United States of America v. Rowena Joyce Scott

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued May 8, 2025 Decided August 29, 2025
No. 24-3036
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
APPELLEE
v.
ROWENA J OYCE SCOTT ,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:19-cr-00030-1)
Stuart A. Berman, appointed by the court, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for appellant.
Eric Hansford, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R. Kolb,
Nicholas P. Coleman, Brian P. Kelly, and Diane G. Lucas,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: S RINIVASAN , Chief Judge, PILLARD and CHILDS ,
Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS .
CHILDS , Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Appellant
Rowena Joyce Scott (Scott) of three counts of wire fraud, one
count of credit card fraud, two counts of filing a false income
tax return, and two counts of willful failure to file an income
tax return. In turn, the district court sentenced Scott to eighteen
months of imprisonment. On appeal, Scott challenges her
convictions on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict and that the district court abused its
discretion in denying her pre-trial motions to suppress
evidence. We affirm.
I.
Park Southern is a 12-story, 365-unit apartment building
in the District of Columbia. Park Southern Neighborhood
Corporation (PSNC), a non-profit, non-member corporation,
owns the apartment building. PSNC’s express purpose was to
make “adequate housing available to poor and underprivileged
residents,” enable those residents “to retain support and other
related services,” involve them “in the planning, development,
re-development and improvement of their community,” and
promote “the revitalization of the Park Southern
neighborhood.” J.A. 2710. A resident-elected board of
directors manages PSNC. In 2006, to rehabilitate its
apartments, PSNC took out a loan in the amount of $3,076,641
from the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing and
Community Development (DHCD).1
On January 1, 2010, the beginning date for the conduct
identified in the indictment, Scott operated as both the
1 DHCD “develop[s] and manage[s] affordable housing for the
District” of Columbia. J.A. 633.

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president of PSNC’s board and the general manager of Park
Southern.2 As PSNC’s board president, Scott exercised control
over the board by effectively making decisions herself, seeking
board approval only occasionally(and, even then, as a rubber
stamp), appointing and replacing members, and limiting their
access to information. She was not entitled to compensation as
board president, but had singular access to PSNC’s financial
records, its banking accounts, checks, and credit cards. As
general manager of Park Southern, Scott reviewed prospective
residents, collected security deposits, prepared units for
occupancy, collected rent, paid bills, kept the building secure
and clear, and made all hiring and firing decisions. For
managing Park Southern, Scott received a salary of about
$60,000 per year and free rent valued at $635 per month. J.A.
990–91.
During the time she served as president of the PSNC
board, Scott used corporate funds to make personal purchases.
She made cash withdrawals, wrote checks, and used the PSNC
ATM and debit cards to, among other things, pay for personal
expenses, buy clothes, robes, fur coats, shoes, spa treatments,
and make car insurance payments. Of particular focus in
Scott’s indictment was her cash withdrawal of the following
amounts from PSNC’s operating account at a Wells Fargo
Washington, D.C., bank branch: $4,115 on February 4, 2014;
$4,210 on March 4, 2014; and $2,250 on May 5, 2014.
In December 2013 and April 2014, DHCD sent notices of
default to Scott and PSNC identifying specific violations of its
loan agreement with PSNC. In response to the default, DHCD
exercised its authority as a debtor in May 2014 to bring in Vesta
2 Although the indictment identified her as a property manager, J.A.
38, Scott was adamant that she was a general manager, and not a
property manager because that designation required a license.

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Management Corporation (Vesta) to serve as the property
manager of Park Southern.3 Vesta owns and operates
affordable housing communities. When Vesta becomes the
property manager of a building, it assumes the management
and physical operation of the property and collects rent due,
pays bills, maintains the property, provides security for the
property, and ensures regulatory compliance. Vesta entered
Park Southern with its own personnel, removed all the
members of the PSNC board, including Scott, changed locks to
the management and maintenance offices, and took possession
of the building’s records, files, documents, and computers.
On July 10, 2014, Georgette Benson, a portfolio and asset
manager with DHCD, conveyed to Charlotte Reis, a special
agent (SA) with the Internal Revenue Service Criminal
Investigation (IRS-CI) division, that Scott was misusing Park
Southern funds for personal use. As a result, SA Reis opened
a criminal investigation, which led to her interviewing
witnesses and subpoenaing and summoning records from
PSNC and Vesta among others. Thereafter, on August 6, 2014,
Vesta gave consent to search the computers at Park Southern
and IRS-CI took an image—essentially making a copy—of
those computers on August 12, 2014. SA Reis then applied for
and was granted a search warrant for the computer imaging.
On November 9, 2016, Reis and a second IRS-CI special agent
interviewed Scott at her apartment. Scott spoke with the
agents, reviewed documentation, and answered their questions.
During the conversation, Scott admitted that she did not file tax
returns for tax years 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2014. J.A. 1161–
62. Scott eventually asked the agents to leave when the tone of
their questions became more accusatory.
3 PSNC originally hired Vesta in February 2014. However, conflict
between Vesta and Scott arose when Vesta requested access to
financial records. As a result, Scott terminated Vesta in March 2014.

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On January 31, 2019, a federal grand jury indicted Scott
for three counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343,
two counts of filing a false income tax return in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7206(1), two counts of willful failure to file an income
tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, and one count of
D.C. credit card fraud over $1,000 in violation of D.C. Code
§ 22-3223(b)(5), (d)(2). On February 3, 2023, Scott filed a
motion to suppress asserting that statements she made to law
enforcement officials were secured in violation of her Fifth
Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). That same day, Scott also filed a motion to suppress
contending that the government procured the evidence from
computers at Park Southern without probable cause in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied both
motions to suppress.
The criminal trial regarding the charges pending against
Scott occurred in June 2023. On June 27, 2023, the jury found
Scott guilty on all eight counts. J.A. 2269–71. Thereafter, on
March 5, 2024, the district court sentenced Scott to a total of
eighteen months of imprisonment, twenty-four months of
supervised release, restitution in the amount of $201,158.04,
and a $650.00 special assessment. J.A. 2556, 2558, 2561. The
district court entered judgment on March 7, 2024.
Scott timely appealed. Thereafter, we appointed counsel
to present arguments on behalf of Scott.4
II.
We have jurisdiction to review Scott’s appeal of her
judgment of conviction as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
United States v. Barrow, 109 F.4th 521, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
4 We express our gratitude to Stuart A. Berman for his service.

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(observing that a “judgment of conviction [i]s a final order
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291”).
III.
Scott, aided by appointed counsel, challenges her
convictions and the district court’s judgment on several
grounds. First, Scott contends that the government’s evidence
is insufficient to support her wire fraud convictions because
there was neither an interstate wire communication nor a
communication that “furthered the fraud scheme.” Appellant’s
Br. 27. She further contends that the government failed to
prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that Scott did not act in good
faith.” Id. Scott next argues that “[t]he government also failed
to prove that the D.C. Code credit card charge in Count Four
extended into the applicable six-year statute of limitations
period.” Id. Additionally, as “[f]or the tax offenses,” Scott
opines that “the government presented insufficient evidence to
support [those] convictions.” Id. at 28. Finally, Scott asserts
that “the district court erred in not suppressing Scott’s oral
statements to law enforcement agents and evidence seized from
[the] PSNC computer[s].” Id.
Before analyzing the substantive issues, we address
Scott’s procedural contention that the municipal credit card
fraud charge is barred by the statute of limitations. The
government asserts that Scott forfeited this argument because
she did not raise it before the district court. Scott admits she
“did not raise the statute of limitations issue in the district
court.” Appellant’s Br. 38.
“[A] statute-of-limitations defense becomes part of a case
only if the defendant puts the defense in issue.” Musacchio v.
United States, 577 U.S. 237, 248 (2016). “When a defendant
fails to press a limitations defense, the defense does not become

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part of the case and the Government does not otherwise have
the burden of proving that it filed a timely indictment.” Id.
“When a defendant does not press the defense, then, there is no
error for an appellate court to correct—and certainly no plain
error.” Id. “A defendant thus cannot successfully raise the
statute-of-limitations defense . . . for the first time on appeal.”
Id. Therefore, under Musacchio, Scott forfeited her statute of
limitations challenge to her municipal fraud conviction.
Even if Scott’s statute of limitations challenge were not
foreclosed by Musacchio, it would fail plain error review.
“[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at
trial, there must be (1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that
affect[s] substantial rights.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.
461, 466 (1997). Ordinarily, “to affect the defendant’s
substantial rights, ‘the error must have been prejudicial: It must
have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’”
United States v. Meadows, 867 F.3d 1305, 1317 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734
(1993)). Here, the government presented evidence of many
credit card transactions showing Scott’s embezzlement
extending well into the limitations period. J.A. 2288–89.
Because extensive evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that
those transactions were fraudulent, any error did not affect
Scott’s substantial rights. We thus proceed to consider the
merits of Scott’s remaining arguments.
A.
Scott’s first sufficiency challenge is to the Government’s
wire fraud evidence, which she contends was defective because
it failed to establish (1) an interstate wire communication, (2) a
communication that furthered the fraud scheme, or (3) that
Scott did not act in good faith. We reject these contentions.

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We review challenges “to the sufficiency of the evidence
de novo.” United States v. Boyd, 803 F.3d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir.
2015). This Court’s review is “highly deferential to the jury’s
decision.” United States v. Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083, 1089 (D.C.
Cir. 2022). For that reason, “[t]he standard for overturning a
guilty verdict on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence is a
demanding one.” United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028,
1035 (D.C. Cir. 1990). “A conviction should be reversed only
where the evidence is such that, viewing it in the light most
favorable to the government, a reasonable trier of fact could not
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Under that
light, we “draw[] no distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence, and giv[e] full play to the right of the
jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw
justifiable inferences of fact.” United States v. Gaskins, 690
F.3d 569, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
The wire fraud statute makes it a criminal offense for a
person, “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, [to] transmit[] or cause[] to be transmitted by means
of wire . . . communication in interstate or foreign commerce,
any writings . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343. For a conviction, “[w]ire fraud
requires proof of (1) a scheme to defraud [to get money or
property]; and (2) the use of an interstate wire communication
to further the scheme.” Maxwell, 920 F.2d at 1035. In Scott’s
indictment, the government charged that she devised a “scheme
to defraud” for the purpose of stealing, purloining, converting,
and embezzling PSNC’s funds “for her own personal benefit
and use.” J.A. 38.

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The trial record yields sufficient evidence supporting the
jury’s verdict finding Scott guilty of having fraudulently
skimmed PSNC’s funds and redirected them to herself. The
government demonstrated use of interstate wire
communications to process cash withdrawals from PSNC’s
account through the testimony of SA Reis, who testified that
Scott’s withdrawals required communications between a bank
branch in Washington, D.C. and servers located in Shoreview,
Minnesota. J.A. 1148–50. Particularly, during her testimony,
Reis referred to a document received from Wells Fargo—
Exhibit 120—and confirmed that the three 2014 cash
withdrawals by Scott cited in the indictment were electronic
interstate communications between computers in Washington,
D.C. and servers in Minnesota. 5 J.A. 1150, 3605. Moreover,
5 At oral argument, Scott’s counsel challenged Exhibit 120’s
admissibility, arguing that the first three pages of the document were
not substantive evidence of an interstate wire communication and, if
they were considered as such, there would be a Confrontation Clause
problem under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009). However, Scott did not object to the government’s
introduction of Exhibit 120 into evidence, J.A. 468–70, 956, and we
see no plain error, United States v. Bostick, 791 F.3d 127, 142 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (“Because Johnson did not raise that argument in the
District Court, our review is for plain error.”). Here, Scott cannot
show prejudice because prior to government’s counsel asking Reis
questions about Exhibit 120, Reis reviewed withdrawal slips that
were also in evidence and testified that Scott made all three cash
withdrawals from PSNC’s account at a Wells Fargo Bank Branch in
Washington, D.C. J.A. 1144–47. Reis then explained that the Wells
Fargo computers in Washington had to communicate with computers
elsewhere in the country to process the withdrawals, thereby showing
the interstate nature of the communications. J.A. 1148. Only then
did the government’s attorney ask Reis to refer to the last page of
Exhibit 120 to establish that the elsewhere location was Shoreview,
Minnesota. J.A. 1150. Due to the totality of evidence from Reis’
testimony, we do not reach the issue of whether the first three pages

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the wire communications furthered the scheme because the
withdrawal would not have occurred but for the
communications confirming that the requested amounts were
in PSNC’s account. These communications “played a
significant part in enabling [Scott] . . . to acquire dominion
over” PSNC’s funds, and “the success of [her] scheme
depended” on the bank’s wires that allowed her to withdraw
the money. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 401–02
(1974).
Finally, the government introduced ample evidence of
Scott’s lack of good faith in support of the wire fraud
convictions. Despite her knowledge that Park Southern’s
money was meant only for Park Southern and its tenants, Scott
repeatedly used its funds for her personal expenses, including
spa weekends, luxury clothing, and speeding fines. J.A. 530–
31, 1064–75, 1127–36, 1838–39. She also took steps to
prevent discovery of her fraudulent purchases, including
preventing Park Southern’s bookkeeper from reviewing
incriminating financial statements. J.A. 706–08, 714–15.
These examples of Scott’s conduct suffice to show that she was
knowingly stealing from and intending to defraud Park
Southern. In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence presented was
sufficient to support a finding that Scott was guilty of wire
fraud as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we
affirm Scott’s convictions for three counts of wire fraud.
B.
Scott’s second sufficiency challenge is that the
Government failed to carry its burden to support the jury’s
of the Wells Fargo exhibit were properly in evidence or otherwise
present a Confrontation Clause problem.

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verdict on the tax offenses, and in particular that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that she “acted willfully” and did not
act “in good faith.” Appellant’s Br. 28. Scott argues that “[t]he
uncontroverted evidence was that [she] was [a] busy person,
untrained in finance and accounting issues, who was far more
focused on helping the residents of Park Southern than she was
on personal finances or tax returns.” Id. at 45. As a busy
woman, “[s]he relied on others to prepare accurate returns and
to advise her on whether she needed to file at all.” Id.
1.
The government charged Scott with two counts of filing a
false income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) for
underreporting her income in 2011 and 2013. Section 7206(1)
mandates that it is a felony for a person to “[w]illfully make[]
and subscribe[] any return, statement, or other document,
which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is
made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not
believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.” 26
U.S.C. § 7206(1). “To sustain a conviction under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1), the government must prove that: (1) the defendant
willfully made and subscribed to a tax return; (2) the return
contained a written declaration that it was made under penalties
of perjury; (3) the defendant did not believe that the return was
true as to every material matter; and (4) the return was false as
to a material matter.” United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158,
1163 (11th Cir. 2009). In criminal tax cases, willfulness
“requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty
on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that
he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.” Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
The government presented evidence showing that Scott
earned $100,022.73 in 2011 and $83,980.47 in 2013. J.A.

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2843. It further showed that she reported only $37,115 in
income for 2011, J.A. 2927, and $57,524 for 2013, J.A. 2935.
In light of Scott’s testimony that a PSNC board member
prepared her 2011 and 2013 tax returns, J.A. 1746–47, the
district court instructed the jury that “[r]eliance on a qualified
tax preparer is an affirmative defense to a charge of willful
filing of a false tax return, if the defendant can show that she
provided the preparer with complete information and then filed
the return without any reason to believe it was false,” J.A. 2239.
The district court added that Scott was not guilty of
evading taxes if she had a good faith belief that she paid the
government all the taxes owed. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, we find that it was
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that Scott willfully filed tax returns in which
she knowingly and significantly under-reported her income for
tax years 2011 and 2013, and that she was aware of the falsity
in her returns when she signed and subscribed them under
penalties of perjury. While Scott testified that a PSNC board
member prepared her returns, the jury could reasonably reject
this defense. One return stated it was “self-prepared” and the
other return listed no preparer, in contrast to earlier returns that
did list a preparer. J.A. 2928, 2936. Accordingly, we affirm
Scott’s convictions for violating 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).
2.
The government also charged Scott with two counts of
willful failure to file an income tax return in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7203 for her failure to file income tax returns in 2012
and 2014. It is a criminal offense under § 7203 for “[a]ny
person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax,
or required by this title or by regulations made under authority
thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any

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information” to fail willfully “to pay such estimated tax or tax,
make such return, keep such records, or supply such
information, at the time or times required by law or
regulations.” 26 U.S.C. § 7203. To sustain a conviction for
violation of § 7203, “the evidence must be sufficient to prove
each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1)
[the defendant] was required to file . . . tax returns; (2) she
failed to file them; and (3) her failure was willful.” United
States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir. 2007). As with a
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), willfulness only requires
proof of a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty.” United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976).
The government presented evidence showing that Scott
earned $103,112.39 in 2012 and $36,603.78 in 2014. J.A.
2843. The government further solicited testimony establishing
Scott’s admission of her failure to file tax returns for those
years, her awareness of the obligation to pay taxes if she made
more than the applicable threshold amount, and her
acknowledgement that she had previously filed tax returns
from 2003 through 2008, 2011 and 2013. J.A. 1161–62, 2036.
This evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
government is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that
Scott was aware of the requirement to file taxes and that she
willfully failed to file tax returns for tax years 2012 and 2014.
Accordingly, we affirm Scott’s convictions for violating 26
U.S.C. § 7203.
C.
Before trial, Scott filed two motions to suppress which she
argues the district court erroneously denied. “In reviewing the
district court’s denial of the suppression motion[s], we review
legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.”
United States v. Miller, 799 F.3d 1097, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

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“We will affirm the district court ‘so long as any reasonable
view of the record supports its denial of the motion to
suppress.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991,
997–98 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
1.
Scott argues that the district court erred in denying her
motion to suppress “non-Mirandized statements that were
custodial and involuntary.” Appellant’s Br. 46. In support of
her argument, Scott contends that SA Reis knew Scott was the
target of a government investigation. Therefore, Reis’s
testimony denying the purpose of the IRS-CI’s visit shows that
“[a] reasonable person in Scott’s position would have felt, as
she did for two hours, that she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave.” Appellant’s Br. 48–50 (citing J.A.
142–43). In this regard, Scott contends that her statements
were involuntarily induced by agents who “showed up armed
and unannounced; fail[ed] to contact counsel for Park
Southern; and failed to disclose the existence of a criminal tax
investigation or tell Scott that her oral and written statements
could be used against her.” Id. at 51.
The district court denied Scott’s motion to suppress,
concluding that she was not in Miranda “custody” and her
statements were voluntary.
Law enforcement officers “are not required to administer
Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question,” but
rather only when an interrogated suspect is “in custody.”
United States v. Lea, 839 F. App’x 551, 554–55 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (citations omitted). “The Miranda custody analysis is a
two-step inquiry.” Id. at 555. “As an ‘initial step,’ the court
must ‘ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances
of the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or

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she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’”
Id. (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted). “If the individual would
have felt free to leave, the inquiry ends; a restraint on freedom
of movement is a prerequisite for Miranda custody.” Id. “If,
however, the individual’s freedom of movement was
restrained, the court ‘must then ask the additional question
whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently
coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at
issue in Miranda.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 949
F.3d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2020)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “If so, then the individual is ‘in custody’ and
therefore ‘entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed
by Miranda.’” Id. (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 440 (1984)).
SA Reis testified that Scott was told that the interview was
“voluntary and that she could end the interview at any time.”
J.A. 113. Even though Scott testified that she was not told that
answering the questions was voluntary, J.A. 1702, Scott
nevertheless stopped the interview when she determined that
Reis’ tone had become too aggressive and accusatory, J.A.
1703–04. The agents stopped the interview and left
“willingly.” J.A. 1703. Reviewing these circumstances de
novo, we hold that Scott was not in Miranda custody and, thus,
we affirm the district court’s denial of Scott’s motion to
suppress her statements to IRS-CI agents.
2.
Scott argues that the district court erred in denying her
motion to suppress evidence seized from PSNC’s computers
because the search warrant was defective. Specifically, she
contends the warrant was defective because: (1) it contained
facts irrelevant to the alleged tax crimes; (2) the affiant

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accepted as true allegations from a civil complaint; (3) it
contained information from a witness without establishing their
credibility; and (4) it failed “to negate the very plausible
possibility of data deletion, alteration, or other tampering.”
Appellant’s Br. 52–53. Further, in Scott’s view, the good-faith
exception is inapplicable because the affidavit was “so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable.”6 Id. at 54–55 (quoting United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)).
The district court denied Scott’s motion to suppress based
on the validity of the warrant. The district court concluded that
“the affidavit plainly set out probable cause,” J.A. 323, and
provided sufficient details about and corroboration for the
account of a former employee who said that Scott had used
Park Southern funds for personal expenses, id. at 314–20.
“And if I am wrong about any of that,” the district court added,
the evidence still would not be subject to suppression, because
“[t]he agents were acting within the scope of a valid warrant
when they conducted the search and their reliance on the
warrant issued by the magistrate judge was objectively
reasonable.” J.A. 324.
The Fourth Amendment prescribes that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
“Probable cause is an objective standard to be met by applying
a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” Johnson v. District
of Columbia, 927 F.3d 539, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting
United States v. Burnett, 827 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
2016)). “It is ‘more than bare suspicion but is less than beyond
6 “Under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, ‘evidence
seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant’ need
not be excluded, even if the warrant turns out to have been
unsupported by probable cause.” United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d
1265, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 905).

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a reasonable doubt, and, indeed, is less than a preponderance
of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Burnett, 827 F.3d at 1114).
“When assessing whether a search warrant is supported by
probable cause, we ask whether the issuing judge had a
‘substantial basis’ for concluding that ‘a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing.’” Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1271 (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).
The warrant to search Park Southern devices established
probable cause to believe that Scott willfully failed to file tax
returns. Probable cause “is less than a preponderance of the
evidence.” Burnett, 827 F.3d at 1114. When approving a
search warrant, the magistrate need only determine whether
“reasonable inferences” from the evidence described in the
application establish a “fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates,
462 U.S. at 240. To begin, the warrant affidavit described IRS
records and information submitted to the IRS by third parties
suggesting that Scott had willfully failed to file her taxes for
2009–2012 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 and had made
willfully false statements in a tax return in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7206(1). J.A. 237, 250–51. It was reasonable to
believe that the computers—which the affidavit stated
contained Park Southern’s financial and accounting records—
would provide corroborating evidence of those crimes. J.A.
238, 254. Other information cited in the warrant, including
statements about Scott’s embezzlement and allegations of
financial mismanagement, further supported probable cause of
Scott’s tax fraud, J.A. 249, reinforcing the inadequacy of
Scott’s challenges to probable cause.
First, the additional facts—such as Scott’s monopolization
of the common room, Park Southern’s loan delinquency, and
the deteriorating building conditions—cited in the warrant bear
on the tax crimes by providing additional evidence that Scott

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was underreporting income and using Park Southern’s money
for her personal benefit. J.A. 246. Second, the affidavit did
not accept the allegations in the civil complaint as necessarily
true: it merely cited those allegations and their corroboration
by witness statements and IRS records as supportive of
probable cause. J.A. 243–46. Third, and similarly, the
credibility of the witness’s account in the affidavit was
bolstered by its consistency with allegations in other civil
complaints, documents signed and submitted to the IRS,
declarations signed by Scott herself, and statements by a
property management company. Finally, Scott offers no reason
to think any data tampering occurred, let alone any explanation
why the warrant needed to negate the possibility of such
tampering. In sum, these insubstantial attacks do not invalidate
the issuing judge’s “substantial basis” for concluding that
probable cause existed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.
However, even if probable cause were absent, the evidence
from PSNC’s computers would be admissible because Vesta
consented in writing to the search of the computers. J.A. 254,
275–76. “Consensual searches fall outside the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.” United States v. Lewis,
921 F.2d 1294, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1990). And Vesta’s consent
was legitimate because Vesta exercised control over the
computers at the time of the search. See United States v.
Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Therefore, we
affirm the district court’s denial of Scott’s motion to suppress
computer evidence.
*****
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
So ordered.

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