Centurytel of Montana, Inc ., Asubsidiary of Lumen Technologies , Inc . v. National Labor Relations Board

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 15, 2025 Decided January 13, 2026
No. 24-1346
C ENTURYTEL OF M ONTANA, INC ., A SUBSIDIARY OF LUMEN
TECHNOLOGIES , INC .,
P ETITIONER
v.
NATIONAL LABOR R ELATIONS B OARD ,
R ESPONDENT
INTERNATIONAL B ROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS
LOCAL UNION 768,
INTERVENOR
Consolidated with 24-1352
On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
for Enforcement of an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board
Patrick R. Scully argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs was Monica J. Frascona.

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Jared D. Cantor, Senior Attorney, National Labor
Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were William B. Cowen, Acting General Counsel,
Ruth E. Burdick, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Meredith
Jason, Assistant General Counsel, and Usha Dheenan,
Supervisory Attorney.
Jacob J. Demree argued the cause for intervenor in support
of respondent. With him on the brief was Jonathan D.
Newman.
Before: P AN and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and R OGERS ,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court by Senior Circuit Judge R OGERS .
R OGERS , Senior Circuit Judge: The National Labor
Relations Board ruled that CenturyTel of Montana, Inc.,
violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (“the Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1), by failing
to furnish information requested by the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 768 (“the
Union”) on non-union technicians working within the Union’s
jurisdiction. CenturyTel petitions for review on several
grounds, in an attempt to show that the Board’s decision was
not supported by substantial evidence. For the following
reasons, the court denies the petition and grants the Board’s
cross-application for enforcement of its order.
I.
CenturyTel provides telephone and data services as a
subsidiary of Lumen Technologies, Inc., a national
telecommunications company. It has had a collective

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bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the Union for decades.
The Union represents employees in northwest Montana who
perform installation, maintenance, and repair work for
businesses and residences. Among the attachments to the
operative CBA is a letter of understanding on crossing
jurisdictional boundaries, which states that CenturyTel “may
have employees from other bargaining units work within this
bargaining unit’s jurisdiction only when no employees from
this bargaining unit are available or to help during
emergencies.” Ltr. of Understanding, CenturyTel of
Washington, Inc., CenturyTel of Oregon, Inc., CenturyTel of
Montana, Inc. and Locals 89 and 768, IBEW, AFL-CIO, at 103
(July 1, 2020).
On July 27, 2021, the Union’s business manager, George
Bland, received an email from the Telecommunications
Council, a group of local member unions of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“IBEW”) that represent
employees of CenturyTel and other Lumen entities throughout
the United States. The email, sent to union representatives
across the country, referred to a report from a union local that
Lumen was using non-union National Technicians to perform
work in the local union’s area. Union locals in Missouri and
Texas responded that National Technicians were working in
their areas. On August 9, the Council sent Bland and other
locals a model information request regarding CenturyTel’s use
of National Technicians.
Bland sent the information request to Lumen’s regional
manager, John Bemis, on August 10. In a covering email,
Bland stated “the attached information request [was] regarding
National Techs working in Local 768’s jurisdiction,” and
Bemis should “call with any questions.” The request itself
stated the information was “for purposes of monitoring the
collective bargaining agreement between the parties and the

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investigation, preparation and processing of grievances in the
event the Union feels there has been a violation of any
provision(s) therein.” There were eighteen questions about the
number of National Technicians working in the Union’s
“jurisdiction,” how long they had worked there, the nature of
their work, and the job descriptions of certain Union positions.
Bemis called Bland upon receiving the email. The two
men had worked together for a number of years, and he was
curious whether there were outstanding grievances. During the
call, Bemis mentioned there were two National Technicians
working in Montana. Lacking details, Bemis forwarded the
information request to Arnell Anderson, the national team’s
manager for processing. A stream of emails followed. On
August 25, 2021, having heard nothing, Bland notified Bemis
and Anderson that the Union was filing an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board for “failure to provide or communicate
[CenturyTel’s] intent regarding this information request.”
Anderson promptly responded the team was working on the
request and would respond as soon as “appropriate
information” was available.
On September 1, 2021, Lumen Senior Human Resources
Advisor Keller Noble responded. Noble stated she was
working on the requested job descriptions and would provide
them once they were available. In an attached letter, Noble
confirmed two National Technicians were working in
Montana, provided an overview of their responsibilities, and
stated National Technicians were not performing unit
bargaining work. Ltr. from Keller Noble to George Bland
(Sept. 1, 2021). With respect to the questions about the number
and length of time National Technicians were or had worked in
the northwest Montana area, Noble asked “[w]hy is this
information relevant to administering your Collective
Bargaining Agreement when these Lumen employees are not

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represented by [the Union] and are not performing bargaining
unit work?” Id.
Bland replied on September 13. He appreciated “the
Company’s assertion” that the National Technicians were “not
performing bargaining unit work,” but pointed out “the Union
has the right to make an independent determination” of whether
the technicians were performing such work or had done so in
the past and for how long. He inquired whether Noble had the
requested job descriptions. Noble provided one job description
that day and three more nine days later. When Bland then
inquired the following day about answers to the remaining
unanswered questions, Noble responded that the requested
information about the National Technicians was “outside the
scope of [the Union’s] jurisdiction as outlined in the collective
bargaining agreement” because they were not part of the
bargaining unit. Bland replied the Union’s request would be
within the scope of its jurisdiction if “non-bargaining unit
members are performing the work of employees who are
covered by the CBA.” Bland renewed again the request for
information, with a response by September 29.
On October 1, 2021, the Union filed an unfair labor
practice (“ULP”) charge with the Board. Thereafter the Board
General Counsel filed a complaint on April 27, 2022, alleging
that CenturyTel violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
failing and refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
unit, due to its failure to respond to the Union’s request for
information, which was “necessary for, and relevant to, the
Union’s performance of its duties.” Compl. ¶ 6(b). Following
an evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
found that the General Counsel had met the burden to prove the
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. CenturyTel of

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Mont., Inc., Case No. 19-CA-283839, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 6,
2022) (“ALJ Dec.”).
Bland, Bemis, and Noble testified at the ULP hearing. As
relevant, Bland testified that Bemis had admitted during his
August 2021 call there were “a couple” of National
Technicians that were either working or had worked in the
Union’s “jurisdiction” or in its “area.” Hearing Tr. 51-52, 130
(June 14, 2022). Bemis testified that he called Bland upon
receiving the August 10 email to find out whether there were
any forthcoming grievances of which he was unaware, and that
he did not “believe” he referred to the Union’s “jurisdiction” in
responding there were two National Technicians working in
Montana. Hearing Tr. at 141-42. “On balance,” the ALJ
credited Bland’s version of the call “as far more likely, given
the stated subject matter of the email that inspired [Bemis] to
initiate the call . . . .” ALJ Dec. at 5. (The ALJ noted the terms
“area” and “jurisdiction” were used “interchangeably” by the
parties. Id. at 5 n.8.) It was “undisputed that the parties had a
history of disagreement over what constituted work within [the
Union’s] jurisdiction or ‘area,’” id. at 12; the Union had filed
and settled two grievances in 2018 alleging that CenturyLink
(a predecessor company) violated the CBA by using non-union
personnel in 2017 and 2018 to perform bargaining unit work in
the Union’s Market Area. And Bemis, the ALJ observed, “did
not deny that unit work was being performed by the National
[Technicians] but instead obfuscated, admitting they had
‘been’ in the Union’s jurisdiction ‘a few times.’” Id. The ALJ
therefore concluded the relevance of the requested information
should have been apparent to CenturyTel. Id. (citing Murray
Am. Energy, 366 NLRB No. 80, slip op. at 29).
The ALJ rejected as meritless CenturyTel’s objections that
(1) it was not obligated to respond to the information request
because the Union failed to establish “an objective factual basis

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for its belief that the [National Technicians] were, in fact,
performing unit work,” and (2) alternatively, CenturyTel had
provided “every piece of information outlined” in the General
Counsel’s complaint. Id. (citation, emphasis, and internal
quotation marks omitted). The ALJ also overruled
CenturyTel’s objections to admission of the
Telecommunications Council’s August 9 email (attaching a
model information request that Bland used as a template) and
the 2018 grievances, on the ground the Union had produced
neither in response to a pre-hearing subpoena. Stating that
preservation or diversion of unit work is a subject of mandatory
bargaining under the Act, the ALJ found that the Union’s
information requests “were plainly aimed at ascertaining
whether [CenturyTel] had been violating the parties’ contract
by utilizing the National [Technicians] to perform [Union]
work.” Id. (citing New York & Presbyterian Hosp. v. NLRB,
649 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Further, “[e]ven
assuming that the relevance of the Union’s request was not
apparent to [CenturyTel] upon its receipt” of the information
request on August 10, “the Union was hardly acting on a ‘mere
suspicion’ when it continued to pursue the requested
information,” “especially considering Bemis’ admission that
the National Techs had been present in [the Union’s] ‘area’”
during his subsequent phone call with Bland. Id. at 13-14. The
ALJ therefore ruled that CenturyTel violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) by failing to supply relevant requested information to
the Union and ordered CenturyTel to cease and desist, provide
the remaining information as alleged in the complaint, and post
a notice describing the violation. CenturyTel filed exceptions,
and the General Counsel filed an answering brief to which
CenturyTel responded.
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, factual findings,
and conclusions of law, as clarified, and adopted the Order, as
modified. CenturyTel of Montana, Inc., 373 NLRB No. 128,

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at 1 & n.2 (Oct. 10, 2024). The Board agreed the Union had
established that the requested information about National
Technicians was relevant to its duties at the time of the request.
First, the Union established and demonstrated to CenturyTel
the relevance of the requested information about the National
Technicians on August 10, upon making its information
request. Id. at 3. The Board adopted the ALJ’s “well-reasoned
credibility determinations,” finding Manager Bemis had made
a “contemporaneous admission” on August 10 that “National
Technicians had worked in the Union’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 3.
Second, the relevance of the information request should have
been “readily apparent” to CenturyTel “under the
circumstances on August 10” based on the Bland-Bemis call.
Id. at 4. Third, the Union demonstrated the relevance of the
requested information at the ULP hearing with evidence of the
August 10 Bland-Bemis call, the 2018 grievances and
settlements, and Telecommunications Council reports that
National Technicians had been performing bargaining unit
work in two other states. Acknowledging CenturyTel had
learned of some of this evidence for the first time at the ULP
hearing, the Board pointed to its “longstanding” precedent that
“a union is not obligated to disclose the factual basis for its
information request at the time of the request.” Id. at 3 (citing
Cannelton Indus., Inc., 339 NLRB 996, 997 (2003); Brazos
Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 241 NLRB 1016, 1018-1019 (1979),
enf’d. in relevant part 615 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980)). “Rather,
it is sufficient that the General Counsel demonstrate at the
hearing that the union had, at the relevant time, a reasonable
belief.” Id. (quoting Cannelton Indus., Inc., 339 NLRB at 997).
The Board noted CenturyTel did not request the Board to
overrule its longstanding precedent allowing the General
Counsel to demonstrate relevance at the ULP hearing, and that
even if it had, the result would be the same. Id. at 4-5.

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One Member dissented. He concluded the Union failed to
establish relevance because it had not provided CenturyTel,
prior to the ULP hearing, with “objective evidence underlying
its belief that the information was relevant.” Id. at 6 (Member
Kaplan, dissenting). He urged the Board to adopt the standard
in Hertz Corp. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d 868, 874 (3d Cir. 1997), to
require a union to provide factual evidence of relevance when
making a request for information. Id. at 6, 8.
II.
CenturyTel petitions for review, and the Board cross-
applies for enforcement of its Order.
A.
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (“the
Act”) provides that it is an “unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
Violation of subsection (a)(5) “results in a derivative violation
of section 8(a)(1),” which provides that employers who
“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the[ir] rights guaranteed by the [Act] have committed an unfair
labor practice.” Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 976 F.3d
276, 284 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Although the text of the Act does not expressly require
employers to provide relevant information upon request, the
Board construed the Act to include this requirement shortly
after the Act was enacted. In Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1
NLRB 837, 842 (1936), employees sought a revised wage and
hourly scale and the employer responded with a reduced wage
scale and increased hours. When collective bargaining

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commenced after some employees had formed a union, the
employer claimed that it could not offer higher wages or
reduced hours because of its poor financial condition, but it
offered no evidence or alternative proposal and declined the
union’s request to produce its books or have them audited. Id.
at 842-43. The Board found that the employer was on notice
of the requested pay and hourly scale and therefore was
obligated under the Act to meet with the union, and did not do
so until considerable time had passed. Id. Further, the
employer’s “attitude was peremptory and non-conciliatory
even though the employees had been on strike for several
months.” Id. at 843. Given the employer’s “assertion that the
[company’s] financial condition was poor,” and a refusal
“either to prove [the] statement, or to permit independent
verification,” the Board concluded the employer’s refusal to
bargain with the employees’ representative interfered with,
restrained, and coerced the employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, id., which include
the right to organize, form or join a union, and bargain through
their representatives with the employer, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153
(1956), the Supreme Court addressed similar circumstances.
As in Pioneer Pearl Button Co., the employer refused to
provide information about the financial ability to pay increased
wages, arguing that the requested information was irrelevant to
the bargaining process and related to matters exclusively within
the province of management. Id. at 151. The Court affirmed
the Board’s reasoning that good-faith bargaining necessitates
both sides having access to information bearing on the
bargaining process. Id. at 152-53 (citing Pioneer Pearl Button
Co., 1 NLRB at 842-43).
The Board and the Supreme Court have adhered to this
interpretation of the Act. See, e.g., NLRB. v. Acme Indus. Co.,

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385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967) (citing Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149) (enforcing Acme Indus. Co., 150 NLRB 1463 (1965)).
The requirement to provide requested information, therefore,
“derive[s] from the statutory duty to bargain.” Public Serv. Co.
of New Mexico v. NLRB, 843 F.3d 999, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(enforcing Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 360 NLRB 573
(2014)).
B.
CenturyTel challenges each of the grounds on which the
Board found that the General Counsel had established the
relevance of the requested information. It contends broadly
that “the Board disregarded substantial evidence and departed
from established precedent” by removing “any requirement
that relevance must be based on a reasonable belief or
supported by objective evidence.” Pet’r’s Br. at 20. It contends
specifically that the Board lacked substantial evidence to find
(1) the August 10 Bland-Bemis phone call demonstrated the
relevance of the Union’s information request, (2) the
circumstances on August 10 made the relevance of the
information apparent, and (3) in any event, the evidence at the
ULP hearing established relevance. Id. 20, 26, 31-41. The
court will overturn the Board’s decision “only if the Board’s
factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or
the Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying
established law to the facts of the case.” Windsor Redding
Care Ctr., LLC v. NLRB, 944 F.3d 294, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A Board
finding is supported by substantial evidence so long as ‘a
reasonable mind might accept a particular evidentiary record as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” CP Anchorage Hotel 2,
LLC v. NLRB, 98 F.4th 314, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999)).

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The Union bears the burden of establishing that it sought
relevant information because it was seeking information about
non-union employees. New York & Presbyterian Hospital v.
NLRB, 649 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Presbyterian
Hospital is a hallmark decision in this circuit. “A union’s bare
assertion that it needs information” would be insufficient;
instead “the union must explain to the employer why the
information is relevant.” Id. (quoting Detroit Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314 (1979)). “[T]he threshold for
relevance is low,” however, and “the union need not
demonstrate the existence of some particular controversy or the
need to dispose of some recognized problem.” Teachers
College, Columbia Univ., 902 F.3d at 302 (quoting
Presbyterian Hosp., 649 F.3d at 730). Instead, relevance is
assessed under “a discovery-type standard,” where the “fact
that the information is of probable or potential relevance” to
the Union’s responsibilities “is sufficient to give rise to an
obligation” to provide it. Presbyterian Hosp., 649 F.3d at 730
(quoting Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. at 437; then quoting Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Loc. Union No. 6-418, AFL-CIO v.
NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Relevance is
“examined as of the time of the demand and refusal.” Id. at
731 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 916 F.2d 1163, 1169 (7th
Cir. 1990)).
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that
the Union had “a reasonable belief, supported by objective
evidence,” that the information sought from CenturyTel was
“relevant to the performance of its duties as the bargaining
representative.” DirectSat USA LLC v. NLRB, 925 F.3d 1272,
1278 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB
1256, 1258 (2007)). Although the Board relied on new
evidence of the Union’s reasonable belief at the ULP hearing,
Board precedent permits that practice, and CenturyTel forfeited
any challenge to that precedent.

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The Board agreed with the ALJ that the Union had
demonstrated to CenturyTel the relevance of the information
request about National Technicians when it made the request
on August 10. CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 3. Reviewing the
testimony before the ALJ — when Manager Bemis had
responded on August 10 to Bland’s question whether any
National Technicians had been working in the Union’s
jurisdiction, “a few times but not very many” — the Board
concluded Bemis’s “contemporaneous admission” established
the relevance of the requested information and was
unpersuaded by CenturyTel’s and the dissenting Member’s
attempts to minimize the significance of the August 10 call. Id.
In the Board’s words: “Of course, Manager Bemis was aware
of his own admission and that the Union sought the information
to protect unit work from diversion,” and there was “no reason
to disturb the judge’s well-reasoned credibility
determinations.” Id. Further, “the Union can hardly be faulted
for its assiduousness in pursuing the request for information
regarding exactly what work the National Technicians
performed when Bemis admitted that they had been working in
the Union’s area.” Id. at 3-4.
CenturyTel acknowledges that “[a] hint of relevance
possibly may have attached if the parties had in fact been using
the terms ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘area’ interchangeably.” Pet’r’s Br.
39. That is what the ALJ found, ALJ Dec. at 5 n.8, and what
the Board confirmed, CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 3. Regardless,
“[w]hen confronted with competing versions of evidence, [the
court will] defer to the Board’s credibility determinations
absent the starkest error.” Constellium Rolled Prods.
Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB, 45 F.4th 234, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2022)
(citation omitted). CenturyTel points to no such error.
The Board’s findings and reasoning refute CenturyTel’s
other challenges to the Decision as well. On the ground that

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the relevance of the Union’s information request was not
apparent to Manager Bemis on August 10, Petitioner’s Br. 31,
the Board explained why “the relevance of the requested
information should have been readily apparent to
[CenturyTel]” on August 10: Manager Bemis called Bland
upon receiving the August 10 email, and having been put “on
notice that the Union was seeking information regarding a
possible diversion of unit work,” Bemis told Bland that
National Technicians had worked in the Union’s “jurisdiction.”
CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 4. On the ground that substantial
evidence to support the Board’s findings was not presented at
the ULP hearing, the evidence before the Board included
Bland’s August 10 email to Bemis attaching the information
request; Bemis’ phone call to Bland on August 10 regarding
the Union’s information request; the prior
Telecommunications Council emails advising Bland that
National Technicians were performing local bargaining unit
work in Texas and Missouri, and that he should inquire about
whether this was occurring in his Union’s “jurisdiction”; and
the 2018 grievances filed and settled with a predecessor
company alleging unlawful diversion of Union bargaining unit
work to non-union personnel in northwest Montana.
CenturyTel nonetheless contends that the General Counsel
“cannot establish relevance for the first time at the unfair labor
practice hearing.” Pet’r’s Br. at 22. In petitioning for review,
CenturyTel does not contest its statutory obligation to provide
information necessary for the Union to carry out its
representational responsibilities. Nor does it adopt the
dissenting Member’s position that the Board should abandon
its precedent allowing the General Counsel to show relevance
of requested information at the ULP hearing and require the
Union, as in the Third Circuit in Hertz Corp., 105 F.3d at 874,
“to apprise [CenturyTel] of facts tending to support its request
for non-unit information.” CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 6

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(Member Kaplan, dissenting) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 2 n.1. Instead,
CenturyTel contends evidentiary and procedural failures
require reversal of the Board’s decision. It would have the
court overlook the sources of evidence underlying the Board’s
conclusion that the Union’s information request was based on
“a reasonable belief” that CenturyTel may have been diverting
work. CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 4 (quoting Bentley-Jost Elec.
Corp., 283 NLRB 564, 568 (1987)).
In CenturyTel’s view, the Board could not rely on the 2018
grievances, the Telecommunications Council’s information
request template, and correspondence between Bland and
Noble because this evidence was not produced in response to
the pre-hearing subpoena. This contention doubly fails.
CenturyTel did not include this objection in the exceptions to
the Decision, much less show an abuse of discretion by the ALJ
in admitting this evidence, Cadillac of Naperville, Inc. v.
NLRB, 14 F.4th 703, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2021), or that the ALJ was
required to disregard as irrelevant any material not produced as
called for in the subpoena, see, e.g., Hearing Tr. at 44-51, 53-
55, 90. Moreover, the court has no occasion to address
CenturyTel’s claim that its due process rights were violated
when the Board relied on evidence introduced for the first time
at the ULP hearing. Pet’r’s Br. 24-25. CenturyTel did not raise
this in exceptions to the Decision, nor in a petition for Board
rehearing, and offers no explanation for the failure to do so.
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); HealthBridge Mgmt, LLC v. NLRB,
798 F.3d 1059, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
So too CenturyTel may have forfeited its argument that the
Union acted in bad faith when, in responding to the pre-hearing
subpoena, it failed to disclose that it had not drafted the
information request. Pet’r’s Br. at 32-34. Bland acknowledged
on cross examination that he had mistakenly failed to produce

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the Telecommunications Council’s August 9 email in response
to the subpoena. Hearing Tr. 55. Neither the ALJ nor the
Board found bad faith. CenturyTel did not expressly reference
noncompliance with the subpoena in its exceptions. Even now,
CenturyTel fails to explain how the Union acted in bad faith
absent a requirement to disclose such evidence prior to the
hearing.
CenturyTel also challenges the Board’s reliance on the
2018 grievances, which it characterizes as “distant, sparse, and
irrelevant,” having occurred several years ago involving its
predecessor. Pet’r’s Br. 34-35. Yet the Board reasonably
focused on them because they involved the same type of
“allegations of unilateral subcontracting of work and the use of
non-unit employees to perform bargaining unit work in
Northwest Montana.” CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 4.
CenturyTel’s challenges therefore fail in view of the
substantial evidence of relevance, considered in light of the
surrounding circumstances, which permitted the Board to find
that Bland’s August 10 email to Manager Bemis as well as
Bemis’s response put CenturyTel on notice of sufficient
relevant facts that explained the objective basis for “the
information request regard[ing] whether ‘National Techs
[were] working in [the Union’s] jurisdiction.’” CenturyTel,
373 NLRB at 2 (alterations in original); see Brazos, 241 NLRB
at 1018. Unlike Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB at 1258, on
which CenturyTel relies, Pet’r’s Br. 28, both the August 10
email and phone call informed CenturyTel management “that
the Union sought the information to protect unit work from
diversion.” CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 3. Likewise misplaced
is CenturyTel’s reliance on the concurring opinion in Teachers
College, 902 F.3d at 308 (Silberman, J., concurring), given the
evidence in support of the Board’s finding that the purpose of
the Union’s information request was apparent on August 10 to

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Bemis, who was Lumen’s regional manager. CenturyTel, 373
NLRB at 4. Because the Board properly concluded that the
evidence and context supported a reasonable belief regarding
diversion of Union work, id., CenturyTel’s reliance on San
Diego Newspaper Guild, Local No. 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863,
869 (9th Cir. 1977), and G4S Secure Sols. (USA), Inc., 369
NLRB No. 7, at *2 (Jan. 9, 2020), is misplaced. In Newspaper
Guild, Local No. 95, the request was “apparently grounded
only upon the Union’s suspicion that some contract violation is
or has been taking place,” 548 F.2d at 869, and G4S Secure was
similarly based on “suspicion alone,” 369 NLRB, at *2.
Accordingly, the court denies CenturyTel’s petition and
grants the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

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