United States of America v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/t Arina With International Maritime…

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 14, 2025 Decided April 21, 2026
No. 24-5218
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
ALL PETROLEUM-PRODUCT CARGO O NBOARD THE M/T ARINA
WITH I NTERNATIONAL M ARITIME ORGANIZATION NUMBER
9189952 AND ALL PETROLEUM-PRODUCT CARGO ONBOARD
THE M/T NOSTOS WITH INTERNATIONAL M ARITIME
ORGANIZATION NUMBER 9258014,
APPELLEES
ASPAN PETROKIMYA CO.,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-03234)
Michael J. Satin argued the cause for appellant. With him
on the briefs was Timothy P. O’Toole.
Katherine Twomey Allen, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief
were Jeanine Ferris Pirro, U.S. Attorney, and Brian P. Hudak,
Assistant U.S. Attorney.

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Before: HENDERSON, KATSAS and GARCIA, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.
GARCIA, Circuit Judge: In the fall of 2021, the United
States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers
in the Mediterranean Sea. According to the government, that
oil is subject to civil forfeiture because it belonged to the
National Iranian Oil Company, an entity that has materially
supported the Iranian military’s terrorist activities. A private
commodities trading company claimed ownership of the oil
and moved to dismiss the forfeiture action on the grounds that
the United States did not adequately plead several elements of
its forfeiture claim. The district court denied that motion.
We affirm.
I
Congress has designated certain property “subject to
forfeiture to the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1). That
category includes “[a]ll assets” of any entity “engaged in
planning or perpetrating any [] Federal crime of terrorism . . .
against the United States.” Id. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i). A “Federal
crime of terrorism,” in turn, is any of several enumerated
offenses, so long as it is “calculated to influence or affect the
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to
retaliate against government conduct.” Id. § 2332b(g)(5).
Those enumerated offenses include “knowingly provid[ing]
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization.” Id. § 2339B(a)(1). The material-support
statute provides extraterritorial jurisdiction over that offense if
it “occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.” Id.
§ 2339B(d)(1)(E).
The government’s Amended Complaint alleges the
following facts. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)

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is a state-owned enterprise responsible for producing and
exporting Iranian oil and petroleum. NIOC generates billions
of dollars of annual revenue and provides between one-third
and two-thirds of the Iranian government’s total revenue.
Among the beneficiaries of that funding are the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Qods Force (collectively,
the IRGC), branches of the Iranian military responsible for
terrorist activities worldwide, including attacks on U.S.
officials, servicemembers, and civilians. See Am. Compl.
¶ 20 (describing the IRGC’s role in bombings that have killed
and injured U.S. civilians and military personnel). The United
States designated the IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organization in
2019. NIOC cooperates and coordinates directly with the
IRGC, including by acting as its “agent or affiliate” and selling
oil on its behalf. Id. ¶¶ 25–26, 41. More generally, “Iran’s
petrochemical and petroleum sectors are primary sources of
funding for the Iranian regime’s global terrorist activities.”
Id. ¶ 13.
In October 2020, the Stark I—a ship owned by the
National Iranian Tanker Company, a subsidiary of NIOC—
loaded several hundred thousand barrels of crude oil at Kharg
Island, Iran. The Stark I then traveled west into the Persian
Gulf and, in November 2020, conducted a ship-to-ship transfer
of the oil to a tanker called the Arina. Documents generated
by NIOC indicate that the transfer involved a consignment of
oil from NIOC to another one of its subsidiaries, Naftiran
Intertrade. Nine months later, in August 2021, the Arina
engaged in a second ship-to-ship transfer, offloading a portion
of the oil onto a vessel called the Nostos.
Following the Arina-to-Nostos transfer, the United States
obtained and executed warrants to seize the oil aboard both
vessels. The United States then brought two civil-forfeiture
complaints (one for each ship) and named the seized oil as
Defendant Property. The government alleged that the

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Defendant Property belonged to an entity—NIOC’s subsidiary,
the National Iranian Tanker Company—that materially
supported terrorism by facilitating oil sales for the IRGC.
With judicial approval, the United States conducted
interlocutory sales of the Defendant Property for over $50
million.
In April 2022, Aspan Petrokimya Co.—a Turkish
commodities trading company—claimed ownership of the
Defendant Property and sought to recover the proceeds from
the interlocutory sales. Aspan moved to dismiss the
government’s forfeiture complaints, and the district court
granted the motions without prejudice. The district court
concluded that the government did not adequately plead that
“NIOC’s sale of Iranian crude oil affects foreign commerce.”
J.A. 260.
The United States filed an Amended Complaint that
consolidated the two forfeiture actions and included additional
factual allegations about NIOC’s activities, its relationship to
the IRGC, and the impact of its transactions on international oil
markets. Aspan again moved to dismiss, but this time the
district court denied the motion. The district court explained
that the Amended Complaint “remedied the defect” of the
initial complaints as to the jurisdictional element and
adequately alleged all other elements of the civil-forfeiture
statute. J.A. 61.
Seeking to expedite appellate review, Aspan filed an
answer admitting all factual allegations in the Amended
Complaint, consented to entry of judgment on the pleadings in
favor of the United States, and preserved its right to appeal.
The district court entered final judgment, and Aspan timely
appealed.

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II
This court has jurisdiction over Aspan’s appeal from the
district court’s final judgment, and we may review the
preceding denial of Aspan’s motion to dismiss “based on the
principle that [interlocutory] orders merge into the final
decision.” LeFande v. District of Columbia, 841 F.3d 485,
491 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “We review denials of motions to
dismiss de novo.” Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 333 F.3d 250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
In forfeiture actions like this one, the Federal Rules are
modified by the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime
Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions. Under Supplemental
Rule G, a forfeiture complaint must “state sufficiently detailed
facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be
able to meet its burden of proof at trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.
R. G(2)(f). Neither party suggests that the Rule G standard
materially differs from the Twombly-Iqbal standard, so we
proceed on that understanding. See Appellant’s Brief 15.
Aspan raises three independent challenges to the district
court’s denial of its motion to dismiss. It argues that the
Amended Complaint does not adequately allege (1) that NIOC
owned the Defendant Property; (2) that NIOC’s material-
support offense “affects . . . foreign commerce” under
Section 2339B(d)(1)(E); and (3) that NIOC’s offense was
“calculated to influence” government conduct per
Section 2332b(g)(5). We address—and reject—each
argument in turn.

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A
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendant
Property is subject to forfeiture because it “is the property of
NIOC or its subsidiaries”—entities engaged in “perpetrat[ing]
a federal crime of terrorism.” Am. Compl. ¶ 66. Aspan
argues that the government failed to plausibly allege that NIOC
owned the Defendant Property. “At most,” Aspan contends,
the United States has shown that NIOC and its subsidiaries
“transported Iranian oil” but “not that they owned it.”
Appellant’s Brief 42.
This dispute turns largely on a temporal question: As of
what time should ownership be assessed? Aspan asserts that
we must examine ownership “at the time of seizure.” Id. at
43. The government counters that it need only plead that
NIOC owned the property at the time of the offense giving rise
to forfeiture. See Appellee’s Brief 56–57.
The government is correct. The forfeiture statute
provides that “[a]ll right, title, and interest in property” subject
to forfeiture “shall vest in the United States upon commission
of the act giving rise to forfeiture.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(f). That
text is squarely governed by the Supreme Court’s holding that
“whenever a statute enacts that upon the commission of a
certain act specific property used in or connected with that
act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes effect immediately
upon the commission of the act.” United States v. Stowell, 133
U.S. 1, 16 (1890). Although a judicial proceeding must
“perfect[]” the government’s title, that title, “when obtained,
relates back” to “the time the offense is committed.” Id. at 17.
This “long-recognized” relation-back rule applies in cases
involving civil and criminal forfeiture provisions that are
materially identical to the one before us now. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627
(1989); see United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111,

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129 (1993) (plurality opinion); United States v. BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg), S.A., 46 F.3d 1185, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see
also 1 David B. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture
Cases ¶ 3.05[2] (2025) (“[A] judgment of forfeiture ‘relates
back’ to the date of the offense subjecting the property to
forfeiture.”). As a result, title (albeit imperfect title) vested in
the United States when the forfeiture-inducing offense
occurred. There is no need to show that NIOC owned the
property at any later time, such as the time of seizure.
Here, the Amended Complaint adequately alleges that
NIOC owned the Defendant Property at the time of the offense
giving rise to forfeiture. That offense is NIOC’s material
support for the IRGC by acting as its “agent or affiliate” in
international oil transactions. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. The
Amended Complaint alleges such support as early as 2012 and
continuing through the present day. Id. ¶¶ 24–28. The
offense was thus ongoing when the Defendant Property was
transferred from the Stark I to the Arina in November 2020.
And the Amended Complaint alleges facts permitting a
reasonable inference that, at least at that time, NIOC owned the
Defendant Property. Certificate of Origin documents
produced by NIOC identify NIOC as the consignor of the oil
in that transaction, id. ¶ 56—a designation ordinarily
associated with the “true owner,” 5 Hawkland, UCC Series §
9-319:1 (2025). Moreover, the Amended Complaint’s
allegations describing NIOC’s role as the Iranian government
entity responsible for the country’s oil transactions further
support the same inference. See Am. Compl. ¶ 22.
Aspan counters that Certificate of Origin documents
primarily “verify[] the geographical origin of goods.”
Appellant’s Brief 43. That may well be true. We do not
suggest that these documents definitively establish who had
title to the Defendant Property. But at the motion-to-dismiss
stage, documents identifying NIOC as the oil’s consignor

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combined with NIOC’s central position in the Iranian oil
industry support a reasonable inference that the Defendant
Property belonged to NIOC at the time of NIOC’s alleged
offense.
B
Aspan next argues that the Amended Complaint does not
adequately allege the jurisdictional element of the material-
support offense.
This forfeiture action is premised on the allegation that
NIOC “perpetrated a federal crime of terrorism” by
“knowingly providing material support to a designated terrorist
organization,” the IRGC. Am. Compl. ¶ 66. The material-
support statute prohibits such conduct and confers “jurisdiction
over an offense” that “occurs in or affects interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(E). The parties agree,
and so we assume, that this jurisdictional element shares its
meaning with the Foreign Commerce Clause: An activity
affects commerce for purposes of the material-support statute
if that effect would be sufficient to justify congressional
regulation. See Appellant’s Brief 21; Appellee’s Brief 29.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Aspan argues that the Foreign Commerce Clause—and, by
extension, the material-support statute—requires a “nexus to
the United States” in the form of an act in “foreign commerce”
with “a significant connection between that commerce and the
United States.” Appellant’s Brief 20–21. More specifically,
Aspan asserts that the Foreign Commerce Clause reaches only
“commerce that itself involves the United States” and should
be construed more narrowly than the Interstate Commerce
Clause. Id. at 23. In support of this theory, Aspan relies on
a close reading of the text of the Foreign Commerce Clause,

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out-of-circuit authorities, and separate writings of several
Supreme Court Justices. Id. at 21–23.
Irrespective of those arguments’ force, they are foreclosed
by our precedent. In United States v. Park, 938 F.3d 354
(D.C. Cir. 2019), we held that the Foreign Commerce Clause
incorporates the same “framework” and is “at least as
expansive” as the Interstate Commerce Clause. Id. at 371–72.
The Interstate Commerce Clause, we explained, permits
Congress to regulate even local activity that indirectly but
“substantially affect[s]” interstate commerce. Id. at 371
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).
And we held that the Foreign Commerce Clause similarly
permits Congress to regulate transactions occurring entirely
abroad so long as they substantially affect commerce with the
United States. Id. at 372; see also In re Sealed Case, 936 F.3d
582, 591 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
We have twice applied that “effects test” to find the
Foreign Commerce Clause applicable without needing to
“define . . . the precise level of ‘effect’ necessary,” because the
allegations sufficed “under any version of the test.” Sealed
Case, 936 F.3d at 591; see also Park, 938 F.3d at 372. The
same is true here.
As pleaded, NIOC’s material-support of the IRGC
consists of NIOC’s supply, transport, and sale of oil for the
IRGC’s benefit. At the outset, we agree with Aspan that the
relevant conduct is not so broad as to encompass all of NIOC’s
“general commercial activities.” Appellant’s Brief 27–28.
But it is also not so narrow as to include only transactions
involving the “seized property.” Id. at 18. The question is
whether NIOC’s conduct underlying its material-support
offense has the requisite effect, and the Amended Complaint
alleges that NIOC trafficked oil to support the IRGC for several
years leading up to the seizure of the Defendant Property.

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Those sustained dealings form the offense that is the focus of
our analysis.
The Amended Complaint admittedly does not define the
precise scope of that offense, and so leaves unclear exactly how
much of NIOC’s profits have supported the IRGC as opposed
to the rest of the Iranian government. See Am. Compl. ¶ 24
(noting NIOC’s support for the entire Iranian government).
But the Amended Complaint does allege that NIOC generates
billions of dollars of oil revenue each year. See id. ¶ 23. And
it alleges that a substantial portion of that activity—amounting
to many millions of dollars—benefits the IRGC. Id. ¶¶ 40–
41. Given that this is no “minor offense,” it is unnecessary to
define its breadth with precision to assess whether it would
have the requisite effect on foreign commerce. Sealed Case,
936 F.3d at 591.
That effect is plain based on the allegations in the
Amended Complaint: By conducting millions of dollars of
sanctioned oil transactions and related activities in support of
the IRGC, NIOC is alleged to play a significant role in a black
market that predictably impacts U.S. commerce. Per the
Amended Complaint, fluctuations in this black market
frequently influence oil prices in the United States. Thus,
even if none of the oil traded by NIOC for the IRGC’s benefit
was “ultimately headed” to the United States, and even if we
only know the quantity of that oil was “large,” the scope of the
offense suggests “a significant effect” on energy markets in
which the United States participates. Id. at 591–92. Under
our precedent, that offense constitutes an activity that
substantially affects commerce within the meaning of the
Foreign Commerce Clause.
C
Finally, Aspan challenges the district court’s conclusion
that the Amended Complaint adequately pleads that NIOC’s

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material-support offense was “calculated to influence”
government conduct.
In a forfeiture action based on a “Federal crime of
terrorism,” the forfeiture-inducing “offense” must be
“calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). Aspan argues that
the offense must be so calculated specifically with respect to
the United States government because the civil-forfeiture
statute itself reaches only offenses “against the United States.”
Id. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i). We assume without deciding that this
aspect of Aspan’s interpretation is correct. The issue, then, is
whether NIOC’s alleged material-support offense here was
“calculated” to influence the conduct of the U.S. government.
In approaching that question, we consider whether the facts
support “plausible inferences” that NIOC’s conduct was so
calculated. United States v. Mohammed, 693 F.3d 192, 201–
02 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
The calculation requirement is akin to an intent
requirement. We have twice referred to it as such. See
United States v. Khatallah, 41 F.4th 608, 648 (D.C. Cir. 2022);
Mohammed, 693 F.3d at 201–02. And that is the consensus
view among other courts of appeals that have addressed the
question in more depth. See United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d
306, 317 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104,
148–50 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399,
408–09 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mohamed, 757 F.3d
757, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Alhaggagi, 978
F.3d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ansberry, 976
F.3d 1108, 1127 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Arcila
Ramirez, 16 F.4th 844, 852–54 (11th Cir. 2021). As those
courts explain, the “ordinary and plain meaning of ‘calculated’
is planned to accomplish a purpose or intended.” Arcila
Ramirez, 16 F.4th at 852 (citing dictionary definitions); see

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Awan, 607 F.3d at 317 (similar). Thus, to fall within the scope
of Section 2332b(g)(5)(A), the defendant must have “acted
with the purpose of influencing or affecting government
conduct and planned his or her actions with this objective in
mind.” Wright, 747 F.3d at 408.
Other circuits have also provided two helpful and
persuasive clarifications in applying the calculation
requirement. First, calculation is not the same as “motive.”
The statute requires the actor to commit an offense that is
calculated to affect government conduct, even if that effect “is
not his personal motivation.” Awan, 607 F.3d at 317; see also
Wright, 747 F.3d at 408 (explaining that “influencing the
government” need not “be the defendant’s ultimate or sole
aim”). Second, the calculation requirement can be met
through reasonable inferences based on objective
“circumstantial evidence.” Arcila Ramirez, 16 F.4th at 854.
That evidence might include evidence of a defendant’s
“knowledge” that his activities could “influence government
conduct.” Id.; see also United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d
329, 340 (4th Cir. 2012). So, combining the two points, “a
person who murders a head of state, for instance, sure in the
knowledge that his crime will influence or affect the conduct
of government, satisfies the terms of § 2332b(g)(5)(A) even if
his particular motivation in committing the murder is to
impress a more established terrorist with his abilities.” Awan,
607 F.3d at 317.
With this understanding in mind, we agree with the district
court that the Amended Complaint adequately alleges facts
supporting a reasonable inference that NIOC’s material-
support offense was calculated to affect the U.S. government.
The United States has alleged that NIOC plays a major role in
funding the Iranian government in general and the IRGC in
particular. It has also alleged that NIOC and the IRGC are
closely intertwined—that NIOC is an “agent or affiliate of the

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IRGC” and that the two actively coordinate. Am. Compl.
¶ 26; see also id. ¶ 41. And the Amended Complaint details
at length how the IRGC’s activities are aimed at influencing
the U.S. government, with the IRGC using “terrorism as a tool
of statecraft” focused specifically on the United States. Id.
¶ 16. On these allegations, it is reasonable to infer that NIOC
not only knew but in fact intended that its substantial support
for the IRGC would be put toward one of the IRGC’s primary
aims: using terrorism to affect the United States government.
To support its contrary argument, Aspan draws on cases in
which we have declined to impute even knowledge to entities
accused of supporting terrorism. Those cases involve aiding-
and-abetting liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which
“requires a defendant be ‘generally aware of its role in an
overall illegal activity from which an act of international
terrorism was a foreseeable risk.’” Bernhardt v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 47 F.4th 856, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting
Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 22 F.4th 204, 220 (D.C. Cir.
2022)). In Bernhardt, the plaintiff argued that a defendant
bank had such awareness because it allegedly conducted
business with intermediary banks who in turn dealt with al-
Qaeda. Id. at 868. We rejected that argument, even though
the intermediaries included “nationalized Iranian banks” and
“Iran has historically supported” al-Qaeda. Id. We
explained that “sovereign nations invariably maintain
legitimate government activities.” Id. So, at least without
other allegations showing that the intermediary banks were
“closely intertwined with al-Qaeda” and that the defendant
bank was aware of those close “connections,” the complaint
did not adequately plead that the bank “was generally aware
that its financial dealings with intermediary banks supported
al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts.” Id. We reached a similar
conclusion on analogous facts in another Anti-Terrorism Act
case, Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael-Jewish National Fund v.

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Education for a Just Peace in the Middle East, 66 F.4th 1007
(D.C. Cir. 2023). There, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant nonprofit was aware that its donations to a
Palestinian boycott committee would support terrorist
activities by Hamas. We rejected that claim in part because
the intermediary engaged mainly in “lawful civil resistance.”
Id. at 1017. Aspan draws on those cases to argue that because
the IRGC engages in a range of activities, we cannot
automatically “infer that any support provided to [the IRGC]
must have been calculated to influence U.S. conduct.”
Appellant’s Brief 40.
The government’s allegations here, however, are
meaningfully distinct. As an initial matter, the government
has not simply claimed that NIOC supports the “sovereign
state” of Iran. Bernhardt, 47 F.4th at 865. Rather, the claim
is that NIOC specifically supports the IRGC—an entity that is
itself designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. And as
recounted above, NIOC is not alleged to be a minor and
indirect supporter of the IRGC through some independent
intermediary. Instead, NIOC is a major and direct source of
funding for the IRGC. Indeed, both entities are arms of the
Iranian government, and they are “closely intertwined.” Id. at
868. If the relevant actors had a more tenuous relationship,
we would be reluctant to “impute” knowledge, let alone
calculation. Keren Kayemeth, 66 F.4th at 1017. But in this
context, we have little trouble concluding that it is reasonable
to infer that NIOC calculated its support of the IRGC to further
the IRGC’s terrorist activities aimed at influencing the United
States, one of the IRGC’s primary targets. The Amended
Complaint therefore adequately alleges that NIOC’s material-
support offense was calculated to affect the U.S. government.

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D
The district court also ruled that forfeiture was supported
on an alternative theory: Even if the Defendant Property’s
owner was not an entity “engaged in planning or perpetrating”
a “Federal crime of terrorism,” it afforded its owner “a source
of influence over any such entity.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(G)(i). Because we find that the Amended
Complaint adequately alleges that the owner of the Defendant
Property was engaged in perpetrating a Federal crime of
terrorism, we need not reach this alternative theory.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
So ordered.

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