Farah Naz v. Chris Wright, Secretary of the U.s. Department of Energy

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 16, 2025 Decided June 9, 2026
No. 23-5237
FARAH NAZ,
APPELLANT
v.
CHRIS WRIGHT,
SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:22-cv-01730)
Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by the court, argued the
cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on
the briefs was Cody F. Marden, appointed by the court.
Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Matthew M.
Graves, U.S. Attorney, and Brian P. Hudak and Jane M. Lyons,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Fithawi Berhane, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, KATSAS, Circuit Judge,
and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by
Circuit Judge KATSAS.
SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: Farah Naz alleges that her
former employer, the Department of Energy, unlawfully
discriminated and retaliated against her in a series of actions
culminating in her firing. She brought a pro se lawsuit against
the Department. The district court dismissed her suit,
concluding that her complaint failed to state a discrimination
or retaliation claim.
While we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
retaliation claim, we vacate the dismissal of the discrimination
claims and remand for further proceedings. Under our
precedents, a court reviewing a pro se plaintiff’s lawsuit
generally must consider filings beyond just the complaint when
deciding whether to dismiss the action. The district court in
this case carefully treated with Naz’s discrimination claims,
including by considering allegations in her opposition to the
government’s motion to dismiss; but it appears that the court
did not take account of a potentially dispositive factual
allegation in the opposition. We thus vacate the dismissal and
remand the case to permit the district court to assess in the first
instance whether the allegation in Naz’s opposition supports a
different disposition of her discrimination claims, or whether
there is some basis—such as breach of a court rule enforceable
against a pro se plaintiff—for disregarding the allegation.

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I.
A.
The following facts are drawn from the plaintiff’s
complaint and from “documents either attached to or
incorporated” into it. EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial
Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because this case
comes to us from the grant of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
complaint, we assume the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations
to be true. And because she brought her complaint pro se, we
give the complaint and other relevant filings a “liberal[]”
construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citation omitted).
Farah Naz is a Muslim woman of Pakistani origin. From
January 2017 to January 2021, she worked as an economist in
the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Consumption and
Efficiency Analysis. That office “projects industrial-energy-
consumption trends and publishes its analyses in [Department]
publications.” Naz v. Granholm, 2023 WL 6389130, at *1
(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2023). Naz’s responsibilities included
writing papers. When she began her tenure, her direct
supervisor was Kelly Perl and her second-level supervisor was
James Turnure. At the outset, Naz enjoyed a “cordial and
productive relationship” with Perl. Compl. ¶ 5 (J.A. 16).
About nine months after she began working at the
Department, Naz testified in support of the Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) complaint of Christopher Dickerson, a
colleague with whom Naz had a “close relationship.” Compl.
¶ 6 (J.A. 16). Dickerson accused Perl of race discrimination,
and Naz testified about what she perceived to be “rampant race
discrimination that pervades” the Department. It is unclear

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what ultimately happened with Dickerson’s complaint, but his
employment with the Department ended in March 2018.
In April 2018, Naz experienced a “sea change” in her
working conditions and relationships. Compl. ¶ 8 (J.A. 16).
Perl went from “cordial” to “hostile, antagonistic, and
unproductive,” threatening to fire Naz and screaming at her for
what Naz considered ordinary conduct. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12 (J.A.
16–17). On one occasion, Perl told Naz that “non-native
people” like her often “have difficulty writing” and inquired
whether she had “attended school in the United States.”
Compl. ¶ 11 (J.A. 16). Naz surmises that the “sea change”
came about because Perl had learned of Naz’s testimony
against Perl in support of Dickerson’s EEO complaint.
Naz asked Turnure for a transfer to a different supervisor.
Turnure encouraged her to “explore other opportunities” and
organized a meeting between Naz, Turnure, and a number of
other individuals. Compl. ¶ 15 (J.A. 17). Before the meeting,
though, Perl told Naz’s colleagues that they should refuse to
meet with her because she would spend “[their] valuable time
complaining.” Compl. ¶ 16 (J.A. 17). It appears that the
transfer request was never granted.
In June 2018, Naz submitted a paper discussing the subject
of irrigation in California. Perl told Naz that her paper was
deficient in various ways: citations were missing, references
in the bibliography were not in proper form, and the conclusion
needed to be rewritten. Naz was surprised, as she had
submitted a paper in May 2017 in a “substantially similar style
and manner” and had received no criticisms. Compl. ¶ 27 (J.A.
18). Later that year, Naz asked Perl to nominate her for an
award, but Perl declined to do so. Perl also denied Naz various
training opportunities.

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By November 2018, Perl had concluded that Naz’s writing
deficiencies were serious enough to warrant placing her in a
performance plan. Naz reiterated her transfer request, but to no
avail. In early December, Perl placed Naz on a 90-day
performance plan. As a result of that action, Naz was unable
to telework or benefit from alternative work schedules. In
response, Naz filed an EEO complaint against Perl and accused
Perl of discriminating and retaliating against her.
In January 2019, Naz resubmitted her California irrigation
paper. Perl again gave her a “deficient and untimely”
performance review in response. Perl also continued to deny
Naz training opportunities and to direct slights at Naz,
including commenting that Naz frowned too much during a
meeting.
In March 2019, Peter Gross replaced Perl as Naz’s
supervisor. Despite the change, Naz’s difficulties persisted.
As it turned out, Gross allegedly knew about Naz’s EEO
complaint against Perl and was close with Turnure. Turnure—
relatedly, Naz alleges—decided to reinstate the performance
plan that Perl had previously imposed. The plan indicated that
Naz’s writing deficiencies continued to present a problem.
As Naz’s supervisor, Gross gave Naz inconsistent
directions and “micromanage[d]” and “bull[ied]” her. Compl.
¶¶ 65–66 (J.A. 21). He also denied her an “automatic” grade
increase owed to all employees at her level. Compl. ¶ 71 (J.A.
21). Together with Turnure, Gross denied Naz the opportunity
to telework or participate in alternative work schedules because
of her performance plan. And he allegedly prevented Naz from
completing her work by scheduling meetings on her “busy
working days,” sending her distractingly “long emails,” and
giving her “unrealistic deadlines.” Compl. ¶¶ 74–76 (J.A. 21).

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In October 2019, Naz filed another EEO complaint, this time
against Gross for retaliating and discriminating against her.
As for the issues that had been raised about Naz’s
performance, Gross “constantly criticized” her work as
“deficient and inaccurate,” even though she thought it was
“completed adequately.” Compl. ¶¶ 58, 62 (J.A. 20). She also
received a “Fails to Meet Expectations” rating for two of the
four elements of her 2019 performance evaluation, eventually
leading to Gross’s placing her in a performance plan the
following year. Compl. ¶¶ 69, 73 (J.A. 21).
In August 2020, after determining that Naz’s performance
would not improve, Gross issued her a notice of removal. Naz
was given a chance to submit oral and written responses to the
notice and appear before her supervisor, though her meeting
with Gross resulted in her being humiliated and belittled. In
January 2021, the Department terminated Naz’s employment.
B.
In June 2022, Naz, proceeding pro se, brought this action
against the Department. Her complaint alleges unlawful
discrimination based on her race, gender, sex, religion, and
national origin, as well as unlawful retaliation, all in violation
of Title VII. She claims that the Department discriminated
against her by terminating her employment and failing to
promote her based on her protected characteristics, and that the

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Department retaliated against her because of her testimony in
support of Dickerson and her various EEO complaints.
The Department moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted the
Department’s dismissal motion.
With respect to Naz’s claims of discrimination, the district
court found “no facts in the complaint from which an inference
of discrimination could be drawn.” Naz, 2023 WL 6389130, at
*3. The court acknowledged the complaint’s allegation that
Perl had said to Naz in April 2018 that “non-native people” like
Naz often “have difficulty writing.” Id. at *4 (quotation marks
omitted). “But at the time of her termination,” the court
reasoned, “Naz had transferred away from Perl and had been
working under a different supervisor, Gross, for nearly two
years.” Id. And “the complaint does not allege that Perl was a
decisionmaker in Naz’s termination,” whereas “the apparent
decisionmakers, Gross and Turnure, had ample justification to
fire Naz based on her record of poor performance over time”
as recounted in the complaint’s allegations. Id. Relatedly, the
court concluded that Naz failed to state a claim of
discriminatory non-promotion because she did not adequately
allege a causal connection to discrimination as opposed to
performance problems. Id. Finally, with respect to Naz’s
retaliation claim, the court similarly held that Naz failed to
allege “the presence of a causal link” between her protected
EEO activities and the adverse actions she allegedly suffered.
Id. at *5.
Naz now appeals. The government moved for summary
affirmance, and Naz opposed the government’s motion in a pro
se filing. A panel of this court denied the government’s motion
and appointed an amicus curiae counsel to present arguments
in favor of Naz’s position in her appeal. Naz notified the court

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that she would rely on appointed amicus’s briefing and would
not submit additional briefing of her own.
II.
A.
We review the district court’s dismissal of Naz’s
complaint de novo. King v. Jackson, 487 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). In
assessing whether that standard is met, we must draw all
reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Maljack
Prods., Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.3d 373,
375 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Because Naz is a pro se plaintiff, we hold her to “less
stringent standards than” those applicable to “formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). So, “when weighing
whether a pro se plaintiff has stated a claim”—the question we
face here—“courts must treat technical deficiencies in the
complaint leniently and scrutinize the entire pleading to
determine if any legally cognizable claim can be found.”
Spence v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 109 F.4th 531, 538
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). And our “court has explained
the liberal standard extends to consider[ing] supplemental
material filed by a pro se litigant in order to clarify the precise
claims being urged—including facts set forth in a plaintiff’s
opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In that regard, “[w]e have previously held that
a district court errs in failing to consider a pro se litigant’s
complaint ‘in light of’ all filings, including filings responsive

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to a motion to dismiss.” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,
789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Richardson v.
United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
In view of those governing standards, we must vacate the
district court’s grant of dismissal as to Naz’s discrimination
claims. In explaining the dismissal of Naz’s claim of
discriminatory termination, the court took cognizance of the
complaint’s allegation that Naz’s initial supervisor Perl
remarked to Naz that “non-native people” like Naz “have
difficulty writing.” The court did not doubt the statement’s
discriminatory character, but explained that, by the time of
Naz’s termination, she had been working for a different
supervisor, Gross, for close to two years. The court observed
that the complaint did not allege that Perl played a
decisionmaking role in Naz’s termination, and that the evident
decisionmakers, including Gross, had ample basis to terminate
Naz based on concerns about her performance. Naz, 2023 WL
6389130, at *4. Similarly, with respect to Naz’s claim of
discriminatory non-promotion, the court reasoned that, per her
allegations, she was placed on performance plans that
disqualified her for a promotion due to legitimate,
performance-related concerns. See id. at *3–*4.
The court’s analysis understandably assumes that, if there
were an allegation that a decisionmaker such as Gross had
made seemingly discriminatory statements like the one
allegedly made by Perl—especially in some proximity to the
relevant decisions—the complaint might have stated claims of
discriminatory termination and non-promotion. In fact, there
was such an allegation. Naz alleged that, in May or June 2019,
she asked Gross—who by then had become her supervisor—
whether during the month of Ramadan, he could adjust the start
time of their weekly team meetings by 30 minutes and grant
her a flexible work schedule to accommodate her religious

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observance. Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 7, Naz v. Granholm,
No. 22-cv-1730 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2023), Dkt. No. 23. But
“instead of accommodating m[y] request,” Naz alleges, Gross
“bluntly replied to me that [the Department] is a workplace, not
a religious institution, and he does not believe in Islamic
religious extremism.” Id.
That allegation, which we must credit at this stage,
supports Naz’s claims of discrimination based on her religion.
And Gross’s alleged statement took place within a year of his
placing Naz on a performance plan and little more than a year
before he gave Naz notice of her removal. Cf. Morris v.
McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 669–70, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(reversing grant of summary judgment to employer based in
part on statement suggesting discriminatory attitude that was
made two to three years before challenged suspension).
The district court’s opinion, though, does not expressly
take account of Naz’s allegation about Gross’s statement.
Granted, Naz did not include the allegation in her complaint,
instead stating it in her opposition to the Department’s motion
to dismiss. But as noted, our precedents generally call for
considering a pro se plaintiff’s allegations in an opposition to a
dismissal motion even if they are not in the complaint. See
Spence, 109 F.4th at 537–48; Brown, 789 F.3d at 152. And
here, the district court thoughtfully gave Naz the benefit of that
treatment as a pro se plaintiff when it addressed a separate
argument advanced by Naz later in her opposition: the court
“address[ed] the argument that Naz’s placement on several
performance-related plans disqualified her from promotion to
which she otherwise would have applied,” even “though this
argument is not explicit in the complaint but is instead
contemplated by Naz’s response to the motion to dismiss.”
Naz, 2023 WL 6389130, at *4 (citing Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss
at 65). But the court did not appear to consider Naz’s allegation

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earlier in the same document about Gross’s pointed rebuff of
her request for a religious accommodation. And because that
allegation has relevance to whether Naz states a claim of
discrimination, we must vacate the district court’s dismissal in
that regard.
On remand, the district court can take that allegation into
account or could seek to explain why it may be disregarded.
That kind of assessment is more appropriately conducted by the
district court in the first instance. While our precedents
generally require consideration of a pro se plaintiff’s
allegations in an opposition to a motion to dismiss, the decision
from which we drew that expectation “do[es] not suggest that
a District Court must cull through every filing of a pro se
litigant to preserve a defective complaint.” Richardson, 193
F.3d at 549; see Brown, 789 F.3d at 152 (citing Richardson,
193 F.3d at 548, for the proposition that a pro se complaint
should be considered in the context of “all filings”). If, for
instance, accounting for a pro se plaintiff’s filing would
substantially prejudice the defendant, there may be cause for
disregarding it. See Brown, 789 F.3d at 152. And here, Naz’s
opposition is a lengthy document including many attachments.
District courts retain discretion to manage their dockets,
enforce standing orders, and apply local rules governing party
submissions in a manner consistent with the obligation to give
appropriate leeway to pro se parties. Cf. Oviedo v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Author., 948 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (“While we liberally construe pro se pleadings, pro se
litigants do not have a license to ignore the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
district court can give consideration to such matters on remand
if it opts to do so.

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B.
We recognize that the court-appointed amicus who
supported Naz did not, in its briefing before us, specifically
point to the allegation in Naz’s opposition about Gross’s
reaction to her request for a religious accommodation. Naz,
though, had pointed our court to that exact allegation: she
reiterated and relied on it in her pro se filing opposing the
Department’s motion for summary affirmance. See Opp. to
Mot. for Summ. Aff. at 7, Naz v. Wright, No. 23-5237 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 2, 2024). While amicus did not repeat that particular
reference in its briefing, it made a fulsome argument that Naz’s
allegations of discrimination, including based on her religion,
were sufficient to state a claim. We are unaware of any
precedent suggesting that a party who argues that allegations
suffice to survive a motion to dismiss must reference every
single allegation supporting that showing or else risk forfeiture
of an unmentioned allegation. See Flyers Rights Educ. Fund.,
Inc. v. FAA, 864 F.3d 738, 748 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[A] party
cannot forfeit or waive recourse to a relevant case just by
failing to cite it.”); cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
535 (1992) (“Once a federal claim is properly presented, a
party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties
are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.”).
And that notion has particular salience in a case involving a pro
se party, one who in fact drew our court’s attention to the
precise allegation in issue.
Our dissenting colleague nonetheless would disregard
Naz’s allegation that Gross, when explaining his refusal of her
request to accommodate her observance during Ramadan, said
“he does not believe in Islamic religious extremism.” Our
colleague does not suggest that, if that allegation is considered,
Naz still failed to state a claim of discrimination based on her
religion. Instead, our colleague would overlook the allegation

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because appointed amicus did not specifically reference it.
According to our colleague, “party-presentation principles”
thus require disregarding the allegation. Dissenting Op. 1. We
disagree.
It is true that appellate courts “essentially [sit] as arbiters
of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before
them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
see Dissenting Op. 3. Here, the relevant “legal question[]
presented” by Naz and appointed amicus is whether her
allegations adequately stated a discrimination claim, including
based on her religion. On that score, amicus, upon observing
that Naz “is a member of multiple protected classes” including
due to her “religion (Islam),” argued that she “faced a torrent
of criticism and discrimination”—some of which “explicitly
implicated [her] protected characteristics”—and that Gross
“continued the pattern of discrimination” after becoming her
supervisor. Amicus Opening Br. 19–21. To be sure, in the
course of that argument, amicus did not specifically point to
Gross’s alleged comment about “Islamic religious extremism”
(although Naz, as noted, did when opposing summary
affirmance). Our taking note of that allegation, though,
amounts not to “raising a new issue” unraised by a party, but to
“adducing additional support” for an already-raised issue,
“much like citing a case” uncited by the parties. Koch v. Cox,
489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007). After all, “not all legal
arguments bearing upon the issue in question will always be
identified by counsel, and we are not precluded from
supplementing the contentions of counsel through our own
deliberation and research.” Carducci, 714 F.2d at 177.
Our dissenting colleague emphasizes that the allegation
about Gross’s “Islamic religious extremism” remark appears in
Naz’s opposition to the Department’s dismissal motion, not her
complaint. Dissenting Op. 5–8. In our colleague’s view, it is

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unfair to expect the government to account for allegations
raised outside the complaint, especially because of the length
of Naz’s opposition and because the government ostensibly had
no cause to anticipate that our court might consider allegations
made in it. Those concerns have no purchase in the context of
this case.
To start, our precedents, as explained, establish that the
“liberal pleading standard” applicable to pro se litigants
generally calls for considering “facts set forth in a plaintiff’s
opposition to a motion to dismiss” when assessing whether to
grant a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Spence, 109 F.4th
at 537–38; see Brown, 789 F.3d at 152. And there is no
uncertainty about whether we ought to apply that
understanding in this appeal or about the fairness to the
government of doing so: the government itself says we should.
The government’s initial submission to our court in this
appeal was its motion for summary affirmance. At the outset
of that document, the government explained that the relevant
“facts are derived from Naz’s complaint and her opposition to
the government’s motion to dismiss and are assumed true.”
Mot. for Summ. Aff. at 2, Naz v. Wright, No. 23-5237 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 15, 2023) (emphasis added). In keeping with that
understanding, the government’s motion repeatedly
referenced—on nearly every page—Naz’s opposition and its
attachments. Id. at 2–4, 6–12, 17–18. The government thus
consistently referred to facts alleged in her “complaint and
opposition,” id. at 6, 10–11 (emphasis added), and it even
invoked “new allegations” made “in her opposition” in its own
support, id. at 8–9. At one point, after noting that Naz “alleged
that she was subjected to discriminatory termination of
employment” including “because she is . . . a Muslim,” the
government said: “while Naz’s complaint and opposition to
the motion to dismiss enumerate manifold allegations against

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individuals affiliated with the Agency, neither contain[s]
factual, nonconclusory allegations plausibly linking Naz’s
termination—or any other personnel action by the Agency—to
her protected characteristics.” Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added).
That is an affirmative invitation to identify allegations in Naz’s
opposition that fill the asserted void. The allegation in her
opposition about Gross’s “Islamic religious extremism”
remark does just that.
In these circumstances, there could be no unfairness to the
government in relying on that allegation: having urged us to
affirm the district court on the premise that the allegations in
Naz’s opposition should be considered, the government could
hardly object to our pointing to an allegation in that document
that cuts in the other direction. Indeed, because the government
has affirmatively invited reliance (and has even itself relied) on
the allegations in Naz’s opposition, disregarding a salient
allegation in that document would disserve—not promote—the
principle of party presentation. After all, the “party
presentation principle is supple, not ironclad.” United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020); see Al-Tamimi v.
Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (deviating from
general rule that argument omitted from appellant’s opening
brief is forfeited because appellant had previously raised the
argument in support of summary reversal and there was no
unfairness to appellee).
Our dissenting colleague submits that it is unfair to the
district court to rely on Naz’s allegation about Gross’s “Islamic
religious extremism” remark because the allegation appears in
an “obviously non-compliant” filing. Dissenting Op. 8–9.
District courts undoubtedly face substantial burdens when
confronted with voluminous, overlength, and scattershot
filings by pro se litigants, as the court did here. But rather than
reject Naz’s opposition, the district court, as the government

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explains, “permitted [her] to file” it and then “clarified that it
considered [the] opposition when deciding the Agency’s
motion to dismiss.” Mot. for Summ. Aff. at 18. Even if the
court need not have done so, it thoughtfully gave Naz the
benefit of that consideration as a pro se plaintiff. And because
Naz’s opposition, as the government acknowledges, is thus part
of the record properly before us, there is no basis to disregard
a seemingly material allegation set forth in it. Considering
Naz’s opposition respects the district court’s choice to accept
it, as does remanding to enable that court to decide in the first
instance how (and whether) to engage with the opposition’s
allegation about Gross’s “Islamic religious extremism” remark.
C.
Finally, while that allegation, as explained, potentially
bears on Naz’s claims of discriminatory termination and non-
promotion, it has no evident relevance to the district court’s
grounds for dismissing her retaliation claim. As to that claim,
the district court carefully explained why Naz failed to
adequately allege causation. Naz, 2023 WL 6389130, at *4–
*5. We see no basis to set aside the court’s persuasive analysis
in that regard.
* * * * *
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of the retaliation claim, but we vacate the dismissal
of the discrimination claims and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

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KATSAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part: Farah Naz worked as an economist for the Department
of Energy. After she received poor performance reviews for
over two years, the Department terminated her employment.
Naz sued pro se, alleging unlawful retaliation and
discrimination. The district court dismissed the case for failure
to state a claim. My colleagues correctly affirm the dismissal
of the retaliation claims, and they find no fault with how the
district court analyzed the discrimination claims as pleaded in
the complaint.
Nonetheless, my colleagues vacate the dismissal of the
discrimination claims, based on a contestable argument raised
neither by Naz nor by the amicus curiae whom we appointed
to support her position. Specifically, my colleagues conclude
that the district court erred in not plucking an allegation out of
Naz’s 148-page opposition to the government’s motion to
dismiss, deeming that allegation to be part of Naz’s complaint,
and then considering whether it tipped the balance against
dismissal. Rather than inject that contention into this appeal, I
would instead apply ordinary party-presentation principles,
which compel an affirmance.
I
The complaint here alleges the following: Naz is a Muslim
woman of Pakistani origin. In January 2017, she began work
as an economist for the Department of Energy. Initially, her
direct supervisor was Kelly Perl, who in turn was supervised
by James Turnure. In March 2019, Peter Gross replaced Perl
as Naz’s direct supervisor. Beginning in April 2018, these
three supervisors consistently criticized Naz’s performance.
Among other things, they found her writing unsatisfactory,
gave her low evaluations, and placed her on performance
improvement plans. The Department fired Naz in January
2021.

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Proceeding pro se, Naz filed this lawsuit under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. She alleges that agency officials
retaliated against her for (1) testifying against Perl in an
internal investigation in October 2017 and (2) filing her own
complaints against Perl in December 2018 and Gross in
October 2019. Naz further alleges that the agency unlawfully
discriminated in firing her and denying her a promotion. The
government filed a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment. In response, Naz filed a 148-page opposition,
together with over 1,000 pages of attached exhibits.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The court
explained that the retaliation claims rested entirely on the
asserted temporal proximity between Naz’s protected activity
and her extended difficulties at work. J.A. 318–19. In the
court’s view, temporal proximity was not enough to support a
plausible inference of retaliation: Naz’s testimony against Perl
occurred six months before any of her difficulties began, and
she filed her own complaints well after supervisors had already
documented substantial concerns with her written work. Id. at
317–18. As for discrimination, the district court noted that the
complaint contained only one allegation touching on a
protected characteristic—that Perl had made a disparaging
comment about the writing skills of “non-native people” in
April 2018. Id. at 315. According to the court, that comment
did not support a plausible inference that different
decisionmakers fired Naz because of her national origin or race
more than two years later. Id.
Naz appealed, again pro se. This Court appointed an
amicus to brief and argue the appeal in support of her position.
Naz declined to file a brief or to participate in the argument,
instead relying entirely on the presentation of her amicus.

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II
The district court dismissed this case on the ground that
Naz’s complaint does not support plausible inferences of
unlawful retaliation or discrimination. In this Court, the
amicus contends that the complaint does support such plausible
inferences. My colleagues rightly affirm as to the retaliation
claims. And they take no issue with the district court’s analysis
of the discrimination claims as pleaded in the complaint. Yet
they nonetheless vacate the dismissal of the discrimination
claims on a different ground not properly raised by Naz or her
amicus—that the court erred by not considering a factual
allegation made by Naz in opposing the government’s motion
to dismiss. In my view, that decision is mistaken.
At every turn, my colleagues rest on the premise that
ordinary procedural rules must be tempered for pro se litigants.
In many contexts, we do read pro se filings charitably. But
where a pro se appellant is supported by a court-appointed
amicus, we have never relaxed the basic rule that the appellant
or the amicus must distinctly identify each ground on which
reversal is sought. In such cases, we routinely decline to
consider points not raised in the briefs, e.g., Harris v. Dep’t of
Transp. FMCSA, 122 F.4th 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2024); United
States v. O’Neal, 844 F.3d 271, 277 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2016); points
first raised in a reply brief, e.g., Palmieri v. United States, 896
F.3d 579, 586–87 (D.C. Cir. 2018); or points developed in only
skeletal fashion, e.g., Rudometkin v. United States, 140 F.4th
480, 491–92 (D.C. Cir. 2025); Abdelfattah v. DHS, 787 F.3d
524, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2015). For good reason: As then-Judge
Scalia explained, “appellate courts do not sit as self-directed
boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters
of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before
them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Moreover, abandoning ordinary preservation rules in cases like

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this puts the appellee at quite an unfair disadvantage; it must
respond to an amicus brief prepared by a skilled legal adversary
and, on top of that, it must scour the record to identify and
proactively address any unbriefed issues that a panel might
raise on its own as a basis for reversal or vacatur.
My colleagues respond that the amicus did raise the
relevant points with enough specificity, in contending that
Naz’s “allegations of discrimination” were “sufficient to state
a claim.” Ante at 12. My colleagues invoke an asserted rule
that a district court “generally” must consider allegations made
by a pro se plaintiff in opposing a motion to dismiss. Id. at 11.
Given that asserted rule, my colleagues claim to be just
measuring pleading sufficiency against all of the relevant
allegations. Id. at 12. And, they say, a court may consider
“unmentioned allegation[s]” in support of a raised claim—or
indeed “‘any argument in support of that claim.’” Id. (quoting
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992)).
For several reasons, I cannot agree. To begin with,
regardless of whether items are labeled as claims, arguments,
or allegations, this Court routinely applies forfeiture principles
to bar consideration of points that are sufficiently distinct from
ones that an appellant has properly teed up. See, e.g., United
States v. All Assets Held at Credit Suisse (Guernsey) Ltd., 45
F.4th 426, 433–34 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“argument” forfeited
because not raised below); POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777
F.3d 478, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“argument” forfeited due to its
skeletal presentation). Likewise, we have confirmed that Yee
does not restrict forfeiture to points that are labeled as claims
rather than as arguments. See United States v. Little, 123 F.4th
1360, 1369–70 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Here, the allegation that my
colleagues invoke as the basis for vacatur (whether labeled as
a claim or argument) seems to me quite distinct from those
pressed by Naz or her amicus. As the district court explained,

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the complaint seeks to rest discrimination claims on a single
disparaging comment about “non-native people” allegedly
made by Perl in April 2018. J.A. 315 (district-court opinion);
see id. at 16 (complaint). In his brief, the amicus likewise
highlights that sole comment in arguing that the complaint
states a discrimination claim. Brief of Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 20, Naz v. Wright,
No. 23-5237 (July 29, 2024). In contrast, my colleagues seek
to construct a discrimination claim from a different comment
about “Islamic religious extremism” allegedly made by Gross
no sooner than May 2019. Ante at 10; see ECF Doc. 23, at 7
(Feb. 2, 2023) (opposition to motion to dismiss). That
statement, made at a different time by a different
decisionmaker, suggests a different kind of discrimination—
disparate treatment because of religion as opposed to national
origin or race. And in Title VII cases, pressing a claim about
one kind of discrimination does not suffice to preserve claims
about a different kind. See, e.g., Haynes v. D.C. Water & Sewer
Auth., 924 F.3d 519, 527–28 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Moreover, the allegation invoked by my colleagues
appears only in the opposition to the dismissal motion, and the
distinction between factual allegations made in a pleading and
those made in other filings is important. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 requires the plaintiff’s “pleading”—i.e., the
complaint itself—to contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also id. Rule 7(a)(1) (“complaint” is the
“[o]nly” pleading “allowed” for the plaintiff absent court
order). Likewise, Rule 12(b) makes clear that defenses attach
to “claim[s] for relief in any pleading” (emphasis added). And
Rule 15 sets forth the requirements for filing amended or
supplemental pleadings. There is no general principle that pro
se plaintiffs may flout these rules by making new factual
allegations in their district-court briefs. To the contrary,

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“[w]hile we liberally construe pro se pleadings, pro se litigants
do not have a ‘license’ to ‘ignore the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.’” Oviedo v. WMATA, 948 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (quoting Moore v. USAID, 994 F.3d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir.
1993)); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993) (Supreme Court has “never suggested that procedural
rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to
excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”).
My colleagues counter with Richardson v. United States,
193 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and Brown v. Whole Foods
Market Group, Inc., 789 F.3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 2015), where we
reversed district courts for dismissing pro se complaints
without considering allegations made while opposing a
dismissal motion. Ante at 8–9. Neither case establishes that
such allegations are generally like those made in the complaint
itself, much less that we should raise that contention ourselves.
In Richardson, we reversed only because (1) the plaintiff
“could have amended his claim as of right” when he opposed
the motion to dismiss, (2) the district court “clearly understood
that [the plaintiff] both recognized the need for and attempted
to make a change to his original complaint,” and (3) allowing
the attempted amendment would not prejudice the government.
193 F.3d at 548–49. Under those circumstances, we concluded
that the district court should have treated the new allegations as
“an amendment to [the] complaint” under Rule 15. Id. at 549.
Our holding was narrow; we stressed that it rested on “[t]hese
factors, taken together,” and we disclaimed any suggestion
“that a District Court must cull through every filing of a pro se
litigant to preserve a defective complaint.” Id. In turn, Brown
merely applied Richardson. See 789 F.3d at 152. Moreover,
the amicus in Brown affirmatively urged this Court to consider
new factual allegations raised in the eleven-page brief opposing
dismissal. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae on Behalf
of Appellant at 6–9, Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., No.

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13-7156 (July 8, 2014). And the defendant, specifically citing
those allegations, argued only that they failed to state a claim.
Brief of Defendant-Appellee Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.
at 10–12 (Aug. 20, 2014). So both parties invited us to consider
the new allegations.
In this case, the district court was not required to consider
new factual allegations made by Naz in opposing the dismissal
motion. None of the considerations flagged in Richardson is
present here. First, by obtaining a 45-day extension of time to
file her opposition, Naz lost her opportunity to amend the
complaint as a matter of right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B);
Sevier v. Lowenthal, 302 F. Supp. 3d 312, 324 (D.D.C. 2018).
Second, neither the opposition itself, nor anything else filed by
Naz, alerted the court to “the need for” any specific “change to
[her] original complaint.” Richardson, 193 F.3d at 549. Third,
forcing the government to engage new allegations in the
opposition—a disjointed, rambling 148-page document,
stacked on top of some 1,063 pages of exhibits—would be
highly prejudicial. That filing violates many basic procedural
rules. Treated as an opposition, it exceeds the 45-page limit by
more than 200 percent. See D.D.C. Civ. R. 7(e). Treated as a
motion to amend, it gives no sense of what proposed material
is new, and it fails to reproduce the original and proposed
amended pleadings. See id. Rule 7(i). Treated as an amended
complaint, it contains no “short and plain statement” of any
claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and it improperly attaches
hundreds of pages of exhibits that are not “essential to
determination of the action,” D.D.C. Civ. R. 5.1(e). Despite
my colleagues’ contrary suggestion, we have never said that all
these rules must give way to an overarching “obligation to give
appropriate leeway to pro se parties.” Ante at 11. These
problems may explain why the able amicus in this case—the
same lawyer who prevailed in Brown by focusing this Court on
new allegations in the brief opposing dismissal there—did not

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ask us to consider the same document here. And because
neither Naz nor her amicus asked us to consider factual
allegations raised in the opposition, the government lost the
opportunity to explain why, in all likelihood, doing so would
be inappropriate in this case.
My colleagues find no prejudice to the government
because its motion for summary affirmance referenced Naz’s
opposition to the motion to dismiss. Ante at 14–15. But the
opening merits brief presents the appellant’s case and provides
the focus for “argumentative back and forth” as the briefing
progresses. Entergy Ark., LLC v. FERC, 134 F.4th 576, 581
(D.C. Cir. 2025). Requiring an appellee to respond not only to
the opening brief but also to its own prior submissions—
especially ones that an appellant and her supporting amicus
have chosen not to address—frustrates this adversarial process.
It also is hard to square with yet another well-established
forfeiture rule, that a party cannot incorporate into its opening
brief, by reference or impliedly, “an argument made at an
earlier stage of the litigation.” See Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916
F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
My colleagues also note that Naz mentioned the relevant
allegation in opposing the government’s motion for summary
affirmance. Ante at 12. But Naz referenced the allegation in a
single paragraph containing no record citations in a document
running over three-hundred pages. See Response in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Affirmance at 7, Naz v. Wright, No.
23-5237 (Feb. 2, 2024). And the allegation was never
mentioned where it matters—in an opening merits brief.
One final consideration involves fairness to the district
court. My colleagues take no issue with how that court
evaluated the complaint that was properly before it. Yet they
fault the court for not plucking out of an obviously non-

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compliant, 148-page opposition one factual allegation that
takes up about one page of that document. Ante at 9–11; see
ECF Doc. 23, supra, at 7. This case seems to me clearly one
where the district court should not be required to “cull through
every filing of a pro se litigant to preserve a defective
complaint.” Richardson, 193 F.3d at 549. Or to quote Judge
Easterbrook, it is not one where we should make the district
court behave “like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in” bloated
and procedurally improper filings. Albrechtsen v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir.
2002) (cleaned up). My colleagues note that the district court
did charitably choose to consider one allegation made by Naz
only in opposing the dismissal motion. Ante at 10–11, 15–16;
see J.A. 316. But it hardly “respects the district court’s choice,”
ante at 16, to conclude that, because that court chose to
consider one allegation made in the opposition, it therefore
needed to slog through more than a thousand additional pages.
In fairness, I should note that my colleagues do not
foreclose the district court on remand from rejecting the
opposition as procedurally improper many times over. Ante at
11 (“the district court can give consideration to such matters on
remand if it opts to do so”). Nonetheless, I would not have
ordered the court to consider that question, in a case where
neither Naz nor her amicus asked us to rule on that basis.
* * * *
The amicus here sought reversal on the ground that the
complaint stated claims on which relief could be granted. I
would apply ordinary party-presentation principles, reject that
contention, and affirm across the board. I would thus not
remand based on the dubious and unpreserved contention that
the district court was required to consider a distinct allegation
buried in a procedurally improper opposition brief.

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