationship, D.C. law is clear that the
“relationship between a student and [her] school” or between a
student and a school official “is not enough, without more,” to
support an NIED claim. Sibley, 134 A.3d at 798.4
In the alternative, Jane contends that her complaint
adequately alleged an undertaking by the District to investigate
her claim of sexual assault. We disagree. Although evidence
obtained in discovery indicates that the school undertook an
obligation to conduct its own investigation, the complaint
alleged no such thing. And in reviewing the district court’s
grant of a motion to dismiss, we consider the facts alleged at
the pleading stage, not the evidence later adduced in discovery.
See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621,
624 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 972
F.3d 853, 871 n.9 (6th Cir. 2020) (“In reviewing the district
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, this Court considers the
4 Jane errs in arguing that the Sibley court’s dismissal of the NIED
claim was based not on the insufficiency of the school-student
relationship, but instead on a contract between the parties that limited
the school’s damages liability. Although the Sibley court mentioned
the existence of the contractual limit on liability as additional support
for its dismissal of the NIED claim, that additional consideration
neither negated nor limited Sibley’s clear statement that the school-
student relationship is insufficient, without more, to support an NIED
claim. See 134 A.3d at 798.

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sufficiency of the facts pleaded by the plaintiff, not the facts
later discovered.” (cleaned up)). It is the plaintiff’s
responsibility to ensure that the complaint “contain[s]
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(cleaned up).
At most, the complaint asserted that school administrators
asked Jane questions regarding the assault, secured the hallway
video footage, and then referred Jane’s claim to the police. The
complaint did not allege any representation or promise by
school officials that the school would conduct its own
investigation separate from the work of the police.5 Indeed, the
complaint explicitly asserted that school officials “did not
further investigate” after turning the matter over to law
enforcement. Compl. ¶ 26 (App. 23). Accordingly, the
complaint did not allege an undertaking by the school to
conduct its own investigation. We therefore affirm the district
court’s dismissal of the NIED claim.
5 For this reason, Jane’s reliance on Cavalier v. Catholic
University of America, 306 F. Supp. 3d 9 (D.D.C. 2018), is
misplaced. In Cavalier, a district court in this circuit allowed an
NIED claim to proceed against a university where, according to the
complaint, the university repeatedly and “affirmatively represent[ed]
to [the plaintiff] that a no-contact order was in place between her and
[her assailant] and that, should [the plaintiff] report . . . violations of
that order, it would take the necessary steps to enforce it.” Id. at 40.
Even if Cavalier was correct, it offers Jane no support. That is
because unlike the complaint in Cavalier, Jane’s complaint did not
allege that the District affirmatively represented that it would
investigate her claim of sexual assault.

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D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The district court erred, however, in granting summary
judgment in favor of Principal James on Jane’s IIED claim. To
prevail on such a claim, “a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and
outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2)
either intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe
emotional distress.” Larijani v. Georgetown Univ., 791 A.2d
41, 44 (D.C. 2002). The district court concluded that James
lacked the requisite intent or recklessness as a matter of law.
In our view, however, a reasonable jury could find for Jane on
all three elements.
1. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
A reasonable jury could conclude that Principal James’s
conduct was extreme and outrageous. To be sure, “[t]he
requirement of outrageousness is not an easy one to meet.”
Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 (D.C. 1994). “The
conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Larijani, 791 A.2d at 44 (cleaned up).
Two principles of D.C. law “profoundly affect the
outrageousness calculus” in this case. Drejza, 650 A.2d at
1312. First, when alleged conduct involves “a series of
actions” that, “taken individually, might not be sufficiently
extreme to warrant liability,” the finder of fact must consider
whether the “actions as a whole” nevertheless constitute
extreme and outrageous conduct. King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656,
674 (D.C. 1993). Second, the finder of fact must consider “the
specific context in which the conduct took place,” including
“the relationship between the parties, and the particular
environment” where the conduct occurred. Id. at 668. Conduct

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that might otherwise not be extreme and outrageous may
become so if the defendant abused a position of power over the
plaintiff or if the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s peculiar
susceptibility to emotional distress. Id.
Examining Principal James’s actions as a whole and
drawing all reasonable inferences in Jane’s favor, a reasonable
jury could make the following findings and conclude that
James’s conduct was extreme and outrageous: James was a
high school principal confronted with a serious allegation that
a student had been sexually assaulted at James’s school. Yet
James, before any investigation had been conducted and
without any evidence, stated to other school administrators that
Jane’s allegations were “bullshit.” She also stated her intent to
“embarrass [Jane’s] ass” and said, “you should see the dress
[Jane’s] got on.” James made those comments to subordinates
who she knew would be tasked with investigating Jane’s claim.
Moreover, she treated Jane brusquely and disrespectfully in
their first meeting after the assault, causing Jane to become
emotional and leave the room.
In evaluating whether James’s conduct was extreme and
outrageous, a jury also could consider James’s conduct
following the June 14 meeting and reasonably infer that
James’s conduct was consistent with her stated desire to
embarrass Jane. Even after James saw video evidence that
unmistakably corroborated Jane’s claim, James continued to
discredit Jane and to undermine the District’s investigation.
She lied to Superintendent Pinder about what the videotape
depicted, falsely stating that the security footage showed Jane
consensually entering the bathroom with M.P. Moreover, a
reasonable jury could find that, in her interactions with other
District officials in positions to help Jane, James withheld
pertinent information regarding the assault, including when, on
separate occasions, Jane Spence and Milo Howard requested

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updates on the matter. Superintendent Pinder ordered an
investigation into James’s efforts to undermine the
investigation because, in his view, her conduct “endangered
student safety.” App. 639. As a result of the investigation,
James was disciplined for her conduct.
James’s conduct could be viewed as especially outrageous
because James was a school principal who was responsible for
Jane’s safety. And Jane, as a student who had just been the
victim of a sexual assault at her school, was in an
“extraordinarily vulnerable condition.” Drejza, 650 A.2d at
1312. Those circumstances could “profoundly affect the
outrageousness calculus.” Id. Under D.C. law, “acts which are
not generally considered outrageous may become so when the
actor knows that the other person is peculiarly susceptible to
emotional distress,” or when the actor holds a position of power
and “abuse[s] the authority of [her] office.” Id. at 1313–14
(cleaned up). Both considerations are relevant here. See id. at
1312–13. In short, a reasonable jury, examining Principal
James’s conduct as a whole and in context, could well conclude
that it rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.
Principal James’s arguments to the contrary are not
persuasive. First, James analyzes each of her actions in
isolation and fails to acknowledge that under D.C. law, her
conduct must be considered “as a whole and in context.” King,
640 A.2d at 674.
Second, according to James, Jane’s principal authority,
Drejza, is not on point because in that case, a police detective
mocked a rape victim to her face, whereas James made her
most inappropriate comments out of Jane’s earshot. But James
seeks to downplay the extent of her own misconduct. In
addition to making inappropriate comments at the June 14
meeting that attempted to influence other investigating

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administrators to disbelieve Jane before any facts had been
determined, James lied to the superintendent about the content
of the videotape, and actively sought to undermine Jane’s claim
of sexual assault to officials who were in positions to help Jane.
Finally, James’s reliance on Kerrigan v. Britches of
Georgetowne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624 (D.C. 1997), is misplaced. In
Kerrigan, the D.C. Court of Appeals concluded that the
plaintiff had not alleged sufficiently extreme and outrageous
conduct where the defendant “targeted him for a sexual
harassment investigation, manufactured evidence against
him . . . , leaked information from the investigation to other
employees, and unjustifiably demoted him to the position of
store manager.” Id. at 628. But Kerrigan arose in the
employment context, where the D.C. Court of Appeals has
been especially “demanding in the proof required to support”
an IIED claim. Id. Jane’s IIED claim arises in a much different
context: A high school principal allegedly abused her power
to undermine the sexual-assault claim of a young student
despite clear evidence corroborating the student’s claim of
assault. Accordingly, we find James’s arguments
unpersuasive.
2. Intent or Recklessness
A reasonable jury could also conclude that Principal James
intended to cause Jane severe emotional distress, or at least
acted recklessly in causing that result. Under D.C. law,
“specific intent is not required; reckless infliction of emotional
distress is sufficient.” Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 820
(D.C. 1998) (cleaned up). Thus, a defendant may be liable not
only when she intends to cause emotional distress, but also
when she consciously disregards a high degree of probability
that her conduct will cause such distress. Id.

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The district court granted summary judgment to James on
this element. Focusing almost exclusively on James’s recorded
remarks during the June 14 meeting, the district court
concluded that although those “remarks were completely
inappropriate,” no reasonable jury could find that James made
them with the requisite intent or recklessness. Doe, 694 F.
Supp. 3d at 47. That is because the Does “had left the room”
and “there was no way for James to have known that [Jane]
would hear the recorded remarks at any point.” Id.
But James’s assumption about what a reasonable jury
might conclude is not necessarily correct. James made
disparaging statements about Jane’s claim to three other
administrators. James could not have reasonably expected her
conduct — including those remarks — to never come to light.
In addition, the record does not foreclose a reasonable jury
from finding that James consciously disregarded a high degree
of probability that the Does might overhear her remarks from
the hallway outside the room. In fact, Julie Doe testified at her
deposition that although the sounds in the room were
“muffled,” she could still “hear” them. App. 473.
In any event, Jane does not rely solely on James’s recorded
statements. She also contends that Principal James intended to
cause her distress by deliberately undermining the District’s
response to her claim of sexual assault in order to embarrass
her. We think a reasonable jury could find for Jane on this
theory.
To start, Principal James’s own words provide direct
evidence of her intent to cause Jane distress, or at least her
recklessness in causing that result. James told her subordinates
that she wanted to “embarrass [Jane’s] ass.” A reasonable jury
could infer from James’s professed intent to humiliate Jane that
James intended to cause her severe emotional distress — or at

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least consciously disregarded the substantial risk that James’s
conduct would have that effect.
And indeed, James’s conduct was consistent with her
stated desire to embarrass Jane: James treated Jane
dismissively; biased investigators who were her subordinates
against Jane by telling them that Jane’s claim was “bullshit”;
and subsequently sought to impede the District’s response,
including by lying to Superintendent Pinder about video
evidence that corroborated Jane’s claim. In the alternative, a
jury could conclude that James consciously disregarded the
substantial risk that her actions would cause Jane severe
emotional distress by undermining the investigation and
making Jane feel that her claim was not being taken seriously
by adults responsible for her safety.
3. Severe Emotional Distress
Finally, Jane has raised a jury issue as to whether Principal
James’s conduct in fact caused her severe emotional distress.
Although D.C. law requires “emotional distress of so acute a
nature that harmful physical consequences might be not
unlikely to result,” Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 64 A.3d
158, 164 (D.C. 2013) (cleaned up), the plaintiff need not
experience any physical harm, Homan, 711 A.2d at 821. D.C.
law, moreover, does not require the defendant’s conduct to be
the sole cause of the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress.
Rather, the defendant’s conduct need only be “a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm.” Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 9 cmt. b; see also Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d
494, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The District of Columbia has
adopted the standard for intentional infliction of emotional
distress from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”).

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Here, a reasonable jury could find that Principal James
caused Jane severe emotional distress. To start, Jane was
diagnosed with chronic PTSD and severe major depressive
disorder. Although Jane’s distress was no doubt caused in part
by the assault she suffered, there is sufficient evidence for a
jury to conclude that James’s conduct was also “a substantial
factor in bringing about” Jane’s distress. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 9 cmt. b. Jane’s expert, a clinical psychiatrist, gave
deposition testimony that James’s conduct “exacerbated” “the
trauma of [the] sexual assault” and that Jane’s “PTSD
symptomatology would not be as severe without the
interactions with Ms. James.” App. 847–49, 852.
Principal James attempts to resist this straightforward
conclusion. She contends that her alleged efforts to undermine
the investigation did not cause Jane meaningful psychological
harm, largely because those efforts were unsuccessful; and that
such conduct was “distinct from the harm caused” by Jane
“hearing James’s recorded comments,” for which James claims
she should not be liable because she did not intend for Jane to
hear those statements. Response Br. 50. In effect, James asks
us to hold that even if her extreme and outrageous conduct
caused Jane severe emotional distress and even if James
intended to cause such distress, she is still not liable because
she did not intend to cause Jane distress in the particular
manner in which her conduct in fact caused that distress.
This argument is forfeited as James raises it in only “a
cursory fashion, without” any citations “to relevant case law or
other authority.” Indep. Producers Grp. v. Librarian of Cong.,
792 F.3d 132, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But even if it were
properly before us, we would decline James’s invitation to split
hairs. When a defendant intends for her extreme and
outrageous conduct to cause severe emotional distress, and
when the defendant’s conduct in fact causes such distress, the

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defendant cannot escape liability merely because the defendant
hoped to have caused the intended emotional distress in a
different way. Indeed, James offers no authority for her
contrary contention that there must be a tight fit between the
way she intended to cause distress and the way distress was
actually caused. Such a rule would be difficult to square with
well-established principles of transferred intent. In the assault-
and-battery context, for example, a defendant who intends her
conduct to put the plaintiff in fear of physical harm is liable
when her conduct instead causes actual physical harm, and vice
versa. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 16, 20.
Transferred-intent principles capture the common-sense
intuition that a defendant who commits culpable conduct with
culpable intent should not avoid liability merely because her
conduct causes injury in a way not precisely intended. Cf.
Gordon v. United States, 285 A.3d 199, 210 (D.C. 2022) (“The
obvious purpose behind [the transferred-intent] doctrine is to
prevent a defendant from escaping liability for a murder in
which every element has been committed, but there is an
unintended victim.” (cleaned up)). We think that the principles
underlying the doctrine of transferred intent are instructive
here.
To be sure, there are important limits on the applicability
of transferred-intent doctrine in the IIED context. D.C. law
restricts when a third party who is not the intended target of
extreme and outrageous conduct can recover for IIED. See
Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 810–11 (D.C. Cir.
2017), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Opati v. Republic
of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418 (2020). But that limit offers no help to
Principal James because Jane was the person James intended to
harm.
In sum, a reasonable jury could find for Jane on all three
elements of her IIED claim against Principal James. We

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therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on that claim.6
* * *
The district court properly dismissed Jane’s NIED claim
and correctly granted summary judgment to the District on the
Title IX claims. The district court erred, however, in granting
summary judgment to Principal James on the IIED claim. We
therefore affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
6 Because the district court did not reach the issue of respondeat
superior liability for the IIED claim, we leave it to the district court
to address on remand whether the District can be held liable for
James’s conduct.

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