Healthy Gulf , Et Al . v. United States Department of the Interior, Et Al .

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued May 6, 2025 Decided August 29, 2025
No. 24-1024
HEALTHY G ULF , ET AL .,
PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE I NTERIOR, ET AL .,
RESPONDENTS
AMERICAN PETROLEUM I NSTITUTE ,
I NTERVENOR
On Petition for Review of a Final Action
of the Department of the Interior
Brettny E. Hardy argued the cause for Environmental
Petitioners. With her on the briefs were Danika Desai,
Christopher D. Eaton, Devorah Ancel, Julia K. Forgie,
Melanie Calero, and Thomas Zimpleman.
Sean Marotta, Danielle Desaulniers Stempel, Keenan
Roarty, and Dana A. Raphael were on the briefs for petitioner
American Petroleum Institute.

-- 1 of 40 --

2
Victoria S. Nugent and Emma R. Leibowitz were on the
brief for amicus curiae Greater New Orleans Interfaith Climate
Coalition in support of Environmental Petitioners.
Elizabeth Neville was on the brief for amicus curiae
American Society of Mammalogists in support of
Environmental Petitioners.
Andrew R. Varcoe, Stephanie A. Maloney, Corinne V.
Snow, and Kevin A. Moscon were on the brief for amicus curiae
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in
support of petitioner American Petroleum Institute.
Christopher Anderson, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were
Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, at the time the brief was
filed, and Justin D. Heminger and Jacob D. Ecker, Attorneys.
Sean Marotta argued the cause for respondent-intervenor
American Petroleum Institute. With him on the brief were
Danielle Desaulniers Stempel, Dana A. Raphael, and Keenan
Roarty.
Julia K. Forgie, Thomas Zimpleman, Melanie Calero,
Devorah Ancel, Brettny Hardy, Danika Desai, and Christopher
D. Eaton were on the brief for environmental respondent-
intervenors.
Jennifer Danis was on the brief for amicus curiae the
Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of
Law in support of respondents.
Deborah A. Sivas, Matthew J. Sanders, and Amanda D.
Zerbe were on the brief for amici curiae Members of Congress,
et al. in support of respondents.

-- 2 of 40 --

3
Before: HENDERSON, CHILDS and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS .
CHILDS , Circuit Judge: Offshore drilling has long stood at
the uneasy intersection of national energy demand, ecological
vulnerability, and environmental justice. Extracting oil and gas
from beneath the ocean floor offers astonishing returns but
carries equally extraordinary risks. Spills, seismic disruption,
and cumulative pollution imperil delicate ecosystems, while
frontline communities along the coast continue to shoulder a
disproportionate share of the harms. Notwithstanding the risks,
the energy industry presses forward, drawn by the promise of
tapping into the vast reserves buried offshore. That pursuit
depends on the federal government’s decision to lease access
to the seafloor for oil and gas production.
By now, the Secretary of the Interior is no stranger to
petitions challenging when and where she authorizes leasing
across portions of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for
offshore oil and gas development. The OCS comprises an
enormous, federally managed swath of submerged lands; it
extends from the seaward edge of state waters, three nautical
miles from the coastline, to the outer boundary of United States
ocean jurisdiction, roughly 200 miles offshore.1 Beneath its
surface lies an estimated 29.4 billion barrels of oil and 391.6
trillion cubic feet of natural gas—enough, by some accounts,
to supply America’s oil needs for four years and its natural gas
needs for approximately twelve years. 2
1 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a–c), (f), 1331(a).
2 See Interior Releases Major Update on Oil and Gas Potential
Beneath U.S. Public Lands, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, (June
18, 2025), [https://perma.cc/W8R3-VSPE].

-- 3 of 40 --

4
This case marks the sixth time we have been called upon
to review a five-year leasing schedule adopted under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et
seq. The 2024–2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and
Gas Leasing Program (Program) was prepared, maintained,
and approved by the Department of the Interior at the direction
of Secretary Debra A. Haaland, in coordination with the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), led by
Director Elizabeth Klein (collectively, Interior). The Program
authorizes up to three lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM)
region, scheduled for 2025, 2027, and 2029.
Environmental Petitioners are a coalition of eco-friendly
nonprofit organizations dedicated to protecting the GOM
region and its surrounding communities. To them, Interior’s
Program violated OCSLA on several fronts. Petitioners
contend that Interior inadequately assessed the risks posed on
vulnerable coastal communities, excluded the endangered
Rice’s whale from its environmental sensitivity analysis,
overlooked potential conflicts with other present and
anticipated ocean uses, and fell short of balancing the
Program’s projected benefits against its environmental costs.
They ask us to remand the Program to Interior for further
consideration. The American Petroleum Institute, intervening
for Interior, contests whether Petitioners’ claims are justiciable.
We hold that Petitioners have associational standing to
pursue their claims. On the merits, however, we find no basis
to disturb the Program. OCSLA demands that Interior consider
a set of interrelated statutory factors and weigh competing costs
and benefits of oil and gas leasing across OCS regions. That
standard does not insist upon analytical perfection at every
turn, but it does demand reasoned decision making. The record
before us, though in parts raises eyebrows, ultimately satisfies
that threshold. We therefore deny the petition for review.

-- 4 of 40 --

5
I.
We have on several occasions examined OCSLA’s
statutory framework in reviewing prior leasing programs. See,
e.g., Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell (CSE), 779 F.3d 588,
593–96 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (challenging the 2012–2017
Program); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior (CBD I), 563 F.3d 466, 472–74 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(challenging the 2007–2012 Program); Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 291–93 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(challenging the 1987–1992 Program); California v. Watt
(Watt II), 712 F.2d 584, 588–89 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (challenging
the 1982–1987 Program); California v. Watt (Watt I), 668 F.2d
1290, 1295–99 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (challenging the 1980–1985
Program). Our evaluation of this Program proceeds against the
backdrop of those decisions. In this iteration, we begin by
outlining the statutory provisions that govern this case and
guide our analysis.
A.
Congress enacted OCSLA in 1953, granting the Secretary
of the Interior broad authority to lease and regulate oil and gas
development of the OCS’s mineral resources. See Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462
(1953). That authority came with few procedural or
substantive guardrails, leaving little guidance on how to
evaluate the Secretary’s decisions. See CSE, 779 F.3d at 593
(citing Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1295). In the following two decades,
the OCS saw the largest oil spill in U.S. history and a foreign
oil embargo, prompting President Richard Nixon to order the
leasing of 10 million acres. See Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1295. That
expansion fueled concerns about harm to coastal communities,
disruption of fisheries, and degradation of marine ecosystems.
Id. at 1295–96.

-- 5 of 40 --

6
Congress addressed those concerns in 1978, overhauling
OCSLA to impose a structured, transparent, and sequential
framework that must be completed before drilling begins. See
Pub. L. No. 95–372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1331 et seq.); Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1296–97. That framework,
“pyramidic in structure,” unfolds in four stages—program
(preparation), leasing, exploration, and development—each
progressively narrower in scope as activity moves closer to
resource production. CBD I, 563 F.3d at 473 (quoting Watt I,
668 F.2d at 1297); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a), 1340, 1344, 1351.
Petitioners challenge the Secretary’s decisions at the
“program” stage of the 2024–2029 Program. At this stage, the
Secretary must prepare “a five-year schedule of proposed
leases and related planning steps.” CSE, 779 F.3d at 594 (citing
43 U.S.C. § 1344). The Program must specify “as precisely as
possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity” that
the Secretary determines “will best meet national energy
needs” for the ensuing five-year period. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
In preparing the Program, the Secretary must adhere to four
statutory provisions—three of which are central to this case.
First, the Secretary must consider the “economic, social,
and environmental values of the renewable and nonrenewable
resources,” the “potential impact of oil and gas exploration on
other resource values,” and the “marine, coastal, and human
environments.” Id. § 1344(a)(1). Second, the Program must
be based on statutory factors that consider the “[t]iming and
location of exploration, development, and production of oil and
gas” across the OCS’s “physiographic regions.” Id.
§ 1344(a)(2). As relevant here, these include, but are not
limited to: “existing information concerning the geographical,
geological, and ecological characteristics of such regions,” the
“equitable sharing of developmental benefits and
environmental risks among the various regions,” “the location

-- 6 of 40 --

7
of such regions with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed,
including fisheries . . . and other anticipated uses of the
resources and space” of the OCS, “the relative environmental
sensitivity and marine productivity of different” OCS areas,
and the “relevant environmental and predictive information for
different areas” of the OCS. Id. §§ 1344(a)(2)(A), (B), (D),
(G), (H). Finally, the Secretary must, “to the maximum extent
practicable,” select the timing and location of leasing to
achieve “a proper balance between the potential for
environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil
and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal
zone.”3 Id. § 1344(a)(3).
B.
On July 3, 2017, Interior initiated the process of
developing a new Program by soliciting public input. See 82
Fed. Reg. 30,886/6 (July 3, 2017). Six months later, Interior
released its Draft Proposed Program (DPP) and scoping for the
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). J.A.
371. In July 2022, Interior released a Proposed 2023–2028
Program and a Draft PEIS. J.A. 25–101. The DPP considered
a range of ten lease sales in the GOM region,4 and one lease
sale in the Cook Inlet region of Alaska. J.A. 30–31. Across
the three planning documents, Interior received nearly three
million public comments. J.A. 371.
3 At the program stage, the Secretary must also ensure that
leasing activities are conducted to “assure receipt of fair market
value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed by the
Federal Government.” Id. § 1344(a)(4). Petitioners do not
challenge that requirement.
4 Although now redesignated as the “Gulf of America,” 90 Fed.
Reg. 8,629/0 (Jan. 31, 2025), we use the terms “Gulf of
Mexico” or “GOM” consistent with the administrative record.

-- 7 of 40 --

8
On September 29, 2023, Interior transmitted the Proposed
Final Program to the President and Congress. J.A. 1754.
Interior then released the 2024–2029 Proposed Final Program
and Final EIS. J.A. 142–1114. On December 14, 2023,
Interior issued a Record of Decision adopting the Proposed
Final Program. J.A. 1754–57. The Program schedules three
lease sales in the GOM region: Sale 262 in 2025, Sale 263 in
2027, and Sale 264 in 2029. J.A. 149, 1269, 1756. Leases are
eligible for sale across the Western, Central, and a small
portion of the Eastern GOM Planning Areas. See 88 Fed. Reg.
67,798/9 (Oct. 2, 2023). No Alaska sales are scheduled. Id.
On February 12, 2024, Environmental Petitioners and the
American Petroleum Institute (API), each timely petitioned for
review of Interior’s approval of the 2024–2029 Program. On
April 18, 2025, Interior announced its intent to develop a new
leasing program, though it left the 2024–2029 Program in
effect while the process to develop a successor program
unfolds.5 API moved for voluntary dismissal of its petition but
remained an intervenor for Interior. We granted the motion.
On July 4, 2025, Congress enacted legislation directing
Interior to conduct “a minimum of 30 region-wide oil and gas
lease sales” in the GOM region by 2040, in addition to any
lease sales under the 2024–2029 Program. One Big Beautiful
Bill Act (BBBA), Pub. L. No. 119–21, § 50102(a)(1), (A), 139
Stat. ___ (2025). The BBBA further requires Interior to “hold
not fewer than 1 lease sale in the [GOM] region . . . by
December 15, 2025,” id. § 50102(a)(1)(B)(i), and “not fewer
than 2 lease sales in that region in each of calendar years 2026
through 2039,” id. § 50102(a)(1)(B)(ii).
5 See Interior Announces Eleventh National Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior
(Apr. 18, 2025), [https://perma.cc/9KRQ-RSUN].

-- 8 of 40 --

9
II.
We first address standing, a constitutional prerequisite to
the exercise of our jurisdiction. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Petitioners invoke associational standing
on behalf of their members, who assert “recreational,
economic, scientific, health, and aesthetic” interests in the
GOM waters impacted by the Program. Pet’rs’ Reply Br. 14–
21. Petitioners are traditional membership organizations with
discrete, stable missions tethered to environmental protection.
Pet’rs’ Add. 42–213. They submitted declarations detailing
how the Program will harm their members’ use and enjoyment
of affected areas.6 See id. That showing is sufficient to
establish their eligibility for associational standing because
once “an organization has identified members and represents
them in good faith, our cases do not require further scrutiny
into how the organization operates.” Int’l Dark-Sky Ass’n, Inc.
v. FCC, 106 F.4th 1206, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of
Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 201 (2023)).
API argues that Petitioners failed to identify at least one
“member who would have standing individually.” Resp’t-
Intervenor’s Br. 10–17. Notwithstanding API’s protestation to
the contrary, Petitioners have standing. To establish
associational standing, Petitioners must show that (1) at least
one of their members would have standing to sue in their own
right, (2) the interests the members seek to protect are germane
to their organizations’ purposes, and (3) neither the claim
6 We evaluate Petitioners’ declarations as evidence to show that
“those persons or entities are actually members of [P]etitioner’s
association and how the challenged agency action affects
them.” Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. EPA, 11 F.4th 791,
803 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

-- 9 of 40 --

10
asserted, nor the relief requested requires the members to
participate individually in the lawsuit. See Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (CBD II), 144 F.4th 296,
305 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citing ITServe All., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 71 F.4th 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2023)).
Petitioners satisfy the first requirement: one member has
individual standing. Article III standing requires an individual
to show “(1) she has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is concrete
and particularized, and actual or imminent rather than
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” CSE, 779 F.3d at 596 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Members must “aver
that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by
the challenged activity.” CBD II, 144 F.4th at 305 (quoting
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 183 (2000)).
Petitioners submit several declarations, including one
from Robert Wiygul, who attests to a recreational and aesthetic
injury resulting from increased oil and gas activity under the
Program and asserts that his injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable decision. Pet’rs’ Add. 161–83. Mr. Wiygul is a
current member of the Sierra Club, a founding member of
Healthy Gulf, a longtime Gulf Coast resident, and a
recreational fisherman. Id. at 162–64 ¶¶ 4–7. He attests that
he has fished in the GOM for decades, including in the OCS,
the Mississippi Sound, Fort Bayou, and the Main Pass region.
Id. at 164 ¶ 7. By his account, he fishes inshore weekly, visits
Mississippi’s Barrier Islands monthly, conditions permitting,
and fishes in OCS waters at least annually. Id.

-- 10 of 40 --

11
According to his declaration, the “damage done” from
previous oil and gas leasing incidents has already injured his
recreational interests. Id. at 164–68 ¶¶ 8–10. As for now, he
identifies specific lease blocks made available under the
Program that, upon release, has harmed or will imminently
harm his “favored fishing and recreating spots,” id. at 180–81
¶ 27 & Fig. 17, directly injuring his “recreational and aesthetic
interests.” Id. at 182 ¶ 29. Those alleged harms are concrete
and particularized, not conjectural or hypothetical. Mr. Wiygul
attests that “OCS oil and gas leasing and the resulting drilling
and production” has impacts that “may be felt at long distances
from the lease blocks or wells themselves.” Id. at 173 ¶ 17.
API questions whether Mr. Wiygul will fish again this year or
in “five-plus years,” Resp’t-Intervenor’s Br. 11 & n.2, but Mr.
Wiygul states that he has a consistent history of fishing and
intends to “continue going out” to the OCS and “the barrier
islands about twelve miles off the coast of Mississippi in the
immediate future.”7 Pet’rs’ Add. 164 ¶ 7, 168 ¶ 12; cf. Jibril v.
Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 804, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2021). That proximity
and sustained connection suffices to establish an injury-in-fact.
Causation and redressability are likewise satisfied. As we
have previously held, “[a] leasing program that used
incomplete economic analyses that failed rationally to account
for leasing’s impact on the environment would harm their
concrete economic and aesthetic interests, and their alleged
harm would be redressed were we to invalidate the Program.”
7 At oral argument, Petitioners explained that seismic survey
activity spurred by the Program’s release would immediately
impair their members’ ability to observe marine species,
including the Rice’s whale. See Oral Arg. Tr. 4:21–125, 5:1–
4. “For purposes of standing, the court assumes the validity of
the [P]etitioner[s’] claims.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 926 F.3d 844,
849 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .

-- 11 of 40 --

12
CSE, 779 F.3d at 596–97 (citing CBD I, 563 F.3d at 479). Mr.
Wiygul’s longstanding use of the GOM, his stated plans to
continue doing so, and his detailed account of how increased
leasing will impair his enjoyment mirror the showing in CSE.
See id. His injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged
Program and are redressable by a decision setting it aside.
Pet’rs’ Add. 182–83. Mr. Wiygul’s declaration establishes a
causal connection between the Program’s adoption, anticipated
offshore drilling, and environmental harm that threatens his
continued use and enjoyment of affected areas. See CBD I, 563
F.3d at 478–79. Petitioners thus satisfy the first requirement.
Petitioners also meet the second requirement of
associational standing: the interests they seek to protect are
germane to their organizational purpose. Germaneness
requires “pertinence between litigation subject and
organizational purpose,” CSE, 779 F.3d at 597 (quoting
Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 58 (D.C. Cir.
1988)), and serves a “modest yet important” function: ensuring
that courts are not drawn into disputes “as to which the
organizations themselves enjoy little expertise and about which
few of their members demonstrably care.” Id. (citation
omitted). The record confirms, and API does not contest, that
protecting GOM communities’ health and natural resources
aligns with Petitioners’ mission. Pet’rs’ Add. 133.
Finally, Petitioners satisfy the third requirement: the
participation of individual members is not required. “Member
participation is not required where a ‘suit raises a pure question
of law’ and neither the claims pursued, nor the relief sought
require the consideration of the individual circumstances of any
aggrieved member of the organization.” CSE, 779 F.3d at 597.
Petitioners challenge Interior’s compliance under OCSLA and
seek vacatur. Neither the claims asserted, nor the relief sought

-- 12 of 40 --

13
depends on individualized evidence from their members. See
id. Accordingly, Petitioners have associational standing.
III.
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review the
petition. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(1). “We liberally defer to the
agency’s findings of fact, upholding facts supported by
substantial evidence; we review the agency’s policy judgments
to ensure that they are neither arbitrary nor irrational; and we
sustain the agency’s interpretation of its authorizing statute so
long as we find it to be legally permissible.” CSE, 779 F.3d at
600. Though we defer to agency policy making and fact
finding, statutory interpretation remains within our province.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024).
Petitioners argue that Interior approved the 2024–2029
Program without first conducting an adequate evaluation of the
environmental consequences that leasing activity would have
in the GOM region. In their view, Interior’s analysis fell short
under three statutory directives: the Program must reflect a
holistic assessment of economic, social, and environmental
values, including impacts on other resource uses and the
“marine, coastal, and human environments,” 43 U.S.C. §
1344(a)(1); must be based on planning factors tied to the
“[t]iming and location” of oil and gas activity, id. § 1344(a)(2);
and must weigh leasing benefits against environmental and
coastal risks to achieve a proper balance, id. § 1344(a)(3). To
them, Interior’s treatment of environmental justice, the
endangered Rice’s whale, and conflicts with other uses fails to
satisfy the planning and balancing obligations set out in
Sections 18(a)(2) and (3) of OCSLA. We address each in turn.

-- 13 of 40 --

14
A.
Section 18(a)(2) of OCSLA requires the Secretary to base
the “[t]iming and location of exploration, development, and
production of oil and gas among the oil- and gas-bearing
physiographic regions of the [OCS]” on a defined set of
statutory considerations. Id. § 1344(a)(2). Petitioners contend
that Interior did not fulfill its obligations under five provisions
of Section 18(a)(2): (A), (B), (D), (G), and (H).
1.
For many shoreline communities along the Gulf Coast, the
harms of offshore oil and gas development are not just
hypothetical, they are felt every day. Often, minority and low-
income communities live near refineries, gas plants, and
petrochemical sites built over decades of leasing. Residents
face high exposure to pollution, serious health risks from
flaring and runoff, and growing danger from storms and land
loss worsened by climate change. These harms are
compounded by the daily disruptions of drilling, including
traffic, noise, discharges, and visible infrastructure.
Federal efforts to confront these challenges fall within the
broader framework of environmental justice. For more than
thirty years, Executive Orders have directed agencies to
identify and mitigate the “disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects” of federal programs on
minority and low-income populations. Exec. Order No.
12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629/9 (Feb. 16, 1994). A more recent
directive defines environmental justice to include:
(b) the just treatment and meaningful involvement of all
people, regardless of income, race, color, national origin,
Tribal affiliation, or disability, in agency decision-making

-- 14 of 40 --

15
and other Federal activities that affect human health and
the environment so that people:
(i) are fully protected from disproportionate and
adverse human health and environmental effects
(including risks) and hazards, including those related
to climate change, the cumulative impacts of
environmental and other burdens, and the legacy of
racism or other structural or systemic barriers; and
(ii) have equitable access to a healthy, sustainable, and
resilient environment in which to live, play, work,
learn, grow, worship, and engage in cultural and
subsistence practices.
Exec. Order No. 14,096, Revitalizing Our Nation’s
Commitment to Environmental Justice for All, 88 Fed. Reg.
25,251/3 (Apr. 26, 2023).
To briefly detour, in supplemental filings following the
petitions for review, the parties brought to our attention a series
of Executive Orders issued in early 2025 that revoked the
orders underlying Petitioners’ environmental justice claims. In
late January, President Donald Trump issued Executive Orders
revoking both Executive Order 12,898, and Executive Order
14,096. See Exec. Order No. 14,173, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,633/4
(Jan. 31, 2025) (revoking EO 12,898); Exec. Order No. 14,148,
90 Fed. Reg. 8,237/0 (Jan. 28, 2025) (revoking EO 14,096). A
third Executive Order further directs that agencies “shall
adhere to only the relevant legislated requirements for
environmental considerations and any considerations beyond
these requirements are eliminated.” Exec. Order No. 14,154,
90 Fed. Reg. 8,353/6 (Jan. 29, 2025).

-- 15 of 40 --

16
Interior and API contend that these developments defeat
Petitioners’ arguments in full or render any error harmless. See
Resp’t’s Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) Letter at 2 (July 17, 2025);
Resp’t-Intervenor’s Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) Letter at 2 (Apr. 29,
2025). API maintains that the repeal of Executive Orders
12,898 and 14,096 eliminates the legal basis for Interior to
consider environmental justice on remand, thereby rendering
any analytical flaw moot. See Resp’t-Intervenor’s Fed. R. App.
P. 28(j) Letter at 1–2 (Apr. 29, 2025). API further argues that
OCSLA does not authorize environmental justice analysis and
that, even if it did, the new Executive Orders bar Interior from
weighing such considerations going forward. See id. at 2.
As to harmless error, Petitioners respond that the issue was
not preserved and should not be considered at this stage. See
Pet’rs’ Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) at 1–2 (July 25, 2025). They also
maintain that their claims arise under OCSLA itself and do not
depend on either rescinded order. See id. at 1. Their opening
brief similarly anchors the environmental justice arguments in
the text and purposes of the statute.
We decline to resolve these disputes over the impact of the
new Executive Orders in the first instance. The Orders
postdate both the adoption of the Program and the party briefs,
and they do not alter our resolution of the case under the law
and record in effect when Interior acted. See City of Port Isabel
v. FERC, 130 F.4th 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citing Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. FERC, 67 F.4th 1176, 1181 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 2023) (applying law in effect at the time the agency
acted)). Whether the new Executive Orders constrain Interior’s
discretion in future proceedings is not before us. They do not
alter our conclusion that, based on the law in force and the
record developed at the time, Interior reasonably evaluated
environmental justice risks under OCSLA and did not act
arbitrarily in doing so.

-- 16 of 40 --

17
As to the issues before us, OCSLA imposes binding
obligations on the Secretary to consider vulnerable
communities. In amending the statute in 1978, Congress made
clear that offshore leasing must not proceed without due regard
for the communities and environments it affects. One of the
stated purposes for the amendment was to “balance orderly
energy resource development with protection of the human,
marine, and coastal environments.” Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1296
(quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1802).
Congress’s mandate manifests in several provisions.
Section 18(a)(2)(B) of OCSLA requires Interior to base the
“[t]iming and location” of lease sales on “an equitable sharing
of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the
various regions.” 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(B). That directive
reflects a judgment that offshore development must proceed
with fair consideration of its costs to “marine, coastal, and
human environments.” Id. § 1344(a)(1). Among those costs is
the risk of harm to the “human environment[],” which includes
“the physical, social, and economic components, conditions,
and factors which interactively determine the state, condition,
and quality of living conditions, employment, and health” of
those affected by activities in the OCS. Id. § 1331(i). To meet
this mandate, Interior must reasonably evaluate the risks that
development may impose on vulnerable communities.
Those statutory commands form the basis of Petitioners’
challenge. They argue that continued leasing in the GOM
region worsens environmental and health harms for already
overburdened communities, and that Interior failed to
meaningfully assess whether those risks are shared fairly across
regions. To them, Interior neither compared vulnerability
levels nor applied any methodology for doing so. Instead, they
say, Interior deferred the analysis to later stages, in conflict
with its obligation to evaluate those risks at the Program stage.

-- 17 of 40 --

18
We find that Interior reasonably evaluated how offshore
leasing risks affect vulnerable communities. It acknowledged
that the benefits and burdens of OCS activity in the GOM
“occur onshore or along the coast,” and identified impact-
producing factors such as “noise, traffic, routine discharges,
bottom and land disturbance, emissions, lighting, visible
infrastructure, and space-use conflicts” that may cause
“disproportionate and adverse human health or environmental
effects” on low-income and minority populations. J.A. 328,
334. Interior also directed readers to a more detailed discussion
in the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement.
J.A. 334–35. To the extent Petitioners fault the Proposed Final
Program document for lacking detail, our review proceeds
“solely on the record made before the Secretary,” which
includes the final environmental documents prepared in
support of the Program. Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1300 (quoting 43
U.S.C. § 1349(c)(6)).
Petitioners assert that Interior needed to appraise the
vulnerability of individual communities in different areas to
rationally evaluate how each would respond to harm from
leasing. Pet’rs’ Br. 23–24. We disagree. Section 18(a)(2)(B)
of OCSLA requires Interior to consider whether environmental
risks are equitably shared “among the various regions,” not to
perform a comparative analysis of individual communities. 43
U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(B). Petitioners’ approach puts the cart
before the horse. The granularity of that task would prove
unduly burdensome at this early stage of the Program’s
development. What the statute demands is a reasoned
assessment of the potential for harm and the severity of its
consequences. See Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1308 (citation omitted)
(defining “risk” as the “exposure to the chance of injury or
loss”). Interior satisfied that obligation.

-- 18 of 40 --

19
Interior reasonably assessed the potential for harm and the
severity of leasing consequences across the GOM region. It
considered ongoing and future burdens across the GOM
Program Area, including land loss, industrial development, sea
level rise, storm intensification, and pollution. J.A. 614–15.
The Program highlighted health disparities near oil and gas
processing facilities and acknowledged that vulnerable
communities may suffer more severe and longer-lasting harm
because they have fewer financial and non-financial resources
available. J.A. 616–17. The EIS also incorporated a robust
account of how environmental harms may disproportionately
affect low-income and minority populations in the GOM. It
recounted the lasting impacts of hurricanes and the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill on communities living outside Louisiana’s
levee protection system. J.A. 614. It illustrated the erosion of
protective wetlands over the past century through Figure 2-13.
J.A. 609–10.
Interior further grounded this analysis in economic and
demographic data. It documented high levels of vulnerability
in Gulf Coast communities, including average poverty rates of
17.2% in counties bordering the Western and Central Planning
Areas, with some counties exceeding 25%. Minority
populations in those counties average 61.8%, with some
counties, such as Willacy County, Texas, reaching as high as
91.5%. Over 60% of the counties and parishes in those regions
exceed the national minority population average of 39.9%.
J.A. 614. Interior also explained that overburdened
communities are not limited to coastal areas but are spread
throughout counties with industrial and environmental links to
offshore oil and gas activity. J.A. 615.
In addition, Interior identified intersecting vulnerabilities.
It cited studies describing the expansion of infrastructure in
coastal areas to support offshore development and its impacts

-- 19 of 40 --

20
on vulnerable communities. It noted that coastal erosion and
subsidence increase susceptibility to flooding and storm-
related hazards, particularly for communities with limited
capacity to adapt or recover. J.A. 615. In Louisiana, Interior
documented that communities of color were exposed to
emissions seven to twenty-one times higher than
predominantly white communities. J.A. 614. It also found that
Native American and Asian fishing communities in southern
Louisiana face heightened risks due to changing environmental
conditions. J.A. 615. The record reflects that low-income and
minority populations often live closest to industrial facilities
and may bear a disproportionate burden from accidents and
chemical releases, especially during extreme weather. J.A.
615. Taken together, Interior’s analysis represents a reasonable
and region-wide appraisal of risk under OCSLA.
Petitioners also argue that Interior failed to compare the
vulnerability of communities across the different GOM
Planning Areas. Again, the statute does not require such a
comparison. Even so, Interior included a regional chart
summarizing the impact-producing factors likely to affect
vulnerable coastal communities across the Western, Central,
and Eastern Planning Areas. J.A. 721. That chart identifies
several concerns as potentially significant in the Eastern
Planning Area, including noise, traffic, bottom and land
disturbance, and visible infrastructure. J.A. 721.
To the extent Petitioners fault Interior for failing to use a
specific methodology to compare risks between the Western
and Central GOM, that argument misreads the statute. The
statute articulates a command of equity, not a calculus for
achieving it. The Secretary must ensure “an equitable sharing
of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the
various regions,” 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(B), but the statute
does not dictate how that assessment must be carried out.

-- 20 of 40 --

21
Congress’s intent was not to impose mathematical balance, but
to ensure that offshore leasing does not concentrate its harms
in one region without fair consideration of the resulting
burdens. A plain language reading confirms as much.
The statutory term “equitable,” as defined in
contemporaneous legal sources, meant “[j]ust,” “conformable
to the principles of justice and right,” and “fair, and right, in
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the individual
case.” Black’s Law Dictionary 632 (Henry Campbell Black
ed., rev. 4th ed. 1968). That understanding reinforces that
Interior was not required to equalize benefits and risks across
all regions. Instead, Interior must make a fair and context-
sensitive judgment about those risks in relation to the benefits
of leasing. Because OCSLA does not specify a particular
metric, that silence grants Interior flexibility in its method, so
long as it is reasonable. Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1311.
Beyond that, we previously held that “[w]hen reviewing
the rationality of Interior’s methodological selections, we have
looked to, among other factors, whether the methodology has
been ‘performed extensively in the past.’” CSE, 779 F.3d at
611 (quoting Watt II, 712 F.2d at 600). Petitioners do not argue
that Interior departed from any established formula. We have
explained that “[w]here existing methodology or research in a
new area of regulation is deficient, the agency necessarily
enjoys broad discretion to attempt to formulate a solution to the
best of its ability on the basis of available information.” Id.
(quoting Watt II, 712 F.2d at 600). And “in making timing
decisions, Interior is generally ‘free to choose any
methodology so long as it is not irrational.’” Id. (quoting CBD
I, 563 F.3d at 488).
Here, Interior did not adopt a rigid formula for evaluating
the equitable sharing of environmental risks, but it followed a

-- 21 of 40 --

22
coherent and historically grounded approach. Interior
explained that it is developing methodologies to assess impacts
on vulnerable communities at both the national and regional
scale, and that it considered a variety of environmental justice
tools and frameworks to inform its planning. J.A. 560–61.
Although environmental justice impacts are highly localized,
Interior included a region-wide analysis at this Program stage
by examining whether minority and low-income populations
are present in each planning area and evaluating whether
proposed leasing may cause disproportionately high and
adverse effects. J.A. 561.
That analysis accounted for a range of interrelated cultural,
social, economic, and environmental factors that may amplify
harm in vulnerable communities. J.A. 561. Drawing on that
framework, the regional impact table, J.A. 721, and the
socioeconomic analysis of vulnerable coastal communities,
J.A. 614–15, reflect Interior’s consideration of how
environmental justice concerns informed its determination of
whether the Program fairly distributes the burdens and benefits
of leasing activity.
Finally, Petitioners contend that Interior improperly
deferred environmental justice analysis to later phases of the
leasing process, despite acknowledging the availability of tools
like the EPA’s EJScreen and an environmental justice index.
Interior explained that those tools would be applied in future
NEPA reviews at the regional, lease sale, and project-specific
stages, where more granular data becomes available. J.A. 560–
61. It noted that pre-lease assessments necessarily rely on
modeled scenarios and that the planning period leaves time for
local engagement. J.A. 560–61. That staged approach is
consistent with both the structure of OCSLA and the tiered
review framework. Watt II, 712 F.2d at 592. Petitioners offer
no basis for concluding that Interior’s decision to defer the use

-- 22 of 40 --

23
of certain tools, while still conducting a program-level analysis,
renders Interior’s equitable-sharing determination arbitrary or
insufficient. We therefore conclude that Interior satisfied its
obligations under Section 18(a)(2)(B).
2.
For many, a visit to the Gulf Coast or deeper OCS waters
means boating, fishing, or scanning the horizon for marine life.
On a lucky day, a boater might glimpse dolphins, sperm
whales, or on rare occasion, one of the most endangered great
whales in the world, the Rice’s whale. J.A. 1708. Long
misclassified as the GOM population of Bryde’s whale, the
Rice’s whale was listed as endangered in 2019, and recognized
as Balaenoptera ricei in 2021, based on new genetic,
morphological, and behavioral evidence. Endangered Status of
the Gulf of Mexico Bryde’s Whale, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,446/6
(Apr. 15, 2019); Technical Corrections for the Bryde’s Whale,
86 Fed. Reg. 47,022/4 (Aug. 23, 2021). It inhabits a narrow
corridor along the Northeastern continental slope between the
DeSoto and Mississippi Canyons, at depths of 100 to 400
meters, spending nights near the surface and days along the
seafloor. J.A. 605, 1709–10, 1725, 1734. Fewer than one
hundred individuals remain, only half of them sexually mature,
and their late maturity, year-round mating, and year-long calf
rearing magnify their vulnerability to threats. J.A. 1707, 1710.
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill exposed nearly half the
population, causing a 22% decline and a projected 69-year
recovery. Designation of Critical Habitat for the Rice’s Whale,
88 Fed. Reg. 47,453/5 (July 24, 2023); J.A. 1711. With a
potential biological removal (PBR) rate of 0.07, the loss of
even one whale threatens recovery. J.A. 2126 n.177. Ongoing
risks include vessel strikes, oil spills, entanglement, and
underwater noise from shipping and seismic surveys, the latter

-- 23 of 40 --

24
particularly harmful given the species’ reliance on sound for
foraging and navigation. J.A. 606–07, 1323, 1710-11. The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has
proposed critical habitat covering much of the whale’s known
range. 88 Fed. Reg. at 47,462.
Petitioners contend that Interior acted arbitrarily by failing
to select the Rice’s whale as the GOM region’s representative
marine mammal of conservation importance. In their view,
Interior violated Section 18(a)(2)(A) of OCSLA by ignoring
peer-reviewed studies, acoustic detections, and federal scientist
declarations documenting the species’ year-round presence in
the Northern, Western, and Central GOM. Petitioners also
argue that Interior disregarded the species’ proposed critical
habitat designation and applied a methodology inconsistent
with its prior decision to exclude the whale’s habitat from
offshore wind leasing areas, violating Section 18(a)(2)(H) of
OCSLA. As they see it, those considerations, together with the
Rice’s whale’s rarity, restricted range, and vulnerability,
required its designation in the Program’s environmental
sensitivity analysis under Section 18(a)(2)(G) of OCSLA.
Under OCSLA the Secretary must consider “the relative
environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different
areas” of the OCS. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(G). The Secretary
must also ground her judgments in the best available facts by
considering “existing information concerning the
geographical, geological, and ecological characteristics of such
regions” and “relevant environmental and predictive
information for different areas of the [OCS].” Id.
§ 1344(a)(2)(A), (H). These commands ensure that leasing
decisions are based not on conjecture or convenience, but on a
record that considers and explains the environmental realities
across the GOM region, and the risks faced.

-- 24 of 40 --

25
The record contains extensive evidence of Rice’s whale
occurrences across the GOM, including scientific studies,
acoustic detections, federal scientist declarations, and the
proposed critical habitat. J.A. 605, 1729, 1751, 1913, 2127–
29. Interior acknowledged receipt of this information, stated it
would review and update its selected species if necessary, and,
in light of public comments and the best available science,
determined that “some changes in selected species were
warranted.” J.A. 317, 901, 943. Not quite for Rice’s whale.
Interior reasonably explained that it declined to select the
Rice’s whale as the GOM’s representative marine mammal
because the species remained almost exclusively confined to
the Northeastern GOM at depths of 100 to 400 meters. J.A.
605. While sightings have increased in the Northern, Western,
and Central GOM Planning Areas, J.A. 605, Interior found
them insufficient to be representative of all mammals across
the GOM. Instead, it selected the sperm whale, which ranges
throughout the GOM, undertakes long-distance migrations
across a broad bathymetric range, dives thousands of meters in
search of deepwater squid, and has served since at least 2007
as the GOM region’s conservation-indicator species for inter-
regional environmental sensitivity modeling. J.A. 242–44.
Petitioners have not shown that Interior overlooked existing
information or acted arbitrary in reaching that decision.
Interior further explained that a final designation of the
Rice’s whale’s critical habitat was pending and that any
necessary adjustments would be addressed at the lease-sale
stage, when specific blocks are selected for development. J.A.
605. Petitioners mount their challenge as a Section 18(a)(2)(H)
claim. However, their argument is best understood as a claim
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2), which requires consultation only when an agency
action “may affect” a listed species or its critical habitat. See

-- 25 of 40 --

26
50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13, 402.14. Even if so construed, that claim
is not ripe for review.
In CBD I, we rejected a nearly identical argument that
Interior’s failure to consult at the program-approval stage
violated the ESA, holding that such a claim was premature
under OCSLA’s multi-stage leasing structure. 563 F.3d at
482–83. The “segmented nature” of OCSLA programs, we
explained, is a mitigating measure that allows “graduated
compliance with environmental and endangered life
standards,” making ESA compliance “more likely to be
satisfied both in an ultimate and a proximate sense.” Id.
(quoting N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 609 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)). Because environmental effects must be evaluated
on a stage-by-stage basis, an ESA consultation obligation
arises only when a particular stage of the program will affect
listed species or critical habitat. Completion of the first stage
does not, by itself, authorize any activity that causes harm to
protected species.
That reasoning applies here. At the program stage, leasing
areas may be identified that Interior ultimately chooses not to
lease. The record confirms that the proposed areas for Program
leasing “do not overlap with the core distribution area of Rice’s
whales” in the Eastern GOM. J.A. 1913. It is therefore not
certain that any leasing activity in or near the proposed critical
habitat will occur, let alone that such activity will adversely
affect the species. Delaying review until a later stage, when
any such impacts are concrete and the ESA consultation
obligation is triggered, will allow both Interior and this Court
to assess the claim on a more developed and definite record.
See CBD I, 563 F.3d at 483. Any hardship to Petitioners from
postponing review is outweighed by these institutional interests
in orderly and stage-specific decision making.

-- 26 of 40 --

27
In 2022, Interior analyzed, explained, and concurred with
a recommendation for Preliminary Wind Energy Area (WEAs)
designation in the GOM region. J.A. 1835–78. As part of that
offshore wind planning, Interior considered protected species,
including the Rice’s whale, and referenced its 100-400 meter
habitat for exclusion. J.A. 1868–69, 1878. Petitioners contend
that Interior’s exclusion of Rice’s whale habitat in the offshore
wind-leasing context, but not in the Program’s leasing analysis,
disregards Interior’s own acknowledgment of the species’
vulnerability across the GOM.
We agree that the contrast between Interior’s exclusion of
Rice’s whale habitat from offshore wind leasing in the Western
and Central GOM and its selection of the sperm whale here
may appear eyebrow-raising at first glance. Still, that apparent
inconsistency does not compel a different outcome. Interior’s
decision to concur with Preliminary WEA recommendations
in the offshore wind-leasing context arose under a different
statutory scheme, addressed different development impacts,
and followed a distinguishable methodological approach. J.A.
1837 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4)(A), (B), (D), (F), (I), and
(J)). Interior also explained that “identification of Preliminary
or Final WEAs does not constitute a final leasing decision, and
BOEM reserves the right under its regulations to issue leases
in smaller, fewer and/or different areas—or issue no leases.”
J.A. 1837. Even if Petitioners were correct that Interior
effectively set aside the Rice’s whale environment in that
context, its decision to take a different approach here is
permissible so long as it provides a reasoned explanation. See
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
Because the methodologies for considering the Rice’s whale
habitat differ across the two regulatory schemes, Petitioners
have not shown that the contrast in outcomes was arbitrary.

-- 27 of 40 --

28
With those claims resolved, Petitioners’ remaining
disagreement concerns how Interior applied the record
evidence through its chosen methodology, not with any failure
to consider the underlying facts. Because their challenge
reflects a policy preference rather than an arbitrary application
of facts to the methodology, their claims fail.
Interior’s selection under its methodology shows no error.
To meet its obligations under Section 18(a)(2)(G) of OCSLA,
Interior developed the Relative Environmental Sensitivity
Analysis (RESA), a model designed to evaluate regional
vulnerability to offshore oil and gas activity based on
biological and ecological indicators. J.A. 1462. RESA
calculates environmental sensitivity scores for each planning
area using representative “parameters,” known as “individual
species or a specific habitat,” grouped into faunal parameters
(such as marine mammals) and habitat-based ecological
features. J.A. 1473. For each faunal group, RESA applies two
criteria: the species’ conservation importance, determined by
its ESA status, and its ecological role within the OCS region.
J.A. 1473. Conservation status is ranked in order: first ESA-
listed species, then ESA-threatened species, and then ESA
candidates. J.A. 1474.
For marine mammals, Interior relied on information
developed by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
and applied a defined process. J.A. 1478. It first compiled “a
table of all federally listed, threatened, and endangered species
of marine mammals” in each OCS region, noting “status and
presence of a corresponding critical habitat.” J.A. 1478. It then
assessed abundance using “the known prevalence or frequency
of sightings” from Stock Assessment Reports and “actual
sightings per unit effort data” from offshore projects, generally
disfavoring species “rarely sighted.” J.A. 1478-79. Interior
favored species with robust datasets over those with limited

-- 28 of 40 --

29
research and, all else being equal, preferred those with
“designated ‘critical habitat.’” J.A. 1479. It also considered
whether a species was the “most frequently sighted large
cetacean” in the region. J.A. 1479. In regions with more than
four qualifying endangered species, Interior’s tiebreaker
process first selected the species with critical habitat and then
the one with the lowest PBR value. J.A. 1479.
Although Interior acknowledged the Rice’s whale’s
precarious status, it again selected the sperm whale as the GOM
region’s representative marine mammal of conservation
importance, just as it had in 2014. J.A. 320, 1616. Under the
RESA framework, Interior considered ESA-listed status,
abundance, available information, and frequency of sightings,
but did not factor in proposed critical habitats or the lowest
PBR value as a tiebreaker metric. Interior determined that both
species are ESA-listed with presumed year-round resident
populations. J.A. 605. It also found that the best abundance
estimate for the sperm whale is 763 individuals, compared to
33 individuals for the Rice’s whale, with the full population
likely numbering fewer than 100. J.A. 605, 1709, 1913.
On frequency of sightings and acoustic detections, Interior
concluded that Rice’s whales are observed almost exclusively
in the Northeastern GOM in the DeSoto Canyon area. J.A. 605.
It acknowledged, however, that recent limited evidence
indicates the Rice’s whale may be present between the 100-
meter and 400-meter isobaths across the Northern GOM, and
that NMFS has proposed a critical habitat designation for the
species encompassing those waters. J.A. 605 (citing 88 Fed.
Reg. 47,453/3 (July 24, 2023)). Even so, Interior found that
little is known “about Rice’s whale density, abundance, habitat
usage patterns and other factors in the central and western”
GOM. 89 Fed. Reg. 31,488/02 (Apr. 24, 2024). Since Interior
re-selected the sperm whale, we presume its frequency-of-

-- 29 of 40 --

30
sightings data and available-information metrics were carried
forward from the prior selection. Tellingly, Interior also
selected the sperm whale in the Gulf of Alaska, East Bering
Sea, Washington/Oregon, and California. J.A. 1616.
Petitioners argue that the conservation factors favored
selecting the Rice’s whale. In their view, the species’ prior
ineligibility for consideration in 2014 should now weigh
against continuing to designate the sperm whale. They note
that the Rice’s whale has proposed critical habitat, and that its
PBR is 0.07 compared to the sperm whale’s 2.0. J.A. 605,
1709. On their account, the Rice’s whale should have prevailed
under RESA’s tiebreaker.
Section 18(a)(2) of OCSLA does not require Interior to
prioritize every relevant factor equally. Watt I, 668 F.2d at
1307 (recognizing that “speculative nature of any information
may well affect the weight the Secretary attaches thereto in
drawing up the leasing program”). Nor does it mandate
adopting one species over another simply because it would
score higher on a single measure. Instead, Interior’s RESA
model weighed the species’ prevalence and data sufficiency of
ecological role together with its conservation importance. J.A.
1478–79. As applied, Interior gave greater weight to the sperm
whale’s GOM-wide range and extensive monitoring record,
identifying it as the “[o]nly endangered whale species to occur
in relatively high abundance” in both the Eastern and Western
GOM. J.A. 1622, 1624. Neither species has a final critical
habitat designation, so this factor was not considered for either
in the RESA scoring. J.A. 605.
Beyond that, Interior was not required to reach RESA’s
lowest-PBR tiebreaker because the sperm whale prevailed
under the weighted prevalence criteria. Although both species
are ESA-listed, the sperm whale outscored the Rice’s whale on

-- 30 of 40 --

31
abundance (763 individuals to 33), GOM-wide distribution
(present throughout the entire GOM versus primarily
Northeastern GOM), frequency of sightings, and volume of
available scientific and monitoring data. J.A. 605, 1709.
Those advantages, in our view, were sufficient to determine the
representative species without resorting to the tiebreaker.
The record reflects a deliberate, albeit counterintuitive,
triage judgment. Choosing the more abundant species over the
more imperiled reflects Interior’s view that, in the event of a
major spill, a proportional loss from a larger population may
produce broader ecological disruption across the GOM. That
approach prioritizes a representative species found throughout
the GOM over one concentrated in a smaller range, maximizing
the model’s coverage of region-wide sensitivity. Moreover,
Interior explained that the composite sensitivity score for the
GOM region was 19.6, the highest among all regions, had
already reflected multiple sensitive taxa, not any single
indicator species. J.A. 322–23. Petitioners have not shown that
substituting the Rice’s whale would have materially changed
that score or altered leasing decisions.
Finally, Petitioners do not challenge Interior’s RESA
methodology. Instead, they criticize Interior’s reliance on its
decade-old application of that methodology to select the
representative marine mammal for the GOM, contending that
the agency ignored existing scientific information about the
Rice’s whale. That argument overlooks the fact that Interior’s
environmental sensitivity analysis was redeveloped using a
“new method.” J.A. 1464. To the extent Petitioners take aim
at this iteration of RESA, we have held that “[w]here existing
methodology . . . is deficient, the agency necessarily enjoys
broad discretion to attempt to formulate a solution to the best
of its ability on the basis of available information.” Watt II,
712 F.2d at 600. That dooms their claims. Interior considered

-- 31 of 40 --

32
the relevant data, applied its methodology, and provided a
reasoned, explanation for its choice.
We conclude that Interior satisfied its obligations under
Sections 18(a)(2)(A), (H), and (G).
3.
The GOM region is not defined solely by oil and gas
activity. It is also home to a diverse array of industries and
cultural practices that depend on stable marine conditions and
open access to ocean space. Commercial and recreational
fisheries contribute billions of dollars to the regional economy,
supporting livelihoods tied to healthy habitats and predictable
migratory patterns. J.A. 300, 304, 557. Aquaculture
operations, identified as a key component of national food
security goals, are expanding along the Gulf Coast. J.A. 302,
543. Offshore wind development is gaining momentum as part
of the nation’s transition to renewable energy. J.A. 542. Many
of these activities occur in areas that overlap with, or lie
adjacent to, potential Program leasing blocks. J.A. 301, 307.
Petitioners argue that Interior failed to consider whether
Program leasing may interfere with other present or anticipated
uses of the GOM region. Section 18(a)(2)(D) of OCSLA
requires the Secretary to consider “the location of such regions
with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed, including
fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sea lanes, potential
sites of deepwater ports, and other anticipated uses of the
resources and space” of the region. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(D).
By Petitioners’ account, Interior merely identified these other
uses without evaluating whether new leasing may impede
them, thereby preventing the proper balancing required under
Section 18(a)(3) of OCSLA. We disagree.

-- 32 of 40 --

33
Interior discussed other uses of the GOM region,
identifying multiple categories: commercial, recreational, and
subsistence fishing; tourism; navigation and marine
infrastructure; military operations; renewable energy; and non-
energy marine minerals. J.A. 294–309, 612–13. For each
category, Interior described current activities, economic
significance, and potential spatial overlap with oil and gas
leasing. J.A. 300–04, 307–08, 612–13. Interior also
acknowledged the increasing presence of aquaculture projects
in the GOM region, mapped designated “opportunity areas” for
aquaculture development, and recognized that these operations
could overlap with oil and gas activity. J.A. 300–03. Interior
also described the importance of subsistence fishing to Cajun
communities, Indigenous peoples, and communities of
Vietnamese heritage, and noted the economic weight of the
commercial fishing sector. J.A. 300–04, 612–13.
By Petitioners’ telling, Interior’s analysis should have
gone further than identifying conflicts. In their view, Interior
failed to determine impediments to these uses, pointing to the
absence of quantified analysis of fishing ground closures or oil
spill contamination. Petitioners’ arguments rest on a more
expansive reading of Section 18(a)(2)(D) of OCSLA than the
statute supports. The provision requires consideration of
“other anticipated uses,” not preemptive resolution of all
potential conflicts. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(D).
Section 18(a)(2)(D) of OCSLA does not require mitigation
at the program stage, as Petitioners contend. See id.; id. § 1802.
Mitigation presupposes knowing which lease blocks will be
offered, their locations, and any site-specific conflicts, which
is information unavailable at the program stage. Interior
addressed use conflicts at the level the statute requires by
identifying conflicts and explaining anticipated future impacts.
In the EIS, Interior noted that fish and fish habitat can “be

-- 33 of 40 --

34
affected by exposure to spilled oil” and identified such impacts
as a potential risk of future development. J.A. 770. That
explanation, together with Interior’s mapping of aquaculture
areas, identification of overlapping uses, and recognition of
cultural and economic stakes, satisfies Section 18(a)(2)(D).
Petitioners also argue that Interior listed offshore wind
development as a potentially competing use without assessing
conflicts between wind leasing and new oil and gas leasing.
Not so. Interior mapped existing wind planning areas
alongside oil and gas pipelines and active leases, J.A. 301;
described the potential impacts of offshore wind projects
including noise, lighting, benthic disturbance, and increased
collision risks for marine mammals and birds, J.A. 543; and
acknowledged that wind lease areas could overlap with oil and
gas program areas, J.A. 307–08. At the Program stage, Interior
lacks knowledge about which specific blocks within the 94-
million-acre GOM Program area will be leased. J.A. 46, 149.
That level of detail is necessary to evaluate potential
infrastructure conflicts. As we explained in Watt II, “[g]reater
specificity is anticipated at each stage” of the process, 712 F.2d
at 592, and the statute does not require granular conflict
resolution before lease areas are defined.
Petitioners also contend that Interior should have exercised
“Subarea Options” to omit acreage and minimize conflicts.
Interior considered those options but chose to retain flexibility
to omit acreage through “targeted leasing” at later stages “when
more regional and site-specific information is available.” J.A.
213. That approach allows Interior to address potential
conflicts, including those involving fishing, aquaculture, and
wind development, when concrete proposals and site data are
in hand. Nothing in Sections 18(a)(2)(D) or 18(a)(3) of
OCSLA mandates exclusion of areas at the Program stage.

-- 34 of 40 --

35
OCSLA requires Interior to consider other present and
anticipated uses of the OCS and to balance the Section 18(a)(2)
factors in setting a leasing schedule. It does not require
preemptive elimination of all potential conflicts. See CBD I,
563 F.3d at 488–89; Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1305, 1309–10. The
record here shows that Interior identified overlapping uses,
mapped relevant infrastructure, recognized potential risks, and
adopted a process for addressing conflicts at later stages
through coordination with other agencies and targeted leasing.
That is the stage-appropriate analysis OCSLA contemplates.
Accordingly, we conclude that Interior complied with Section
18(a)(2)(D) of OCSLA and reject Petitioners’ contention that
this alleged deficiency prevented the proper balancing required
by Section 18(a)(3).
B.
Section 18(a)(3) then directs the Secretary to “select the
timing and location of leasing” by weighing those
considerations “to obtain a proper balance between the
potential for environmental damage, the potential for the
discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact
on the coastal zone.” Id. § 1344(a)(3).
1.
Petitioners argue Interior failed to include environmental
justice in its Section 18(a)(3) balancing. Our precedent
instructs that costs should be quantified, when possible,
particularly when they are “not inherently insusceptible of
quantitative analysis.” CSE, 779 F.3d at 610 (quoting Watt I,
668 F.2d at 1319). Quantification is not required, however,
where no settled methodology exists. See id. at 611 (citing
Watt II, 712 F.2d at 600) (recognizing that an agency has
“broad discretion” to proceed on available information).

-- 35 of 40 --

36
Interior confirms that no established practice exists for
quantifying community-level effects, a limitation our
precedent recognizes as permitting qualitative treatment. Id.
Interior identified environmental-justice considerations,
acknowledged the limits of monetizing them, and incorporated
them qualitatively into the Program’s balancing. J.A. 561,
1170, 1201. Interior explained that it “currently lacks the
capability to quantitatively assign benefits and costs among
different demographic groups” and that the net benefits
analysis “do[es] not disaggregate the impacts on vulnerable
coastal communities from the monetized impacts on the Nation
as a whole.” J.A. 1170, 1201. Interior noted that distributional
impacts would be addressed contextually at later stages when
more location-specific information becomes available. J.A.
1170. Rather than ignore these costs, Interior weighed them
qualitatively alongside other non-monetizable factors.
That approach is consistent with precedent. In CSE, we
rejected a claim that Interior acted irrationally by declining to
quantify the “informational value of delay” although relevant
to Section 18(a)(3) timing. 779 F.3d at 611–12. We held that
Interior could evaluate that factor qualitatively because no
“sufficiently well established” valuation method existed, and
Interior was “free to choose any methodology so long as it is
not irrational.” Id. at 611 (citation omitted). Our view reflected
that when quantification would demand speculative inputs and
“a ‘substantial amount of data,’” Interior may proceed
qualitatively, and courts review only for “obviously incorrect
results or methodology.” Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
Here, Petitioners identify no settled, administrable method
for pricing distributional and community-level burdens from
regionwide leasing at the program stage. Interior candidly
acknowledged that constraint and addressed environmental-

-- 36 of 40 --

37
justice concerns qualitatively. J.A. 561, 1170. That approach
is consistent with past program decisions upholding qualitative
treatment where quantitative modeling would require
unprecedented assumptions, uncertain data, and resource-
intensive projections. CSE, 779 F.3d at 611–12.
Petitioners challenge that view, arguing that because
Interior modeled catastrophic oil-spill risks, it should have
modeled environmental-justice burdens too. The comparison
is inapt. Oil-spill risk lends itself to probabilistic modeling at
the scale of a five-year program. Distributional burdens turn
on localized siting, traffic patterns, and mitigation measures
that are unknown until later stages. Interior reasonably treated
the former with quantitative tools and the latter with qualitative
analysis, while committing to revisit distributional impacts as
decisions crystallize. J.A. 561, 1170, 1201, 1214. That kind
of tiered treatment is permitted when methods for monetization
are not well established. CSE, 779 F.3d at 611–12.
2.
Petitioners contend that Interior could not have achieved
the statutory balance OCSLA requires because it failed to fully
account for the Rice’s whale’s environmental sensitivity under
Section 18(a)(2), thereby skewing the balancing required under
Section 18(a)(3). We have concluded that Interior satisfied
Section 18(a)(2)(G) by applying its RESA methodology to
select the sperm whale over the Rice’s whale for the GOM
region. Supra pp. 27–31. That holding forecloses Petitioners’
derivative balancing claim. Section 18(a)(3) incorporates the
factors enumerated in Section 18(a)(2) into its weighing
process but does not require Interior to assign those factors the
weight Petitioners prefer. See CBD I, 563 F.3d at 484–85
(citing Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1318) (explaining that “cost-benefit
analysis of oil and gas extraction under [S]ection 18(a)(3) is

-- 37 of 40 --

38
satisfactory when an individual area’s potential benefits are
weighed against its potential costs”).
Petitioners further argue that Interior failed to weigh the
extinction-level risk that additional leasing could pose to the
Rice’s whale in its net benefits analysis, despite record
evidence that oil and gas leasing activity in the Western GOM
may cause the species’ disappearance. They point to evidence
that the Western GOM has high levels of vessel traffic, oil and
gas exploration including seismic surveys, and production
activity, which together could drive the species to extinction.
J.A. 1729, 1751. Petitioners emphasize that vessel strikes and
industrial noise are serious threats and that the loss of even a
single whale could imperil the species’ survival. J.A. 1729.
We conclude that Interior is not required to perform a
separate, species-specific cost calculation for the Rice’s whale.
Interior’s environmental balancing analysis is multi-layered.
First, it evaluates the environmental sensitivity of BOEM
ecoregions, which are geographic units defined by physical and
ecological characteristics that may encompass multiple
program areas. J.A. 312–15. For the GOM region, the 2024–
2029 Program’s lease blocks fall within two BOEM
ecoregions: the Western and Central GOM Ecoregion and the
Eastern GOM Ecoregion. J.A. 315. The environmental
sensitivity of each ecoregion is assessed using an ecosystem-
based approach that treats all regions equally without bias and
weighs all species and habitats equally. J.A. 312.
Second, within each BOEM ecoregion, Interior uses the
RESA model to identify indicator species that represent the
region’s overall sensitivity. J.A. 1462. As discussed, Interior
selected the sperm whale, concluding that it more appropriately
served as the indicator species for the GOM region’s marine
mammal group. J.A. 1462. Bearing that reasoned choice in

-- 38 of 40 --

39
mind, Petitioners have not shown that the Rice’s whale was
statutorily required to be considered beyond this step or that
substituting it for the sperm whale would have materially
changed the composite sensitivity score or altered leasing
decisions. J.A. 322–23.
Finally, the composite environmental sensitivity scores
from the RESA model, along with other statutory factors, feed
into the Section 18(a)(3) balancing analysis. The composite
score for the GOM region was 19.6, the highest among all OCS
regions, reflecting the aggregate sensitivity of multiple taxa
rather than any single species. J.A. 322–23. The risks posed
to the Rice’s whale, and all other non-selected species, are
among the environmental harms captured in that aggregate
score through the selection of the sperm whale as the
representative species. Requiring Interior to cherry-pick non-
selected species to balance extinction costs against leasing
benefits would serve no interest beyond Petitioners’ own and
would be akin to judging the strength of a rope by yanking on
one thread instead of testing the whole braid. Section 18(a)(3)
does not require Interior to isolate or separately quantify the
cost of losing a single species so long as relevant environmental
harms are reasonably reflected in the aggregate.
****
We conclude that Interior’s Section 18(a)(3) balancing
satisfied OCSLA’s requirements because it considered relevant
environmental and economic factors, applied its methodology
consistently, and reasonably declined to adopt Petitioners’
preferred species-specific weighting.

-- 39 of 40 --

40
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.
So ordered.

-- 40 of 40 --